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Introduction

The first amendment has long protected a complex and interwoven
range of individual interests. Protected freedoms often involve expressive
activities-religion, 1 speech, 2 the press,J assembly, 4 and association. 5
The first amendment also protects an individual's freedom to refrain
from expressive activity.
Two distinct kinds of liberty interest support the right to refrain
from expressive activity. First, individuals have an interest in not being
forced to reveal information about personal beliefs or associations. Such
a claim may arise in a variety of contexts: a reporter may not wish to
reveal the identity of news sources for fear of discouraging future revela
tions;6 a public school teacher may not wish to reveal all organizations to
which that teacher has belonged for fear of community hostility or loss of
employment; 7 or a litigant may seek to prevent disclosure of trade secrets
or other private information8 through the discovery process. As a group,
these cases are rightfully viewed as "compelled disclosure" cases.
Second, individuals have an interest in not being forced to belong to
any organization or to make any statements when they would rather be
silent or express different views. Within this category fall the claims of
schoolchildren compelled to recite the pledge of allegiance in violation of
their own religious or political views, 9 of school teachers compelled to
sign an oath of loyalty to the Constitution as a condition of employ
ment, 10 and of nonunion employees forced to pay service fees to support
union activities with which they disagree. 11 As a group, the constitu
tional obligations asserted in these three situations can be described as
claims based on a first amendment protection for "intellectual
1. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
2. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
4. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
5. See NAACP v. Alabama ex ref. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
6. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667-71 (1972) (rejecting reporter's claim of a privi
lege not to testify before a grand jury).
7. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 482-87 (1960).
8. See Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 27, 33-34 (1984) (first amendment is
not violated by issuance of a protective order prohibiting publication of membership information
acquired through discovery process when publication would result in reprisals and harassment of
members and contributors).
9. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-29 & n.2 (1943).
10. See Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339, aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
For further discussion of Knight, see infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
11. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For further discussion of Abood,
see infra Part V.
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individualism." 12
This Article focuses on the second group of "protected silence" in
terests. It traces the history and development of such claims in the juris
prudence of the first amendment through decades of sporadic Supreme
Court attention. The Article explores how this distinct branch of first
amendment doctrine relates to core free speech concepts and whether it
is, as some have argued, a separate species appealing to a different range
of interests than traditional free speech claims, 13 or, instead, a part of
traditional fust amendment doctrine appealing to those same values. 14
The Article then discusses the development of the protection against
compelled expression in Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and early
1980s. The aim of this inquiry is to determine whether later cases, taken
together with earlier decisions, present a consistent and coherent doctri
nal picture. To the extent that the later cases suggest the Court has
taken a new turning-either consciously or inadvertently-the values
motivating this doctrinal shift in focus are identified. The Article goes
on to address cases from the 1983-1985 Supreme Court Terms to evalu
ate whether the Court has found a methodologically consistent and doc
trinally sound analysis.
Finally, the Article concludes with a suggested judicial analysis for
cases of this type. The proposed approach accommodates mainstream
first amendment doctrine in analyzing claims of interference with the
freedom from compelled expression or association.
12. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. One author characterizes these rights as negative rights. See
Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23
B.C.L. REv. 995, 996 (1982). This characterization is accurate only in the very limited sense that
the individual subjected to government compulsion may wish to remain silent, instead of voicing the
government-compelled message or disclosing information. The more typical first amendment situa
tions are those in which the government attempts to prevent an individual who desires to engage in
an affirmative act of expression from speaking or associating. In contrast, a person compelled to
express an idea wishes to engage in a negative act by refusing to speak and in this narrow sense
asserts a negative right. The negative rights characterization, however, is flawed for several reasons.
First, the distinction between negative and affirmative rights has another meaning within the juris
prndence of the first amendment. "Negative rights" are those limitations on government power that
protect individual choices to speak or not to speak. "Affirmative rights" are the governmental obli
gations to "promot[e] the system of freedom of expression." Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the
First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 796 (1981). Second, the negative rights label is inaccurate
because it is not always true that the individual desires not to speak. Instead, the individual is
rejecting the government-compelled speech in favor of either silence or of voicing some different
message. Moreover, if one chooses to remain silent, the desire not to speak may in and of itself be
identified by the individual as expressing a viewpoint or attitude. For example, refusing to salute the
flag is an act communicating a definite meaning. Thus, the term "intellectual individualism" has
been chosen as more evocative terminology.
13. Gaebler, supra note 12, at 1004-06.
14. "Belief is not, strictly speaking, expression; yet it is so closely related that the safeguarding
of the right to hold beliefs is essential in maintaining a system of freedom of expression . . . . The
attempt to coerce belief is ... one of the most destructive forms of restricting expression." Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 919 (1963).
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II.

Judicial Recognition of the Coerced Expression Issue

A.

The Flag Salute Cases

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 15 was the first
Supreme Court decision establishing that the free speech guarantee also
secures the right to remain silent in the face of a government effort to
coerce expression. Barnette arose out of a challenge to a resolution
adopted by the West Virginia Board of Education one month after the
start of World War II. The resolution required public schools to include
a mandatory flag salute and the pledge of allegiance as part of their daily
educational programs; all teachers and pupils were required to partici
pate.16 Any pupil refusing to take part was deemed guilty of insubordi
nation and could be expelled from school as a consequence. In addition,
after the students had been expelled, the state could bring delinquency
proceedings and subject the parents to prosecution. 17 The flag salute cer
emony was therefore an instrument to coerce not only school children,
but also their parents.
A suit was brought challenging the constitutionality of the Board of
Education resolution six months after its enactment. The challengers,
three Jehovah's Witnesses who were parents of public school students,
claimed that the ceremony violated their religious principles. They ar
gued that they could not be forced to violate those principles unless the
state could show that excusing their children from participation would
result in some clear and present danger to the state or nation.
The Supreme Court held in favor of the challengers. Its plurality
opinion, however, explicitly did not rely on the principle of religious lib
erty that had been extensively briefed by the lawyer representing the Je
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Decided the same day as Barnette was the related case of Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), in which the Court overturned the convictions of Jehovah's Wit
nesses who had been found guilty of encouraging disloyalty to the federal government and to the
State of Mississippi. One defendant had been charged with distributing literature encouraging resist
ance to a state-mandated flag salute. The Court overturned this conviction commenting, "If the
state cannot constrain one to violate his conscientious religious conviction by saluting the national
emblem, then certainly it cannot punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and
exhorting them to accept those views." Id. at 589.
16. The resolution provided in relevant part:
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the West Virgiuia Board of Education does hereby
recognize and order that the commonly accepted salute to the Flag of the United States ...
now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, ... and that
all teachers ... and pupils in such schools shall be required to participate in the salute,
honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the
Flag be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.
319 U.S. at 628 n.2.
17. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 321, 341 (1979).
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hovah's Witnesses. 18 Instead, the four Justices appealed to a broader
principle. Writing for the plurality, Justice Jackson condemned, in a
much-quoted passage, government prescribed orthodoxy:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us. 19
Although Justice Jackson's opinion spoke in terms of high-sounding
principles, the principles asserted provide little assistance in understand
ing the scope of the limitation on government authority announced in
Barnette. Such understanding requires a more detailed examination of
Justice Jackson's reasoning.
The plurality opinion began by making clear the nature of the claim
presented: The Jehovah's Witnesses asked only to be exempted from the
flag salute, leaving others free to participate in the ceremony; 20 they as
serted no claim of paramonnt right over any other individual. Nor did
the Jehovah's Witnesses suggest the state could not teach patriotism. 21
They acknowledged that the state could instruct students in the values
behind the flag salute and permit voluntary participation in this patriotic
ceremony. Their argument was only that the state could not compel stu
dents to participate in the salute and pledge of allegiance.
Mter considering the scope of the Witnesses' claim, Justice Jackson
analyzed the nature of the state's requirement in light of the interfered
with liberty interest. The flag salute was identified as symbolic speech
communicating an "adherence to government as presently organized. It
18. See Brief for Appellees at 15-33, West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
19. 319 U.S. at 642.
20. Id. at 630.
21. See id. at 631. More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of state efforts to
transmit values such as patriotism in the public schools. See Board of Educ. v. Pice, 457 U.S. 853
(1982); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public schools in
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on
which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.").
Less clear to Justice Jackson, however, was whether the Board of Education resolution only
required students to go through the motions of the flag salute-without needing to become true
believers-or whether they were also required to abandon any contrary beliefs and become "unwill
ing converts" to the state-supported ideology of patriotism. 319 U.S. at 633. In characterizing the
flag salute as symbolic expression, Justice Jackson relied on Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931), involving a daily flag-raising ceremony at a summer camp where a reproduction of the Soviet
Flag was used. Appellant was charged with violating a provision of California law criminalizing
certain displays of a red flag. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction because it found uncon
stitutional the aspect of the California law that permitted punishing anyone displaying the flag as a
symbol of opposition to organized government. Id. at 369. The Court viewed such a display as
within constitutionally protected peaceful political discussion.
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requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance
of the political ideas it thus bespeaks." 22
Justice Jackson then focused on the nature of the question before the
Court. The question for Justice Jackson was not whether the Constitu
tion required an exemption from the flag salute requirement as a matter
of religious liberty. 23 Instead, his inquiry was whether the state had the
power to compel participation by children who had no choice but to at
tend school as a result of compulsory education laws. 24 Justice Jackson's
concern was with the extent of government authority and not with the
specifics of what motivated a particular child to refuse to participate in
the ceremony. 25
For Justice Jackson, defining the limits of governmental authority
involved fundamental questions about the nature of democracy, includ
ing the seeming conflict between the need for strong government and the
individual freedoms guaranteed in a democratic system. Those freedoms,
as he saw them, included not only the right to speak but also the right to
be free of government efforts to force individuals to say what they do not
believe. In exposing this conflict as more apparent than real, Justice
Jackson explored the nature of our governmental system: "There is no
22. 319 U.S. at 633.
23. Justice Jackson rejected the argument that the first amendment protection available to the
Jehovah's Witnesses depended on the religious character of their objections: "Nor does the issue as
we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are
held." 319 U.S. at 634.
24. This view presages modern concern for the plight of a captive audience. See, e.g., FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 759 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the FCC should be
permitted to prohibit broadcasts ofobscene or offensive material during hours in which unsupervised
children are listening); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that a political candidate does not have first amendment right to display adver
tising on city buses); Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953) (discussing the rights and remedies of those deemed "captive audi
tors"); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 153
(1972) (discussing the constitutional interrelationship between speech and privacy and the asserted
right to be free from unwanted communication).
25. In light of Justice Jackson's explicit refusal to limit his holding to religiously motivated
actions, lower courts have readily extended Barnette to situations in which a refusal to participate in
a flag salute ceremony was based on a political objection. See, e.g., Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636,
637-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (extending Barnette to the situation in which a high school student refused to
stand for Pledge of Allegiance because he believed "that there [isn't] liberty and justice for all in the
United States"); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 29, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (extending Barnette to
protect students who refused not only to participate in recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance but also
to stand and leave the classroom during the pledge and flag salute). Teachers wishing to refrain
from leading a daily flag salute ceremony because of political beliefs also have been afforded consti
tutional protection. See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1972)
("[B]ecause the First Amendment ranks among the most important of our constitutional rights we
must recognize that the precious right of free speech requires protection even when the speech is
personally obnoxious."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170,
172-73 (D. Conn. 1970) (holding that a teacher's refusal to lead the Pledge of Allegiance did not
disrupt school activities, interfere with or deny the rights of other teachers or students, or cause any
disciplinary problems among her students).
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mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin
of its authority. We set up government by consent of the governed, and
the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce
that consent."26 Although "[n]ational unity [is] an end which officials
may foster by persuasion and example," 27 compulsion is not a permissi
ble means for its achievement. 28
After establishing this guiding principle, Justice Jackson sought to
justify his view by demonstrating that no society benefitted by efforts to
compel unity and eliminate dissent. Justice Jackson invoked the lessons
of history: "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."29
These tactics were not only dangerous, he reasoned, they were un
necessary. There was no need to fear that securing the "freedom to be
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the
social organization." 30 Similarly, guaranteeing the right to refuse to par
ticipate posed no threat to the continued existence of our form of govern
ment: "To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory rou
tine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions
to free minds." 31
As a final point in his argument, Justice Jackson pointed out that
far from imposing disastrous costs-the kind of restriction on govern
mental authority he was announcing would have many positive benefits:
"We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities
that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccen
tricity and abnormal attitudes. " 32
26. 319 U.S. at 641.
27. Jd. at 640.
28. Although Justice Jackson's view was that compelled affirmation of a government-sponsored
idea is an impermissible means, the Barnette opinion does not make it clear whether such means are
unconstitutional in all contexts or whether the unconstitutionality arose from an inadequate relation
ship between ends and means specific to the facts of the case. On the one hand, the suggestion is
made that the individual might be compelled to participate in the ceremony if to do otherwise would
create "a clear and present danger that would justifY an effort even to mufile expression." I d. at 634.
On the other hand, elsewhere the opinion states, in absolutist language, "We set up government by
consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce
that consent." Jd. at 641. For a recent expression of the view that Justice Jackson's opinion in
Barnette is an example of the absolutist philosophy in first amendment analysis, see Gard, The Flag
Salute Cases and the First Amendment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 419, 422-24 (1982).
29. 319 U.S. at 641.
30. Jd.
31. Jd.
32. Id. at 641-42. In addition to Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court, Justice Black wrote a
concurring opinion that relied on the claim of religious freedom advanced by the resolution's chal
lengers. Justice Black's opinion, joined by Justice Douglas, warned of the religious prejudice hidden
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Although the plurality opinion makes many resounding statements,
it also leaves one important question unanswered or unclear: What is the
scope of the restriction on government authority and of its mirror image,
the individual's freedom to differ? Responding to those inquiries re
quires determining what core value is threatened by incursions on the
freedom to think as one pleases. Some writers view the Barnette ration
ale as resting on a notion of individual self-realization. 33 That Justice
in mandatory flag salute laws: "The ceremonial, when enforced against conscientious objectors,
more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, is a handy implement for disguised religious
persecution." Id. at 644. Justice Murphy, joining the opinion for the Court, also wrote separately
agreeing with Justices Black and Douglas that Barnette was principally a case about freedom of
religion: "Official compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious belief is the antithesis of
freedom of worship." Id. at 646.
Only Justice Frankfurter dissented in Barnette. Justice Frankfurter had written the majority
opinion in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), an earlier decision upholding a
similar mandatory flag salute policy. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44. Unlike a number of
other members of the Court, Justice Frankfurter had not changed his mind about the appropriate
outcome of such cases in the intervening three years. See infra note 52. His dissent in Barnette
emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and respect for democratic processes. 319 U.S. at
647-52. He also reiterated, as he had expressed in Gobitis, that religious liberty did not grant an
immunity from laws of general applicability. Id. at 653. The Jehovah's Witnesses were free to
educate their children in private schools rather than public schools and could affirmatively express
their disagreement with the flag salute ceremony. Id. at 657-58. They could not, however, refuse to
participate in the ceremony so long as the legislature viewed such mandatory participation as a
means to promote good citizenship. Id. at 654-55. For an interesting analysis of Justice Frank
furter's opinions in Barnette and Gobitis, see Danzig, Justice Frankfurter's Opinions in the Flag Sa
lute Cases: Blending Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REv. 675
(1984).
The disagreement between Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concerning the appropriate resolu
tion of the issues posed in Barnette appears to have been deep-seated. See Gard, supra note 28, at
421-35. Nevertheless, in a letter Justice Frankfurter wrote to President Roosevelt in 1943, he praised
Justice Jackson's Barnette opinion: "You may fmd some diversion from your heavy burdens-some
of which are needlessly put upon your shoulders-in Bob Jackson's opinion. It is really worth read
ing." ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 699 (M. Freed
man ann. 1967) (reprinting letter of May 3, 1943).
33. Professor Tribe takes the view that Barnette is most accurately classified as a case in which
the focus of concern is on preventing an invasion of the right of personhood. This right includes an
individual's autonomy to define the essence of one's own personality, both the inner self and the
outward manifestation of the self. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 15-1, at 899-900
(1978). As an underlying justification for the protection of freedom of speech, this concern is re
ferred to as a protection for "self-realization." Id. § 12-1, at 579.
The need to protect "individual self-realization," as the central value behind the first amend
ment, is urged by Professor Redish. See Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591,
593 (1982). Professor Redish finds this term particularly appropriate because it incorporates the
dual concerns of a person's ability to "realize[ ] his or her full potential," and an "individual's
control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions." Id. at 593. See generally
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 966 (1978) (the
free speech clause protects individual liberty); Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom ofExpression, 1 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 204, 215-22 (1972) (the first amendment promotes personal autonomy).
The concepts of autonomy and self-realization as explanations for the underlying purposes
served by the first amendment free speech guarantee have been criticized for not focusing on values
that are specially furthered by the first amendment:
Each of these theories relies on the fact that expressing one's self is an important compo
nent of individual liberty, and if we do not allow channels of self-expression then we will
suffer accordingly. Now this is of course true, but the question is whether communicating
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Jackson was concerned primarily with the individual freedom to develop
serves any particularly special function in terms of self-expression. I can also express my
self in my attire, my occupation, my sexual activity and preferences, my residence, my
hobbies and other recreations, and so on. The list is virtually endless, and that is exactly
the point. Communicating is obviously a form of self-expression, but it is by no means the
only form of self-expression, and it is by no means the form of self-expression that is most
important to everyone. Thus, the argument from self-expression leads to the conclusion
that all forms of self-expression are worthy of equivalent protection. As a result, it is
impossible to distinguish an argument from self-expression as an argument for freedom of
speech from an argument from self-expression as an argument for liberty in general.
Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1284, 1291 (1983).
Justice Jackson's summation of the holding of Barnette is reflected in the following language
from his opinion: "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control." 319 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). Although this statement has received much praise over
the years, Justice Jackson's words are not without their critics. One commentator stated, "It would
be difficult to find another statement so plausible, so seductively obvious, and yet so utterly, so
foolishly, SO deeply mistaken." J. TuSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 3 (1977). Justice Jack
son's use of the phrase "sphere of intellect and spirit" has been seized upon as synonymous with "the
individual's interest in selfhood," an interest which includes both "the individual's ability to define
the persona he presents to the world" and "the individual's freedom of conscience." Gaebler, supra
note 12, at 1004 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). Equating Justice Jackson's concept of the
"sphere of intellect and spirit" with a protection for the concept of "selfhood" or "personhood"
requires embarking on the difficult task of defining the meaning of those terms. Much aeademic
enterprise has already been devoted to translating these concepts into their core components in an
effort to make them useful in the judicial decision-making process. Much of this effort has focused
on defining the scope of the individual interest in privacy that is a part of the "liberty" protected by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments rather than on defining that part of the concept of personhood
protected by the free speech clause. See, e.g., Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976
DuKE LJ. 699, 702 (defming personhood to include elements of individuality, autonomy, and pri
vacy); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977) ("Privacy will be
defined here as an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity."); Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1411 (1974) (defming privacy as a zone of autonomy,
presumptively free of government regulation).
The overlap between a concept of personhood that stresses autonomy, privacy, and individual
ity and the freedom of the mind and spirit protected by the first amendment free speech guarantee is
obvious. That aspect of the first amendment encompassing freedom of mind or freedom of con
science has been described in these terms:
When we refer to freedom of conscience, we ordinarily mean some sort of private domain
of the mind, some area that is under the exclusive control of the individual. This domain is
off limits to the state, not only as a matter of moral right, but also as a matter of necessity.
Ifl say that I am following my conscience, I mean that I am retreating into that portion of
my personality that is an exclusive preserve against governmental interference. Similarly,
references to freedom of thought mark off an area of exclusive control by the individual, an
area that simultaneously sets the outer boundaries of permissible (and practical) state
intrusion.
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 68 (1982). Described in these terms the
act of thinking is, according to Professor Schauer and others, a self-regarding act and not an other
regarding act, and therefore this freedom falls within the category of private activities that, accord
ing to the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, should be free of state control. See J.S. MILL, ON LIB
ERTY (1859). Because Mill's analysis serves as an important element in the argument for a general
constitutional protection for private behavior under the "liberty" clause, the overlap is not surpris
ing. This analysis, however, is not sufficient to explain Barnette.
The behavior at issue in Barnette took place in a public setting. The state was not attempting
the impractical task of trying to influence the Jehovah's Witnesses thoughts, only their acts. Addi
tionally, allowing the Witnesses to refuse to participate in the patriotic ceremony would have some
identifiable impact (for example, to make others uncomfortable in the face of unusual behavior, to
direct additional resentment or prejudice against the Witnesses, or even to cause others to question
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one's own personality, however, is not the only conclusion that can be
drawn from a careful reading of the opinion. To the contrary, although
Justice Jackson's language is sometimes ambiguous, its primary focus is
not on the needs of the individual. Instead, the first amendment is
presented not as an end in itself, but as serving an instrumental purpose34
described in terms of benefits to the community. Focusing on the gov
ernmental excesses that can grow out of compelled uniformity of view
point,35 Justice Jackson suggested that core values of the first
amendment include the preservation of democratic government and
"rich cultural diversities"36 that the community may reap through its
tolerance of dissent. Although this analysis protects the individual, this
protection is provided explicitly because it is necessary to the effective
functioning of democratic government.
The values involved in Barnette did not arise in a jurisprudential
vacuum; the opinion built upon other cases that must be examined to
understand the decision's background and historical context. Three
years before Barnette, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a school board rule requiring a mandatory flag salute and pledge of alle
giance in Minersville School District v. Gobitis. 37 As in Barnette, the
their own participation in the flag salute) on the other participants. Although the nature of the
impact is uncertain, its existence is not.
34. First amendment literature reflects an unresolvable debate over whether the first amend
ment is designed to further instrumental purposes or whether it is an end in itself. The chief archi
tect of the instrumental theory is Alexander Meiklejohn, who describes the first amendment free
speech guarantee as essential to successful self-government. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO GOVERNMENT (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CON
STITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965) [hereinafter cited as A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM]; see also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I,
20 (1971) (arguing for an internally consistent free speech theory that protects only explicitly polit
ical speech); Wellington, On Freedom ofExpression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106 (1979) (addressing the
"role of expression in the political process" and "the proper limits of expression's immunity").
Others view the first amendment as an end in itself, promoting speaker-oriented values. See Redish,
supra note 33, at 593 (asserting that the constitutional guarantee of free speech serves only one true
value, individual self-realization); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral The
ory ofthe First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) ("The value of free expression, in this
view, rests on its deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination without
which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish."). Still other first amendment theorists refuse to
identify a single value served by the first amendment or to limit it to furthering either instrumental
or intrinsic values. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
3-15 (1963) (arguing that the first amendment furthers four purposes: individual self-fulfillment,
attainment of truth, participation in decision-making, and balance between stability and change);
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 285, 313 (assert
ing that "the concept of freedom of speech may not have one central core").
35. See supra text accompanying note 29.
36. 319 U.S. at 642.
37. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). On four occasions prior to Gobitis, the Supreme Court had upheld
similar flag salute requirements in per curiam decisions. See Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S.
621 (1939); Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624
(1938); Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937).
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challengers were Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed the required flag sa
lute and pledge were contrary to their religious beliefs. Justice Frank
furter, writing for an eight-to-one majority upholding the rule, reasoned
that religious convictions did not excuse citizens from obedience to gen
eral laws. Addressing the possibility of a constitutional argument based
on the free speech guarantee, Justice Frankfurter was unwilling to con
cede that protection for anything beyond a citizen's dissemination of
views could be found within the concept of freedom of expression. Even
if the Constitution protected citizens from being required to appear sup
portive of government-compelled expressions38 that protection was not
absolute. The government's interest in promoting national unity, he sug
gested, was sufficient to outweigh any interference with rights of free
speech. 39
The Gobitis opinion reviewed existing Supreme Court precedent.
From that case law, it was· clear that principles of religious freedom had
not been interpreted to include the right to be exempt from generally
applicable laws; religious beliefs did not grant an exemption from mili
tary service,40 or provide an exemption from laws banning polygamy. 41
Earlier decisions demonstrated that the Court had traditionally drawn a
line between freedom to believe and freedom to act. 42
The Court also relied on the few Supreme Court cases that had ex
amined the constitutionality of compelled behavior. Although princi
pally concerned with the obligation of military service, these cases had
reiterated the principle that no special exemption from law could be
based on a claim that compelled activities violate religious scruples. The
state was free to require attendance at a course in military science as a
condition of attending a state land-grant university, despite a student's
religious and conscientious belief that war is immoral;43 applicants for
citizenship could be compelled to swear an oath of allegiance to support
and defend the United States as the price of citizenship. 44 In light of the
38. The Court described this as being protected "from conveying what may be deemed an im
plied but rejected affirmation." 310 U.S. at 595.
39. /d.
40. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931).
41. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878) ("To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.").
42. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices.").
43. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal, 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934).
44. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 616 (1931). The Court interpreted the oath of
allegiance required before admission to citizenship to include a promise to bear arms on behalf of the
United States. This interpretation of the naturalization oath was overruled in Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
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precedent, the decision in Gobitis to uphold the mandatory ceremony was
not surprising.
The Gobitis decision, however, was not unanimous. Justice Stone's
vigorous dissenting opinion conceded that first amendment rights are not
absolute but argued that the government could interfere with these pre
cious guarantees only to further important government ends su.ch as the
need to raise an army. 45 Requiring the flag salute had to be placed at a
different point on the spectrum of government purposes; the govern
ment's interest-promoting patriotism-was less important than raising
an army, and, moreover, alternative means to achieve the asserted pur
pose were available.46
Justice Stone also wrote at length about the individual interests at
stake in Gobitis:
The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties offreedom of
the human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportu
nity to express them. They presuppose the right of the individual
to hold such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free
expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach
and persuade others by the communication of ideas. 47
Clearly, in Justice Stone's view there was an intimate connection between
freedom from compelled expression and the guarantee of freedom of
speech; the individual desire to exercise the right of expression must be
built upon dual protections-unfettered thought and an absence of com
pelled expression. If government is permitted to dampen the independ
ent spirit of the mind, it may damage irreparably the willingness of
individuals to speak out on behalf of divergent views that they hold.
Justice Stone wrote that the individual interest is at its zenith if reli
gious freedom is threatened:
The very essence of the liberty which [civil liberties] guaranty is the
freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall
think and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to
bear false witness to his religion. If these guaranties are to have
any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the
state any authority to compel belief or the expression of it where
that expression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the
45. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 602 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting)
("Government has a right to survive and powers conferred upon it are not necessarily set at naught
by the express prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.").
46. Id. at 603-04 (asserting that "there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism" than to
compel salute of the flag).
47. 310 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added). Some of the themes stressed in Justice Stone's dissenting
opinion are later echoed in Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette. For example, in Barnette, Justice
Jackson spoke of the "sphere of intellect and spirit." 319 U.S. 642. This phrase is reminiscent of
Justice Stone's Gobitis reference to the need to guarantee the "freedom of the human mind and
spirit."
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legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion. 48
In Justice Stone's view, the preeminence of religious freedom in the value
structure of the first amendment had its roots in the history of the United
States. The facts of Gobitis, involving a "small and helpless minority ...
entertaining in good faith a religious belief,"49 conjured up for Justice
Stone the image of the persecuted colonists who fled their homelands to
escape condemnation for their failure to conform to the established
religions.
Traceable to his vision of persecuted religious minorities, Justice
Stone's view of what was at issue in Gobitis nevertheless went further.
The essential difference between totalitarian systems and the democratic
form of government was defined by their differing treatment of small
minorities, whatever the source of the shared beliefs that united the
groups' members. 5° For Justice Stone, protecting the rights of such
groups was a hallmark of a free government. 5 1
Justice Stone's vision of the issues at stake in Gobitis was not then
shared by other Justices. Only three years later, however, the Court did
an "about-face" inBarnette. 52 When this new challenge came before the
Court, the invidious impact of mandatory flag salute laws was evident.
48. 310 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 606.
50. See id. at 606-07. Justice Stone emphasized the commitment to the "constitutional protec
tion of the liberty ofsmal1 minorities to the popular will." I d. at 606. Consequently, our "Constitu
tion expresses [not only) the conviction of the people that democratic processes must be preserved at
all costs," but also the necessity to preserve "freedom of mind and spirit" if a government is to
adhere to "justice and moderation without which no free government can exist." Id. at 606-07.
51. Only two years before Gobitis, Chief Justice Stone wrote about the need for "more exacting
judicial scrutiny" when legislation curtails the rights of "discrete and insular minorities." United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The history of the drafting of the
Carolene Products footnote is recounted in Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminis
cence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982); see also Ball, Judicial Protection ofPowerless Minorities, 59
IowA L. REv. 1059 (1974) (extending Justice Stone's theory of a special role for the judiciary in
protecting small minorities). For additional insight into the meaning of "minorities," as intended by
Justice Stone in 1938, see Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection ofMinorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287, 1294-1300 (1982).
52. The Court's rapid "about-face" on the constitutionality of the mandatory flag salute and
pledge was first suggested in a dissenting opinion in Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942),
vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam). In Jones, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses who had
been convicted of selling religious books without licenses challenged the constitutionality of city
ordinances requiring the purchase of a license before selling printed matter. In a five-to-four opin
ion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of their convictions against a first amendment challenge.
The dissenting Justices wrote three separate opinions. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, stated
that they had come to believe that Gobitis, in which they had voted with the majority, had been
wrongly deeided. They saw the Witnesses as an unpopular religious minority who were in the pro
cess of having their freedom to worship as they chose squelched. They observed, "Certainly our
democratic form ofgovernment, functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, has a high responsibil
ity to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox
those views may be." Id. at 624.
In addition to this announced change in viewpoint, there had been a change in the Court's
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Appellees' brief reported that many similar laws had been enacted after
the Gobitis decision, and that enforcement of these laws had resulted in
the expulsion of thousands of schoolchildren for refusal to salute the
flag. 53 In addition, widespread hostility against the Jehovah's Witnesses
had produced mob violence directed at members of the sect: beatings,
knifmgs, shootings, arson, and parading members of the religion-tied
together with ropes-through the streets. 54 The brief argued that the
central catalyst for these acts of brutality was the refusal of Jehovah's
Witnesses to salute the flag.
In light of the record, the Barnette Court could not view mandatory
flag salute laws as merely foolish, unwise, or uncertain to achieve their
desired end. Instead, the plurality described such laws as destructive of
the fabric of society:
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson
of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christian
ity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to
religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Rus
sian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitar
ian enemies. 55
In order to prevent a desire for unity from deteriorating into totalitarian
ism, our system had to give greater weight to a respect for individualism.
In the end, forced conformity was seen as exacting too high a cost by
stifling the impulse to dissent and eliminating tolerance of the innovative
or idiosyncratic.

B.

The Jehovah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court

In Barnette, Justice Jackson did not adopt the view of Justice
Stone's dissenting opinion in Gobitis-that religious speech was elevated
membership since Gobitis was decided in 1940. The history of these membership changes is re
counted in detail in H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 227-36 (1985).
With four Justices (Chief Justice Stone, the original dissenter in Gobitis, plus Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy) now expressing their disagreement with the result in Gobitis, and Justices
Jackson and Rutledge newly appointed to the Court, the stage was set for a renewed challenge to the
widespread use of mandatory flag salute laws.
53. Brief for Appellees at 62-63, 72, 319 U.S. at 624; see also State v. Lefebvre, 91 N.H. 382, 20
A.2d 185 (1941) (overturning lower court order declaring three children who were Jehovah's Wit
nesses to be delinquent based on their failure to attend school after having been suspended for refus
ing to salute the flag); In re Latrecchia, 128 N.J.L. 472, 26 A.2d 881 (1942) (reversing criminal
conviction of Francesco and Raffaela Latrecchia, both Jehovah's Witnesses, who were convicted of
being disorderly persons based on the expulsion of their children from school for failure to salute the
flag); In re Jones, 175 Misc. 451, 24 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1940) (dismissing delinquency proceedings
brought against nine-year-old Jehovah's Witness who had been expelled from school for refusal to
salute the flag).
54. Brief for Appellees at 71-77, 319 U.S. at 624 (reporting events chronicled in Rotnem &
Folsom, Recent Limitations Upon Religious Liberty, 36 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 1053 (1936)).
55. 319 U.S. at 641.
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above other kinds of speech. Despite the record in Barnette of religion~
based persecution of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the opinion explicitly went
beyond the religious freedom argument pressed by appellees and utilized
as the ground of decision by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy.
However, the choice Justice Jackson made in Barnette-appealing to
broader speech principles-was not unique to his opinion in that case.
A substantial volume of Supreme Court decisions during the Gobitis~Bar~
nette era involved the Jehovah's Witnesses. In light of the sect's religious
tenets, the frequency of their legal battles during this period is far from
surprising. 56
In the years immediately preceding Barnette, the Witnesses were
vindicated in many of their legal battles. 5 7 In each case, the Jehovah's
Witnesses argued that an ordinance or statute unconstitutionally inter~
fered with their religious freedom; in each case the Witnesses were victo~
56. The Witnesses believe themselves accountable only to the God Jehovah and to his laws.
The source of their belief is found in various biblical passages. A major reference is to Exodus:
I am JEHOVAH thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house
of bondage.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor any likeness of any thing that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth:
Thou shalt not bow down thyself unto them, nor serve them; for I JEHOVAH thy
God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children upon the third
and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me.
And showing loving kindness unto thousands of them that love me and keep my
commandments.
Exodus 20:2-6 (American Revised Edition). Jehovah is the head of a theocracy and the Witnesses,
therefore, reject most civil rule. The only exceptions are the payment of taxes and laws that do not
violate the Word of God. As Witnesses, their purpose is to inform all sinners that Jehovah's King
dom has come and it is the route to deliverance for all. For a more thorough description of the
religious beliefs and practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses, see Waite, The Debt ofConstitutional Law
to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28 MINN. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (1944). These beliefs explain both the reason
why the Witnesses distribute literature explaining the Kingdom of Jehovah and why they disobey
civil authority by not obtaining permits, paying license fees, or saluting the flag.
57. The first ease to reach the Supreme Court during this period was Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overturning conviction for distributing literature without permission of city
manager). After a victory in Lovell, the Jehovah's Witnesses successfully litigated other cases. See,
e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating a ban on door-to-door distribution of
literature without a permit and invalidating municipal ordinances prohibiting the distribution of
literature in public places); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down a state
statute prohibiting fundraising for religious causes without a prior determination by a local official
that a true religion was the object of the fundraising and overturning a breach of the peace convic
tion resulting from defendant's efforts to solicit sales for his religious literature); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943) (striking down a municipal ordinance that barred the use of the streets to
distribute handbills publicizing religious views); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (holding that
city ordinance that required a permit to sell or solicit orders for books, as applied to distribution of
religious materials, violated first amendment); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (citing
Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), to overturn on rehearing the conviction of a Jeho
vah's Witness for selling religious books in violation of an ordinance requiring the payment of license
taxes to sell printed materials), vacating per curiam 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down an ordinance that required colporteurs to pay a license tax before
distributing religious literature); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating city
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of literature).
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rious; and in each case the Court chose to ground its opinion in general
free speech and press principles, rejecting the opportunity to rule solely
on the religious liberty issue. 58
. The Court's pattern of behavior can be explained, in part, by the
controversial nature of the Jehovah's Witness religion. The Witnesses
were not only a new religion, 59 but an unpopular one as well. The ag
gressive behavior of the sect's members in spreading their message had
resnlted in fairly widespread public hostility. In all the litigation involv
ing the Witnesses, their lawyers attempted to demonstrate that their ac
tivities-such as going door-to-door, distributing leaflets, and playing
recorded messages-were engaged in as a mandatory part of their service
to Jehovah as required by their religion. 6 Courts could have attempted
to decide which of the Witnesses' activities were part of their religious

°

58. In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), because the challenged ordinance prohib
ited the distribution of all literature, not only religious literature, without the permission of the City
Manager, the ordinance was held to be an unconstitutional prior restraint on the press. Id. at 451.
In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), Clara Schneider was convicted of door-to-door dis
tribution of religious literature without a permit. The Supreme Court reviewed her conviction to
gether with three other challenges to municipal ordinances regulating the distnlmtion of printed
matter. None of the other cases involved the Jehovah's Witnesses or even the distribution of reli
gious literature; they involved absolute bans on the distnoution of leaflets in public places justified
by a municipal concern with littering. The Supreme Court held all four ordinances to be violative of
the first amendment protection for speech and press. The Court struck down the three antilittering
ordinances because the government's justification was inadequate due to the infringement of first
amendment interests. Id. at 163. In light of the important speech and press interests at stake, the
permit scheme that Clara Schneider violated vested too much discretion in police authorities to
decide which ideas could be carried into the homes of citizens. Id. at 164.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court struck down a licensiug scheme that
required a state official to determine whether the cause for which an individual sought to solicit
contributions qualified as a religious one because granting a government official the discretion to
make such a judgment was an impermissible censorship of religion. /d. at 305. Although relying on
the free exercise clause, the Court's reasoning was in line with its earlier decision in Lovell striking
down a prior restraint scheme that gave the government censor unbridled discretion. The Court in
Cantwell also overturned Jesse Cantwell's breach of the peace conviction, categorizing Cantwell's
religious speech as provocative speech but finding his behavior insufficiently threatening to amount
to a breach of the peace. The Court considered Cantwell's behavior analogous to someone airing
unpopular political ideas. Id. at 310. Finally, in Martin v. City of Strothers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943},
the Court invalidated an ordinance that banned all door-to-door distribution of literature, on the
ground that it violated the guarantees of free speech and free press. Id. at 149.
59. Viewed from the perspective of the 1940s, the Jehovah's Witness religion was relatively
recent in origin. The group had only adopted the name "Jehovah's Witnesses" in 1931, having been
previously called "Russellites." The name refers to Charles T. Russell, who founded the religion in
1868. In 1884, the followers of Charles Russell founded the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society.
Today, the Society is responsible for printing the books, pamphlets, and magazines that are distrib
uted by adherents of the religion. Charles Russell was succeeded by Joseph F. Rutherford as the
group's leader. Under Rutherford's leadership they chose to call themselves Jehovah's Witnesses.
For a description of the origin, beliefs, and practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses, see L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 533-37 (1953).
60. References to passages in the Bible and to the Biblical directives to engage in behavior of
the kind described are found in all the briefs filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Jehovah's
Witnesses. See Brief for Petitioners at 22-25, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Brief
for Appellant at 22-25, Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943}; Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Because of their lawyers' increasing familiarity with the concerns of
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practices and which were simply a secular strategy chosen by the sect's
members to proselytize for their religion, a question not easily answered.
Instead, by deciding cases before them on general freedom of speech and
press principles, the Court could refrain from deciding the scope of the
Jehovah's Witnesses' religious as opposed to lifestyle practices. 61 Simi
larly, in Barnette, by regarding as irrelevant what had motivated the de
cision to refuse to salute the flag, the Court avoided the necessity of
evaluating the bona fides of the Jehovah's Witness claim that their re
fusal to salute the flag was required by their religion and protected by the
free exercise clause of the Constitution.
In the period immediately before and after Barnette, the Court was
in the throes of a struggle over the legitimacy of claims raised by the
Jehovah's Witnesses to immunity from generally applicable laws, an im
munity based on an assertion of religious liberty for beliefs and practices,
including door-to-door evangelical activities. 62 In resolving these claims
the members of the Court were at philosophical loggerheads as to the
proper balance between freedom of religion and government regulatory
the Supreme Court, the briefs filed later in the period place less emphasis on the Bible and more
emphasis on case authority. See Danzig, supra note 32, at 683 & n.22.
61. The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in the context of the Amish religion in Wis
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In evaluating a religious objection to the application of Wis
consin's compulsory education law to Amish youths above the age of fourteen, the Court had to
decide if the objection was based on a religious belief. The Court described the task before it and the
justifications for its undertaking:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to
have the protection of the Religion clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.
Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitu
tional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty
precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which
society as a whole has important interests.
Id. at 215-16 (footnote omitted). Because the Court found the Amish claims to be based on their
religious beliefs, the State had to demonstrate a sufficiently strong justification for its infringement of
religious freedom. The Court held that Wisconsin had failed to show that its "strong interest in
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exception to the Amish." Id. at
236.
62. The controversial nature of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Court's cautious handling of
their legal battles is illustrated by examining three cases: Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Douglas v. City ofJcannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944). In the chronology of the fiag salute cases, Murdock and Douglas were decided shortly before
Barnette, and Prince was deeided a little over six months after Barnette.
In Murdock, the Jehovah's Witnesses challenged municipal ordinances that imposed a flat li
cense tax on persons wishing to solicit for the sale of merchandise or literature. 319 U.S. at 106.
Convicted of selling religious literature without paying the tax, the Witnesses challenged their con
victions as violative of the speeeh, press, and religion clauses of the first amendment. Douglas was a
companion case to Murdock, also involving a licensing scheme, but it was dismissed on jurisdictional
grouuds. 319 U.S. at 163. In Prince, the Court had before it an appeal from a conviction for violat
ing the Massachusetts child labor laws. Sarah Prince had been convicted for permitting her nine
year-old ward to offer for sale copies of two religious publications, Watchtower and Consolation, in
violation of Massachusetts law. Mrs. Prince argued that her conviction violated her right to reli
gious freedom as protected by the first amendment. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 158
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control. 63 Justice Jackson defined the scope of religious freedom nar
rowly, and he believed the Constitution's separate recognition of protec
tion for religious liberty was designed to give religious liberty no more
constitutional protection than freedom of speech, but, instead, only an
equal amount of protection. 64 Justice Jackson strongly opposed other
Justices' willingness to deprive municipalities of the authority to protect
their citizenry and preserve the peace. 65
63. The various opinions in Murdock, Douglas, and Prince are telling examples of the deep
division on the Court about the constitutional status of the Jehovah's Witnesses and their religious
practices.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Murdock, overturning the ordinances, supported the evan
gelical activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses and described their door-to-door distribution of religious
literature in positive terms:
It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combi
nation of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious
activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits.
319 U.S. at 109. In contrast, Justice Reed's dissent expressed the view that the sale of religious tracts
was not a religious practice to be protected under the religious freedom clause of the first amend
ment: "The rites which are protected by the First Amendment are in essence spiritual-prayer,
mass, sermons, sacrament-not sales of religious goods." /d. at 132. Although recognizing that the
purpose of these evangelical activities was to spread a religious message, Justice Reed could not see
this behavior as amounting to a religious rite.
An even more negative view of the Witnesses' proselytizing activities was expressed by Justice
Jackson. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 167-74. Describing at length the sometimes intrusive and irritat
ing behavior of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, Justice Jackson argued that the presence of
such behavior created a need for municipal governments to be able to protect their residents from
such abusive actions. Foreshadowing his reasoning in Barnette, Justice Jackson revealed his anger at
the notion that the religiously motivated practices of the Witnesses deserved greater immunity from
government regulation than behavior that promoted political, economic, or scientific ideas: "When
limits are reached which such communications must observe, can one go further under the cloak of
religious evangelism? Does what is obscene, or commercial, or abusive, or inciting become less so if
employed to promote a religious ideology?" /d. at I 79. Justice Jackson's response was clearly "no."
Justice Jackson disagreed with Justice Douglas on the analogy to be drawn between religious
ceremonies and the distribution of literature:
I cannot accept the holding in the Murdock case that the behavior revealed here "oc
cupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits." To put them on the same constitutional plane seems to me to
have a dangerous tendency towards discrediting religious freedom.
/d. at 180 (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109).
64. Justice Jackson grounded his theory of why the Constitution separately mentions freedom
of religion in "the history of religious persecution":
It was often claimed that one was an heretic and guilty of blasphemy because he failed to
conform in mere belief or in support of prevailing institutions and theology. It was to
assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular discussion, rather than to assure it
greater license, that led to its separate statement.
319 U.S. at 179.
65. Justice Jackson's concern that the Court, when it zealously protected minority rights, was
necessarily undercutting the rights of the majority, is evident elsewhere in his writing:
But we must bear in mind that in the protection of individual or minority rights, we
are often impinging on the principle of majority rule. Judicial opinions rarely face this
dilemma. Let us take, for example, a community engaged largely in steel work, many of
whose inhabitants are employed on night shifts and get their rest by day. Acting through
regularly chosen representatives, the municipality duly enacts a regulation that precludes
doorbell ringing in the distribution of literature or goods. A religious faction insists upon
ringing doorbells to summon the occupant to the door to receive religious tracts that attack
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The ringing endorsement of the principle of tolerance for the unu
sual or unorthodox that Justice Jackson sounds in Barnette must be con
trasted with his earlier comments about the need to make sure that a
religious minority does not become a tyrannical force going beyond the
limits of a free society. 66 Justice Jackson's narrow view of religious free
dom provides at least a possible answer to the question of why his opin
ion in Barnette relies on broad free speech principles and does not restrict
itself to religious liberty concerns.
Justice Jackson's view was that the line drawn should be between
activities that affect only members of a religious group and activities that
adversely influence the interests of members of the public. This view was
not shared by all the members of the Court. Some would give broader
deference than others to claims of religious freedom. 67 In Justice Jackhis religion and seek to convert him to the faith of the caller. If the Court holds that the
right of free speech includes the right to enter upon private property and summon the
owner to the door, it necessarily holds that a majority of a community are without the right
to protect their hours of rest against such religiously inspired aggression.
In case after case in which so-called civil rights are involved, the question simmers
down to one of the extent to which majority rule will be set aside.
R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 76-77 (1955)
(published posthumously from the drafts written by Justice Jackson in preparation for his antici
pated delivery of the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University) (the facts described in this passage are
taken from Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943), in which the Court struck down a
municipal ordinance of the kind described over the dissent of Justice Jackson).
66. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Civil government can not let any group ride rough-shod over others simply because their 'con
sciences' tell them to do so.").
67. The battle over the Jehovah's Witnesses' place in the constitutional pecking order still raged
after Barnette, as made clear by the Court's opinion six months later in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944). Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, made it clear that freedom of religion has
no greater constitutional protection than the other freedoms described in the first amendment. Jus
tice Rutledge went on to uphold the state's ability to protect children from the dangers of youthful
employment, even if the child labor at issue involved selling religious tracts. An important govern
ment objective was appropriately served by the challenged Massachusetts legislation.
Justice Murphy, in dissent, disagreed about the extent to which religion should play a role in the
case and its outcome. He viewed the case as one raising a religious liberty claim in which the state
had failed to demonstrate an interest sufficiently important to justify infringement on that "vital
freedom," id. at 174-75, and criticized the majority decision as perpetuating religious suppression:
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of persecution and
intolerance as one dealing with religious freedom. . . . And the Jehovah's Witnesses are
living proof of the fact that even in this nation, conceived as it was in the ideals of freedom,
the right to practice religion in unconventional ways is still far from secure.
Id. at 175-76.
Justice Jackson also wrote separately in Prince, pointing out that the members of the Court had
a fundamental disagreement as to the proper constitutional analysis to apply to complaints of inter
ference with religious liberty. ld. at 177. He could agree neither with the views of Justice Rutledge
writing for the Court nor with the dissent of Justice Murphy.
It is interesting to note by way of comparison that the dispute over the relationship between
freedom of speech and freedom of religion reflected in the Court's decisions during the Barnette era
has resurfaced in recent Supreme Court opinions. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
n.6 (1981) (majority opinion) (religious worship as well as other religious speech is entitled to the
protection of the free speech guarantee of the first amendment), with id. at 284-86 (White, J., dissent
ing) (although religious worship uses speech, it cannot be treated as simply a form of protected
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son's Barnette opinion, as in several other cases during this period, no
preferred position was offered to religious liberty. Instead, freedom of
conscience68 and freedom of mind were equal in the eyes of the first
amendment. The importance of these freedoms was reflected in the
Court's willingness to protect the rights of small minorities who held
unpopular views. So long as unpopular minorities chose to express their
views in ways that did not seriously interfere with the rights of the other
members of the community, their right to express dissident views would
be assured. This protection was required by the ideal of democratic tol
erance; a principle that dictated a concern for securing the kind of society
in which freedom to differ was guaranteed both for its own sake and for
the benefit of the culturally diverse and innovative society that was the
Constitution's vision of America.
C.

Justice Jackson Elaborates on His Barnette Themes

To whatever extent the meaning of the Barnette opinion may have
remained obscure even to the careful reader, Justice Jackson clarified and
expanded upon his views expressed there seven years later in American
Communications Association v. Douds. 69 Although the issue in Douds
was not the same kind of compelled expression as had been presented by
the pledge in Barnette, Justice Jackson's opinion nevertheless explored
the same first amendment themes that he had written about in Barnette.
With only six Justices participating in Douds, the Supreme Court
upheld, by an equally divided vote, the constitutionality of section 9(h) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 70 otherwise known as the non-Communist affidavit
provision. Under that provision, each union officer was required to file
an affidavit stating that the officer was not a member of the Communist
Party or any similar organization and did not believe in "the overthrow
expression under the free speech guarantee; separate treatment is required to avoid undermining the
religion clauses of the first amendment).
68. Freedom of religion is sometimes characterized as "freedom of conscience." Justice Mur
phy's use of the phrase in his dissent in Prince, 321 U.S. at 175, to refer to religious liberty is one of
the occasional references found in the opinions of the Supreme Court during this era. E.g., Schneid
erman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943) (quoting from United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605, 635 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)); Cantwell v. Conneeticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). For
a thorough examination of the origins and meaning of the phrase "freedom of conscience," as well as
a survey of its use in Supreme Court opinions, see Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U.
PA. L. REv. 806 (1958).
69. 339 u.s. 382 (1950).
70. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143, repealed by Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 519, 525. The result in
Douds was in effect overruled in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). In Brown, the Court
found § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 504
(Supp. IV 1958), which made it a crime for a Communist Party member to hold a position as an
officer or employee of a labor union, to be an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. That section was
the successor to § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
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of the United States government by force or by any illegal or unconstitu
tional methods." 71 Many benefits of the National Labor Relations Act
were withheld from any union whose officers failed to submit such affi
davits to the National Labor Relations Board.
Although the required filing of this affidavit, under penalty ofloss of
benefits, was a form of compelled expression, it belongs within that cate
gory of compelled expression known as "compelled disclosure." 72 It
forced all union officials to disclose information about their political affil
iations and beliefs, but did not affirmatively ask them to swear allegiance
to a particular political philosophy, as had the pledge of allegiance in
Barnette.
The union challenging the provision argued that it interfered with
the union's ability to select its officers and infringed on those officers'
freedom of choice in their political views and associations. In response,
Chief Justice Vinson found that the infringement of first amendment
rights was minimal and that the government interest in ensuring labor
peace was important enough to justify that minimal interference. 73
Justice Jackson's separate opinion agreed with that part of Justice
Vinson's opinion that upheld section 9(h) insofar as it required disclosure
of Communist Party membership or affiliation; he disagreed, however,
with the constitutionality of the affidavit that section 9(h) required union
71. Douds, 339 U.S. at 386 (quoting from § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, Act of
June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143 (repealed 1959)). That section, in its entirety, pro
vided as follows:
No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any question
affecting commerce concerning the representation ofemployees, raised by a labor organiza
tion under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9 (e) (1) shall be enter
tained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization
under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit exe
cuted contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of
such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization
of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of
or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of
section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
73. The Chief Justice, joined by Justiees Reed and Burton, distinguished the case before him
from the situation in Barnette. In Barnette, according to Chief Justice Vinson, "the sole interest of
the State was in securing uniformity of belief by compelling utterance of a prescribed pledge." 339
U.S. at 404 n.19. In Douds, however, the government's interest was not seen as aimed at suppressing
political ideas, id. at 402; instead, the government was interested in preventing Communists from
infiltrating labor unions and encouraging obstructive strikes that would serve revolutionary political
ideas, rather than legitimate union objectives. ld. at 388-89. A second factor Chief Justice Vinson
saw as distinguishing Douds was the fact that in Barnette refusal to salute the flag resulted in punish
ment, id. at 404 n.19, but the non-Communist affidavit provision did not impose any similar punish
ment for its violation. Individuals were free to retain their associations and beliefs, subject only to
the posssible loss of their positions as union officials. I d. at 404. Thus, the adverse impact on the
individual was much less serious.
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officers to sign: "that he does not believe in . . . the overthrow of the
United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods." 74 In the course of his opinion, Justice Jackson wrote at length
about the value of "intellectual individualism" 75 that was so central to
his opinion in Barnette:
Progress generally begins in skepticism about accepted truths.
Intellectual freedom means the right to re-examine much that has
been long taken for granted. A free man must be a reasoning man,
. and he must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral majority
may most passionately assert. The danger that citizens will think
wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not think
ing at all. Our Constitution relies on our electorate's complete ide
ological freedom to nourish independent and responsible
intelligence and preserve our democracy from that submissiveness,
timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would foster a
tyranny of mediocrity. The priceless heritage of our society is the
unrestricted constitutional right of each member to think as he
will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we
have no claim to it. . ..
The idea that a Constitution should protect individual non
conformity is essentially American and is the last thing in the
world that Communists will tolerate. . . . If any single characteris
tic distinguishes our democracy from Communism it is our recog
nition of the individual as a personality rather than as a soulless
part in the jigsaw puzzle that is the collectivist state.76
In this eloquent statement, Justice Jackson reaffirmed the position he
announced in Barnette. In doing so he further clarified what underlay
the constitutional protection against compelled conformity that he val
ued so highly.
In his Douds opinion, Justice Jackson established once again his be
lief that the first amendment provides individuals with an immunity that
shields the "realm of opinion and ideas, beliefs and doubts, heresy and
orthodoxy, political, religious or scientific."77 This hnmunity is designed
74. Id. at 435 (quoting National Labor Relations Act, § 9(h), Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120,
§ 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143 (repealed 1959)).
75. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
76. Douds, 339 U.S. at 442-43. Justice Jackson's view of the characteristics of our democratic
system was supported by one other member of the Court. Although writing separately, Justice
Frankfurter's opinion reflects a similar belief:
The cardinal article of faith of our civilization is the inviolate character of the individual.
A man can be regarded as an individual and not as a function of the state only if he is
protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person.
I d. at 421. The agreement of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter on this point is somewhat ironic in
light of their sharp differences over the proper outcome in Barnette. For a description of Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Barnette, see supra note 32.
77. 339 U.S. at 443.
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to assure a free-thinking electorate that can preserve our democratic sys
tem and cause it to prosper.7 8 Our system's superiority over totalitarian
regimes was seen as arising out of its willingness to tolerate nonconform
ity. An individual's ability to develop into his own person is protected in
order to preserve democratic principles of tolerance and to enhance our
country's greatness by assuring its receptiveness to innovative ideas. In
this aspect of Justice Jackson's first amendment philosophy, individuality
is seen not primarily as an end in itself, but as a means to a larger social
end. The individual may receive the immediate benefits of policies
designed to preserve a strong democratic system, but the motivating fac
tor for protecting independence of mind is a concern for our system of
government. Justice Jackson thus appears to align himself with those
who view the first amendment freedoms as serving principally instru
mental functions and not as ends in themselves. 79
Justice Jackson's views, however, did not begin and end with con
cern for the effective functioning of democratic government. In Douds,
he argued that the willingness to allow each person to develop an individ
ual identity, free of government constraint, is what distingnishes democ
racy from totalitarian government. 80 In this part of his first amendment
78. The similarities between Justice Jackson's views and the theories of Alexander Meiklejohn
as to the values furthered by the first amendment are obvious:
We Americans, in choosing our form of government, have made, at this point, a momen
tous decision. We have decided to be self-governed. We have measured the dangers and
the values of the suppression of the freedom of public inquiry and debate. And, on the
basis of that measurement, having regard for the public safety, we have decided that the
destruction offreedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient. The conviction
recorded by that decision is not a sentimental vagary about the "natural rights" of individ
uals. It is a reasoned and sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the
public safety. We, the People, as we plan for the general welfare, do not choose to be
"protected" from the "search for truth." On the contrary, we have adopted it as our "way
of life," our method of doing the work of governing for which, as citizens, we are responsi
ble. Shall we, then, as practitioners offreedom, listen to ideas which, being opposed to our
own, might destroy confidence in our form of government? Shall we give a hearing to
those who hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they had the power, would destroy
our institutions? Certainly, yes! Our action must be guided, not by their principles, but by
ours. We listen, not because they desire to speak, but because we need to hear. If there are
arguments against our theory of government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citi
zens, the rulers, must hear and consider them for ourselves. That is the way of public
safety. It is the program of self-government.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM, supra note 34, at 57. Despite the similarities of their views,
Meiklejohn's writings are referred to only twice in the opinions of Justice Jackson. See Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567 n.9 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290, 300 n.3 {1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Both references express Justice Jackson's disagreement
with Meiklejohn·s absolutist philosophy of first amendment protection for speech that is necessary to
the process of self-government.
79. The battle over instrumental or speaker-benefit values in first amendment jurisprudence is
still a very lively one. See supra note 34.
80. Professor Freund described the centerpiece ofJustice Jackson's constitutional philosophy in
the following terms:
What must be cherished and secured above all-what the Constitution means to be se
cured-is human personality. Its cultivation is both a civic necessity and a spiritual duty.
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theory, Justice Jackson recognized the identity-reinforcing aspect of the
first amendment. 81 Thus, Justice Jackson's first amendment philosophy
surfaces as a multilayered one. 82 Although primarily concerned with the
need for an effective democratic government, his philosophy also recog
nized the independent value of intellectual individualism.
III.

The Loyalty Oath Cases

In the years following Barnette, quotations from Justice Jackson's
Barnette plirrality opinion began to appear regularly in the Court's writ
ings. 83 For a number of years, however, no new controversy raising the
precise issue· of a compelled affirmation reached the Court. The next
The right to be oneself, to differ in thought and word, to express one's nonconformity in
peaceable persuasion, to be treated by one's fellows wielding public power as a rational
subject and not as mere object, to be treated evenhandedly-these claims as ancient as
religious sensibilities formulated with modest British insularity as the immemorial rights of
Englishmen, and retransformed in eighteenth-century America into rights of man, remain
the central concern of a civilization torn between the angel and the dynamo.
Freund, Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought ofMr. Justice Jackson, 8 STAN. L. REv. 9,
23-24 (1955). Professor Freund has been credited with recognizing the emerging concept of
personhood:
The theme of personhood ... is emerging. It has been groping for a rubric. Sometimes it is
called privacy, inaptly it would seem to me; autonomy perhaps, though that seems too
dangerously broad. But the idea is that of personhood in the sense of those attributes of an
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood.
Speech by P. Freund to the American Law Institute (May 23, 1975) (quoted in Craven, supra note
33, at 702 n.l5).
81. In this respect, Justice Jackson's first amendment philosophy goes beyond the views of
Professor Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn's view was that in order to meet the responsibilities of governing,
the citizenry must "acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the gen·
eral welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express." Meiklejohn, The First Amend
ment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REV. 245, 255. Thus, for Meiklejohn, individual dignity and
freedom of thought receive the protection of the first amendment, but they are merely means to the
end of successful self-government. Justice Jackson further refines this theory by considering the
distinctive values inherent in a democratic system. The chief value identified by Justice Jackson is a
respect for individual personality. This aspect is the missing piece in the Meiklejohn analysis. Pro
fessor Redish criticizes Meiklejohn for failing to explore the basic values served by a democratic
system. See Redish, supra note 33, at 601. Redish views democracy as serving to foster individual
self-realization, see supra note 33, because of its process-oriented values. Redish, supra note 33, at
602. Process-oriented values include both "intrinsic" value and "instrumental" value. Intrinsic
value is identified as "the value of having individuals control their own destinies." Id. The instru
mental value is seen as "development of the individual's human faculties." I d. at 603. In the terms
used by Professor Redish, Justice Jackson's reference to democracy as a system that recognizes the
individual personality seems to speak more to instrumental values.
82. Professor Freund explains the multiple layers of Justice Jackson's constitutional philosophy
as resulting from the Justice's focus on the facts of the case before him instead of on an overarching
judicial philosophy. Freund, Mr. Justice Jackson and Individual Rights, in MR. JuSTICE JACKSON:
FOUR LECTURES IN His HONOR 29, 37 (1969) ("Justice Jackson was, above all-and this was one of
his great strengths-a case lawyer.").
83. A partial list of the references to Barnette over this period of years includes United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 97 (1945); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 n.5 (1951); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 n.l5
(1957); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 603 (1961); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 371 (1964); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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such occasion came when the Court began to consider the issue of the
constitutionality of affirmative loyalty oaths, those that required the oath
taker to pledge support for the state or federal government, or both.
Such affirmative loyalty oaths presented a somewhat different constitu
tional problem than did the negative oath epitomized in Douds.
As early as 1866, long before the non-Communist affidavits at issue
in Douds, loyalty oaths and the various constitutional issues associated
with such oaths had reached the Supreme Court. 84 Over the years, the
Supreme Court employed an ever-growing collection of constitutional
doctrines to test the constitutionality of such oaths, 85 often declaring the
oaths unconstitutiona1 86 The central focus of the Court's attention,
however, had been on negative oaths, like that in Douds, requiring indi
viduals such as applicants for public employment to swear that they did
not belong to any groups that advocated the overthrow of the United
States government and that they never themselves had been disloyal to
the government. 87 Such oaths sought both to force disclosure of past
beliefs and associations and to condition government employment on the
absence of such beliefs and affiliations. 88 In this sense, to the extent that
these loyalty oaths related at all to the problem of compelled speech, they
raised the problem of compelled disclosure rather than compelled expres
sion. Although many of the oaths also required an affirmative declara
tion of support for the United States Constitution, the Court often did
not rule specifically on the constitutionality of this aspect of the oaths. 89
84. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (holding an 1865 federal law
requiring attorneys practicing in the federal courts to swear they had never been disloyal to the
United States unconstitutional as both a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto law); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (holding that provisions of 1865 Missouri Constitution requir
ing all ministers and teachers to swear they had never been disloyal to the state or to the United
States violated constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws).
85. For an excellent survey of the varying methods of analysis employed to dispose of the
loyalty oath cases, see Note, Loyalty Oaths Are Not Dead-At Last Report One Was Alive in New
York, 77 YALE L.J. 739 (1968).
86. E.g., Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 62 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-70
(1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 285-88 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357
u.s. 513, 529 (1958).
87. E.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 279 & n.1 (1961); Speiser v. Ran
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 515 (1958); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 718-19 (1951).
88. To the extent that these negative oath cases are viewed as government attempts to affiX a
condition of noninvolvement in subversive political activities to the opportunity for government em
ployment, they can be classified as cases involving unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Oklahoma statute requiring prospeetive state employees to make a
"loyalty oath" that they were not members of a Communist or subversive organization for the pre
ceding five years violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). On the subject of
unconstitutional conditions, see Van Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti
tutional Low, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv.
1595 (1960).
89. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. at 184 n.l (Court did not rule on constitutionality of
challenged support oath-"I will support and defend the Constitution"); Ex pane Garland, 71 U.S.
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On the rare occasion when it did, the Court found the oath unconstitu
tional on vagueness grounds. 90
The first attack on the merits of a so-called affirmative oath that
reached the United States Supreme Court was Knight v. Board of Re
gents.91 Faculty members at a private university challenged a New York
State law requiring all state teachers to execute a loyalty oath. The oath
provision required teachers to swear or affirm that they supported the
United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New
York and would faithfully discharge their duties. In challenging the oath
requirement, the teachers relied upon Barnette.
A three-judge federal court rejected the Barnette analogy on several
grounds. First, the court interpreted Barnette as resting on religious free
dom grounds despite Justice Jackson's specific disclaimer of such a
ground of decision. 92 Second, the court was of the opinion that the pen
alties attached to refusal to take the oath were not as serious as in Bar
nette. And third, the court interpreted "the statute to impose no
restrictions upon political or philosophical expressions by teachers in the
State of New York."93
The last argument, although somewhat vague, suggests that an oath
requirement violates the first amendment only if it restricts the rights of
teachers to engage in protected expression. This view is consistent with
the concept that freedom from compelled expression is merely a deriva
tive of the guarantee of free speech and that protected rights are violated
ouly when a required expression is likely to discourage speech and not
merely because the compelled expression is an insult to an individual's
political conscience. Because the court viewed the teacher's execution of
the oath as a pro forma activity, unlikely to have any long-term impact
on an individual teacher's willingness to engage in political dialogue, the
oath did not rise to the level of a constitutional concern.
In addition to these factors, the court also believed the government
had an adequate justification for imposing the oath. The oath was
viewed as the equal of the allegiance every citizen owed the government
(4 Wall.) at 335 (no specific ruling on constitutionality of challenged support oath-"1 will support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies"); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 280-81 (no challenge to constitutionality of support oath-"1 will bear true faith
and allegiance to the United States, and will support the Constitution and laws thereof as the
supreme law of the land").
90. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 (1964) (holding that oath requiring a promise to "pro
mote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States and the State of Washington" was
too vague because the range of acts consistent and inconsistent with the promise is very broad and
"institutions" is not defined).
91. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
92. 269 F. Supp. at 341.
93. Id.
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at common law. Further, the state's interest in employing the best teach
ers justified the entire oath, including the requirement of subscribing to
their dedication to their profession. An appeal to the Supreme Court by
the teachers resulted only in a summary affirmance of the three-judge
district court opinion. 94 The Court, therefore, offered no clue as to
whether the lower court's interpretation of Barnette was an accurate
one. 95
Loyalty oaths do not reach the Court against the same constitu
tional background as the pledge in Barnette, because these affirmative
oath cases are complicated by three specific constitutional references to
oaths. 96 These constitutional provisions requiring oat}]. taking have made
it easy for members of the Court to look favorably on the requirement of
an affirmative loyalty oath even as against a first amendment challenge.
As Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Douds stated: "Obviously, the
Framers of the Constitution thought that the exaction of an affirmation
94. 390 u.s. 36 (1968).
95. On several occasions after Knight, the Supreme Court was again asked to rule on the consti
tutionality of affirmative loyalty oaths. Just as in Knight, the Court in Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F.
Supp. 876 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 744 (1968), and Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F.
Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 317 (1970), responded by summarily af
firming three-judge district court decisions upholding oaths almost identical to the one challenged in
Knight.
Both Hosack and Ohlson involved a Colorado loyalty oath required of teachers, the original
version of which had been struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Gallagher v.
Smiley, 270 F. Supp. 86, 87 (D. Colo. 1967). The oath provided: "I solemnly swear or affirm that I
will support the Constitution of the State of Colorado and of the United States of America and the
laws of the State of Colorado and of the United States." Hosack, 276 F. Supp. at 878. The district
court found the oath to be a straightforward statement of support for our government and not
violative of the first amendment. Id. at 878-79.
The oath was subsequently revised to read: "I solemnly (swear) (affirm) that I will uphold the
constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Colorado, and I will faithfully
perform the duties of the position upon which I am about to enter." Ohlson, 304 F. Supp. at 1153
(quoting from CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 123-17-6 to 123-17-8, as amended). The oath was upheld,
having been unsuccessfully attacked on equal protection, vagueness, overbreadth, procedural due
process, contract clause, ex post facto, and bill of attainder grounds.
96. The Constitution sets out the oath required of all Presidents of the United States upon
assuming office: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I wiii faithfully execute the Office of Presi
dent of the United States, and wiii to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Consti
tution of the United States." U.S. CaNST. art. II,§ I, cl. 7. Moreover, the Constitution provides that
all members of Congress, all state legislators, and all executive and judicial officers of the states and
United States "shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution." Id. at art. VI,
cl. 3. In addition to these two references to constitutionally required loyalty oaths, there is one
restriction on the requirement of oath taking: "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Quali
fication to any Office or public Trust under the United States." Id.
The Supreme Court has found it unnecessary to decide whether the prohibition on religious test
oaths contained in Article VI applies to the states as well as to the federal government. In Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), appellant was denied a commission as a notary public because he
refused to declare his belief in the existence of God. He challenged his disqualification on the
ground that it violated article VI, and the first and fourteenth amendments. Because the Supreme
Court held that the religious test requirement unconstitutionally invaded Torcaso's "freedom of
belief and religion," id. at 496, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the article VI
prohibition applied to the states. I d. at 489 n. I.
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of minimal loyalty to the Government was worth the price of whatever
deprivation of individual freedom of conscience was involved."97 Thus,
in any situation viewed as analogous to the oath taking required by the
Constitution, no constitutional problem has been thought to exist.
Two issues, however, have remained: first, how far oath taking can
be required beyond the list of public officials included in the Constitu
tion; and second, to what extent the language of an oath can go beyond
the support for the Constitution described in the Constitution itself. The
implication of Knight is that such oaths can be required of teachers, a
group responsible for imparting moral values, 98 and that the state can
require both a promise of support and a promise of best professional
efforts .
. The issues raised in Knight came before the Supreme Court again in
1972 with Cole v. Richardson. 99 In Richardson, the Court addressed the
affirmative oath question in a full opinion in upholding a loyalty oath
97. 339 u.s. 382, 415 (1950).
98. The conclusions that teachers play a special role in imparting values and that the state is
therefore justified in holding them to higher standards than other public employees are reinforced by
a 1979 Supreme Court decision, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), that upheld a state re
quirement that public school teachers be United States citizens or persons manifesting an intention
to become citizens. The Court stated:
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing students'
attitude toward government and understanding of the role ofcitizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students
both in the classrooms and in the other varied activities of a modem school. . . . Further, a
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence
over their perceptions and values.
Id. at 78-79.
99. 405 U.S. 676 (1972). Only seven members of the Court participated in Richardson. Justices
Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of the case. The Court's decision had been
foreshadowed by its 1971 deeision in Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (per curiam). In
Connell, a Florida teacher who had been dismissed for refusing to sign a loyalty oath challenged her
dismissal. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court upheld only the support portion of the Florida
oath which included both a promise of support for the state and federal constitutions and a state
ment that the oath taker did "not believe in the overthrow of the Government." Id. at 208. The
support part of the oath was upheld on the authority of Knight, Hosack, and Ohlson. Justice Mar
shall, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, concurred in the part of the opinion finding
the support oath constitutional. In contrast to the support oath, the section of the oath that included
a statement of belief was struck down. It violated the dismissed teacher's due process right to a
hearing prior to dismissal for failing to subscribe to the oath. ld. at 208-09. Under the Florida
procedure, the failure to sign the oath operated as an irrebutable presumption of belief in the over
throw of the government. Justice Marshall disagreed with this aspect of the per curiam opinion.
Citing Barnette, Justice Marshall asserted that the belief section of the oath was violative of the first
amendment. Id. at 209-10. Justice Stewart would have first given the Florida courts the opportu
nity to narrowly construe the belief section of the oath to avoid its constitutional infirmity. Id. at
210; cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 161-63 (1971)
(holding that a state rule that a lawyer may not be admitted to practice unless the lawyer believes "in
the form of the Government of the United States and [is] loyal to [such] Government" is permissible
because state authorities interpret this role "extremely narrow[ly] and [are] fully cognizant of pro
tected constitutional freedoms").

844

Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy
required of most Massachusetts public employees. 100 The text of the
oath read as follows:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend
the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitu
tion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose
the overthrow of the government of the United States of America
or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method.1o1
In Richardson, the Court for the first time clearly distinguished between
the permissible sort of support oath at issue and oaths that conditioned
employment on the relinquishment of rights to political beliefs and as
sociations secured by the first amendment. 102 So long as an oath requir
ing support is not vague in its meaning and does not ask an individual to
attest to an absence of certain past or present political beliefs and associa
tions, the oath can look to the constitutional provisions providing for
oaths of office as the basis of its validity. Further, it is not necessary for
an oath to employ language identical to that contained in the Constitu
tion. 103 Thus, the Richardson majority viewed the requirement that one
"uphold and defend" the Constitution as indistinguishable from the
"preserve, protect and defend" language in article II, section 1, clause 8
and the oath "to support this Constitution" in article VI, clause 3. 104
More controversy surrounded the second part of the oath which re
quired government employees to affirm that they would "oppose the
overthrow of the government ... by force, violence or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method." 105 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stewart, interpreted this language as not
expanding on the support obligations contained in the first part of the
oath. Instead, the second part of the oath was seen as merely clarifying
"the application of the first clause to a particular issue," 106 specifically
the commitment made by persons in positions of public trust "to live by
100. The controversy before the Supreme Court in Richardson had been before the Court on
another occasion. In Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238 (1970), the Court had vacated the judgment
of the court below and remanded to the district court to determine whether the controversy had
become moot as a result of the elimination of the job previously held by Mrs. Richardson at Boston
State Hospital. The district court, on remand, held that the case was not moot because the Boston
State Hospital stood ready to rehire Mrs. Richardson once the oath controversy was resolved. The
district court therefore reinstated its earlier judgment invalidating the oath and Cole, superintendent
of the hospital, again appealed.
101. ld. at 677-78 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (West 1970)).
102. Id. at 680-82.
103. Id. at 682.
104. Id. at 683.
105. ld. (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (West 1970)).
106. Id. at 684.
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the constitutional processes of our system." 107 The oath was read as im
posing no obligation to take specific action in defense of the government
and as depriving no oath taker of any constitutional right. Because there
was no first amendment right to overthrow the government by force or
other unconstitutional method, "no constitutional right is infringed by an
oath to abide by the constitutional system in the future." 108
Although Chief Justice Burger's opinion did not address the issue of
the relationship between the oath in Richardson and the pledge in Bar
nette, a concurring opinion by Justices Stewart and White implicitly con
sidered that question and concluded that the oath did not "impinge on
conscience or belief." 109
That casual rejection of the Barnette analogy was disputed by the
two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Douglas and the other by Justice
Marshall joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas, citing Barnette,
expressed a general opposition to loyalty oaths, characterizing them as
"tools of tyranny" aimed at "coercing and controlling the minds of men"
and therefore "odious to a free people." 110 Justice Marshall wrote at
greater length about the evils of such oaths and the relationship between
a constitutionally patterned support oath and expanded loyalty oaths.
Unlike Justice Burger, Justice Marshall was not willing to consider
the kind of oath at issue in Richardson as "no more than an amenity." 111
107. ld. This aspect of Chief Justice Burger's opinion is consistent with the view expressed by
Justice Stewart in Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 210 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See supra note 99. The oath at issue in Connell required the taker to
swear she did "not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of
Florida by force or violence." 403 U.S. at 209. In Justice Stewart's view, "[i]f the clause embraces
the teacher's philosophical or political beliefs" it is constitutionally invalid, id. at 210, however, if
"the clause does no more than test whether the first clause of the oath can be taken 'without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion' it is constitutionally valid." ld.
108. 405 U.S. at 686. Chief Justice Burger also rejected a vagueness challenge as well as a claim
that the state employees who refused to take the oath were entitled to a hearing prior to being
discharged from their employment.
109. ld. at 687 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 241 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
110. Id. at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952)
(Black, J., concurring)). In Wieman, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Oklahoma loy
alty oath required of all state employees. Failure to subscribe to the oath resulted in loss of employ
ment. Although the oath contained a variety of sections, including one requiring the employee to
"support and defend the Constitution," 344 U.S. at 184 n.1, the Court's review was limited to the
part requiring employees to swear that they were not and had not been members of subversive or
Communist-front organizations. The Court viewed the exclusion of persons from public employ
ment on the basis of innocent membership-the provision was not limited to knowing membership
in a subversive organization to be an arbitrary exercise of government authority in violation of the
due process clause. 344 U.S. at 191. The Court, therefore, viewed the oath as an unconstitutional
condition on government employment. See supra note 88.
1 I 1. 344 U.S. at 685. The language used by the Chief Justice is a quotation from Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in the Court's earlier encounter with the Massachusetts oath. Richard
son, 397 U.S. at 240 (Harlan, J., concurring). See supra note 100.
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Instead, Justice Marshall drew a careful line between support oaths re
quired of government employees "as an expression of 'minimal loyalty to
the Government,' " 112 and more comprehensive oaths. Minimal oaths,
although they intruded on the freedom to think and express ideas, were
tolerated as an expression of the idea that public employees would abide
by the law in the performance of their duties. More extensive oaths were
highly suspect and justified only in an emergency.
Justice Marshall argued that the government had only limited
power "to force its citizens to perform symbolic gestures of loyalty,'' 113
and that these limits existed because of the oath's potential as "an instru
ment of thought control and a means of enforcing complete political con
formity."114 Justice Marshall ended his opinion with a quotation from
Justice Black's concurrence in Speiser v. Randall:115
Loyalty oaths . . . tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or
unpopular thinking or expression-the kind ofthought and expres
sion which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history
of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in the
end may well turn out to be more destructive to our free society
than foreign agents could ever hope to be. 11 6
This view of the societal cost exacted by loyalty oaths parallels Justice
Jackson's warning about the detrimental effect of forced patriotic expres
sions in Barnette.
Although the Richardson dissenters did not discuss at length the
relationship between the unconstitutional pledge in Barnette and the oath
at issue in Richardson, the source of their concern is clear. The dangers
of forced expression are seen in terms of costs to society. In the end,
suppression of unorthodox thinking would be destructive to our nation;
new ideas and nonconforming individuals need to be allowed to develop
unchecked for the betterment of all. An atmosphere of tolerance for
thought and speech is an essential aspect of a self-governing free society.
Although this theme is apparent in Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette,
112. 405 U.S. at 696 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415
(1950)).
113. Id. at 697. Justice Marshall followed this comment with a citation to Barnette.
114. 405 U.S. at 698 (quoting Asper, The Long and Unhappy History ofLoyalty Testing in Mary
land, 13 AM. J. LEGAL Htsr. 97, 108 (1969)).
115. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In Speiser, a California law requiring the signing of an oath to obtain a
property tax exemption, which the California Constitution granted to veterans, was challenged. The
oath provided as follows: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States
or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support
of a foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities." Id. at 515. The Supreme
Court characterized this scheme as a penalty imposed on the exercise of free speech rights and held
that it violated the due process clause by unfairly placing the burden of proof on applicants for the
exemption to show that they had not engaged in criminal advocacy. Id. at 528-29.
116. 405 U.S. at 698 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 532).
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the additional message communicated by Justice Jackson's opinion in
Douds was that forced conformity must be avoided not only for the bene
fit of the community but also for the sake of the affected individual.
Thus, while Justice Jackson saw the first amendment as condemning
government-compelled affirmations of belief for two complementary rea
sons, the Richardson dissenters focused on only one concern, the good of
the nation.
Any comparison of Barnette and the oath cases is of course compli
cated by the constitutional approval of support oaths for government of
ficials. Whenever the issue of the effect of dictating expressions of
loyalty is raised in these cases, however, the focus of the Court's discus
sion is the same-the tendency of such oaths to stifle unpopular thoughts
and ideas. Justices who find such oaths constitutionally inoffensive view
the impact on the individuals forced to take such oaths as a trivial and at
most momentary annoyance. In contrast, Justices who fear such oaths
argue that they portend an ominous direction, one choking the desire to
think new thoughts and express new ideas.
Thus far in the compelled expression cases, the beginnings of an an
alytic framework can be deciphered. There is an initial focus on the ten
dency of the compulsion to stifle intellectual individualism. Only if such
a tendency is found does the Court go on to consider the governmental
purpose behind the compulsion. If the purpose is to force loyalty, it is
suspect. If the purpose is one of promoting some other legitimate gov
ernment interest, a closer case is presented.
IV.

Wooley v. Maynard

No expansion of the Barnette doctrine occurred through the loyalty
oath cases of the late sixties and early seventies.' The case remained sui
generis, and its central issue did not arise again in any completely analo
gous situation 117 untill977, when the Supreme Court decided Wooley v.
117. One case in the period after Richardson, although distinguishable, deserves mention.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomiiio, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), involved a challenge to Florida's
right of reply statute granting candidates for public office a right to reply to negative comments
about the candidate's qualifications appearing in a newspaper. The paper was required to print the
reply in the same type and just as conspicuously as the original critical commentary. The Miami
Herald argued that the statute was an impermissible regulation of newspaper content. The statute's
defenders replied that the statute's guarantee of a right of access was consistent with first amend
ment principles. Although much of the opinion is addressed to the arguments made by access advo
cates that the monopoly position of many newspapers has a negative effect on the marketplace of
ideas, the Court did describe the statute as a "compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to
print that which it would not otherwise print." Id. at 256. The Court expressed the fear that the law
would cause newspapers to refrain from publishing critical comments about candidates to avoid the
reply requirement. Although the Court did not discuss the relationship between Tornillo and Bar
nette, it is clear that one exists. Unlike Barnette, however, the compulsion is triggered by a particu
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Maynard. 118 In Wooley, the Court directly confronted the Barnette pre
cedent in a fact pattern parallel even to the extent that the appellees were
Jehovah's Witnesses raising a claim of religious liberty under the
Constitution.
Jehovah's Witnesses George and Maxine Maynard challenged New
Hampshire's requirement that all license plates for noncommercial vehi
cles bear the state motto "Live Free or Die" 119 as offensive to their reli
gious beliefs. The Maynards also disagreed with the motto as a
statement of political conviction, believing instead that "life is more pre
cious than freedom." 120 The Maynards covered the state motto with
tape. Mr. Maynard was found guilty on three separate occasions of vio
lating the New Hampshire misdemeanor law against obscuring any part
of a license plate. 121 The Supreme Court viewed the case as raising "the
question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual
to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by display
ing it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose
that it be observed and read by the public." 122
At the outset of his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger ad
dressed the relationship between the first amendment right to refrain
from speaking and the free speech guarantee. The two rights were seen
as complementary; both were necessary to assure that public debate re
mained vigorous. This proposition was followed by a discussion of Bar
nette. Barnette was viewed as involving a more drastic infringement of
rights than the more passive behavior at issue in Wooley, but both cases
were found to involve state invasions of "the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control." 123 The thread common to the two
cases was that both concerned "a state measure which forces an individ
•

Jar action on the part of the press and can be avoided by refraining from publishing critical
comments. This chilling effect on the willingness of the paper to print critical commentary clearly
contributed to the law's invalidity. Professor Tribe has described Tornillo as a situation involving
compelled speech that "comes too close to the power to censor speech." L. TRIBE, supra note 33,
§ 12-22, at 697.
118. 430 u.s. 705 (1977).
119. The motto is taken from a remark attributed to Major General John Stark: "Live free or
die; death is not the worst of evils." State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 334, 295 A.2d 454, 455 (1972).
Prior to 1971, license plates in New Hampshire bore the message "Scenic New Hampshire."
120. 430 U.S. at 707 n.2 (quoting the Affidavit of George Maynard).
121. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:176 {1982).
122. 430 U.S. at 713. In contrast, the district court viewed the case as raising a claim based on
symbolic expression. 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386-87 (D.N.H. 1976). The court saw Mr. Maynard's
behavior in covering the motto as symbolic expression because it was done to symbolize his objeetion
to the motto and was likely to be understood in those terms. Id. at 1387. The district court held that
the state lacked an adequate justification for interfering with free speech rights. Id. at 1388. The
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. 430 U.S. at 713.
123. 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting West Va. StateBd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943)).
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ual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 124
The Court then asked whether the state had a constitutionally suffi
cient justification for its actions. Two interests had been advanced by the
state. First, the state claimed the law assisted in ready identification of
passenger vehicles because the motto was said to aid police in determin
ing whether a vehicle was carrying proper plates. Although the Court
accepted the importance of this state concern, it found that there were
less drastic means available to achieve this purpose.
Second, the state asserted that the license plate "promotes apprecia
tion of history, individualism and state pride." 125 The Court's reaction
to this purported justification is of greater interest. Labelling the interest
as "not ideologically neutral," 126 the Court indicated this legitimate in
terest could be pursued in a variety of ways. Disseminating the state's
chosen ideology by forcing individuals to become "an instrument for fos
tering public adherence," 127 however, was not a legitimate choice among
available means. 128
· Wooley offers a basis for determining what elements are now viewed
as essential to the claim of freedom from coerced expression raised in
both Barnette and Wooley. In the two cases, there is a distinction based
on what is being coerced. The coerced speech in Barnette was pure
speech in the form of the pledge of allegiance or, at the least, symbolic
expression in the form of a salute: students were compelled to recite the
pledge and salute the flag. In both written and recited loyalty oath cases,
moreover, there was also a forced act connoting approval of the words of
the pledge or oath: the oath takers had to recite in words or affix their
signatures to a written declaration. This was not the case in Wooley. A
license plate attached to a person's automobile is not the same kind of
coerced affirmation-the Maynards were forced to display the state's
message, not to identify it as their own. As the Court so graphically put
it, appellee's car was used as "a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideologi
cal message." 129
This distinction between advertising the state's message and assert
ing it as one's own, however, was not viewed as critical. The Maynards'
124. Id. at 715.
125. Id. at 716.
126. Id. at 717.
127. Id. at 715.
128. Justice Jackson stressed a similar point in Barnette. In Justice Jackson's view, promoting
patriotism, although a legitimate state interest, could not be furthered by coercing the recitation of
the pledge. 319 U.S. at 640-41.
129. 430 U.S. at 715.
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objections were based on a serious religious and political disagreement
with the content of the message and a profound objection to displaying it,
a resentment not lessened by the fact that they were not forced to recite
the message by words or affirm it by deeds. In light of the depth of their
objection, the distinction between affirmative and passive acts was not
seen by the Court as a central issue.
The Court, however, viewed as important two factual similarities
between the cases. The first was the repetitious character of the forced
expression: in Barnette, the pledge was recited each school day; in
Wooley, the message was displayed each time the Maynards drove their
car, part of their daily routine. Although the Court did not say so explic
itly, there is a distinction between a daily activity and an oath recited on
a single occasion, as in Richardson, or signing an oath form only once.
This distinction does have significance in light of the first amendment
values protected by the Barnette decision. Barnette addresses the chilling
of individuality and the diminishing of the desire to engage in original
thought; in that respect, a single act of compelled expression can be more
easily shrugged off and is less likely to have a dampening effect upon the
human spirit. In contrast, a repeated act is more likely, in a manner akin
to brainwashing, to suppress individual initiative and to bring individual
thought into line with the state's chosen ideology.
A second similarity between the cases is that in both Barnette and
Wooley the state's purpose was to promote a chosen ideology. Deliberate
state encouragement of a particular viewpoint is not analogous to the fact
that another statute-with a nonideological purpose-may support some
ideology as an incidental outgrowth. 130 To distinguish other cases, the
Wooley Court contrasted the license plate with the use of a state seal to
130. A similar distinction, based on the government's purpose, between a statute prompted by a
desire to suppress expression and one causing such a result only as an incidental outgrowth of some
other governmental purpose has been viewed as critical in a number of Supreme Court decisions
beginning with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In that case, the Court upheld a
conviction for burning a draft card and found a symbolic speech defense insufficient grounds for
overturning the conviction. The Court viewed the question of whether "the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression," id. at 377, as critical to its analysis. The govern
ment's interest was identified as a concern for the efficiency of the Selective Service System rather
than a desire to prevent draft card burning, id. at 382; therefore, the criterion was satisfied. The
O'Brien test is explored thoroughly in Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles ofCategori
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). More recently,
the Court has shown a renewed interest in the distinction between statutes justified by a government
interest in suppressing expression and those justified by legitimate government interests "unrelated
to the supression of ideas." See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984)
(quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) ("[D]ifferential treatment ... suggests that
the goal of regulation is not unrelated to supression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively
unconstitutional.").
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authenticate documents. 131 A seal, although it may contain a state
motto, is not stamped onto documents for the purpose of disseminating
the message contained in the motto; instead, the purpose is the ideologi
cally neutral one of authentication, and the dissemination of any ideolog
ical message is only an incidental by-product. State efforts that infringe
on individual interests and purposefully disseminate favored ideologies,
however, must be viewed less benignly by the Court. Because such ef
forts can be seen as a form of reverse viewpoint discrimination, 132 they
must be analyzed with greater attention to the relationship between ends
and means. From the tone of Wooley and Barnette, whether the use of
coerced expression is ever an appropriate means to disseminate a state
supported idea is unclear. 133 Although the government may be free to
131. 430 U.S. at 715 n.ll.
132. In the typical case of government viewpoint-discrimination, government efforts are directed
at censoring speech that promotes a disfavored idea. Access to a public forum may be permitted for
some speech, but not for speech the government views as dangerous or evil. See, e.g., Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a university cannot discrimi
nate against religious speech when school facilities are available to discuss anticlerical ideas); South
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that the musical "Hair'' could not
be arbitrarily excluded from a municipal theater on the basis of its objectionable content). In some
of the content discrimination cases, however, the government has chosen to grant access to speech
within a particular subject-matter category and to deny it for others. Government efforts to grant a
preferred status to certain private speakers and deprive others of a method of communication have
often failed. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,459-63 (1980) (concluding that a state cannot
discriminate between ideas expressed by labor picketers over those communicated by nonlabor pick
eters); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (holding that to permit labor picketing and
not other forms of picketing is impermissible content discrimination). But cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (holding that because of its special nonforum
status, school mail system could be made available to union that served as exclusive bargaining
representative and not to the rival uuion). In a situation like Wooley or Barnette, the government
forces an individual to disseminate a government-favored viewpoint. Such efforts can be considered
a form of forbidden reverse viewpoint discrimination designed to promote, not censor, a particular
idea, and can be viewed as analytically different from government promotion of a favored idea by
government speech. See infra note 134. The difference lies in the fact that in cases in which the
government coerces individuals to assist in a government publicity campaign it is infringing directly
on the constitutional rights of such persons. The government, therefore, bears a heavy burden of
justification to legitimate its actions.
Barnette involved a far more offensive version of government use of the citizenry to spread a
government-supported message than did Wooley. In Barnette, the government's tactics obscured the
source of the message. Although the government provided the occasion for the expression of patri
otic sentiments by mandating the flag salute, the participants appeared to genuinely support those
sentiments. By contrast, in Wooley the license plate bearing the state motto was supplied by the state
and nothing about its appearance on the vehicle suggested that the driver shared the view expressed
in the motto. Thus, the degree of complicity and duplicity in the government's scheme was far less
than in Barnette.
133. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 ("[W]here the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, •.•
such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier
for such message."); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."); see also supra note 28 (discussing the extent to which Justice Jackson's opinion in
Barnette may reveal an absolute prohibition of coerced expression of government supported ideas).
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promote some ideas at the expense of others, I34 it may not be able to use
the device of forced affirmation or support as a legitimate means to that
end. Such means may be per se illegitimate or may be inappropriate be
cause of the existence of less restrictive alternatives.
As the Wooley majority read Barnette, I35 the critical element was
the individual's animus at being forced to participate in the dissemination
of a state-sponsored message. The form of individual participation is not
critical: being forced to express support for that message and being
forced to disseminate it are both equally condemned. What does seem to
matter is the quantity of forced participation. A key factor appears to be
whether the state-composed message involves the individual only once or
as an ongoing demand.I36
These factors must be examined to judge their consistency with the
focus of the Court's concern in Barnette. The Barnette Court was princi
pally concerned with forced conformity because of the cost it exacted
from the individual and from a society that depends on individual partic
ipation in its government processes. To the extent that the state habitu
ally requires an act affirming belief in a particular idea, that fear is well
founded. The process of creating a universal voice sounding a single note
134. Government efforts to promote particular ideas must be considered in the context of the
subject of government speech. Questions have been raised as to whether constitutional limits should
be placed on the government's ability to promote favored ideas by participating as a speaker in the
marketplace of ideas. Scholarly commentary considering this question includes M. YuooF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLmCS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983);
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979);
Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 373 (1983); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565 (1980).
135. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's view that Wooley was
closely analogous to Barnette. Distinguishing Barnette, Justice Rehnquist noted that the State of
New Hampshire had not compelled the Maynards to speak or engage in any act that was akin to
speech in its communicative effect. Justice Rehnquist argued that the Barnette principle depended
on the coercion of an affirmative belief. He argued, "[T]he State must place the citizen in the posi
tion of either apparently or actually 'asserting as true' the message." 430 U.S. at 721. The May
nards were not placed in any such position because placing the license plate on their car did not
imply that they endorsed the state motto or agreed with the sentiment it expressed. /d. at 721-22.
Justice Rehnquist's view on this point is supported by Hoskin v. State, 112 N.H. 332, 336, 295 A.2d
454, 457 (1972), an earlier deeision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court considering several con
stitutional challenges raised by two persons who had been convicted of obliterating the state motto
appearing on their automobile license plates. The court rejected all the claims raised by the defend
ants, including their claim of deprivation of first amendment rights. I d.
Justice Rehnquist also stated there was nothing to prevent the Maynards from disclaiming the
idea communicated by the state motto through a bumper sticker placed alongside their license plate.
430 U.S. at 722. Justice Rehnquist apparently did not consider the dilemma his solution would
create: the Maynards would be able to counter state-coerced expression only by disclosing their
conflicting beliefs. Indirectly, then, the competing message remedy would involve compelled disclo
sure. See infra notes 196, 199-201 and accompanying text.
136. In both Barnette and Wooley, the challengers could point to daily repetitions of the offen
sive message and the fact that the message reached a wide audience and had a visible presence in the
marketplace of ideas at least in part because of compelled expression. See supra text preceding note
130.
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may be effective-the individual is impressed with the cost of noncon
formity, including the cost of being the lone dissenting voice, and the
price of nonconformity may seem too high for an individual to express a
dissenting opinion. Forced repetition of an idea may also make that idea
seem more acceptable as each repeated act of affirmation makes the
state-sponsored idea seem less and less objectionable.
Being forced to advertise the state's message, in contrast, may be
more easily shrugged off. Once attached to the car, the license plate can
be largely ignored by a driver not forced to perform any act of obeisance
to it. The state's message may be an irritant to individuals and they may
deeply resent the state's imposing on them the task of aiding in its dis
semination campaign, but an individual is not forced to choose between
the act of reciting the motto and imprisonment. '
To the extent that Wooley is a response to first amendment concerns
articulated in Barnette, it is not a response to the fear that forced con
formity poses a threat to our democratic system by weakening the incen
tive to introduce new, nonconforming ideas. Instead, its appeal is to the
vindication of individual personality. The Maynards felt their personal
integrity was violated by having to display the state motto; its presence
was an insult to deeply held religious, moral, and political beliefs. 137 Any
association between them and the motto on their license plate deeply af
fected their sense of personal well-being, because it affronted both their
inner selves and the selves they wished to present to the world. 138
Although the state's message did not create any pressure to conform,
137. Despite the Court's disclaimer on this point, it is impossible to judge how much the Court's
willingness to protect the concept of individual identity in Wooley might have been influenced by the
intensity of the Maynards' religiously based objections to the state's message. Interestingly, despite
that intensity, the record in Wooley indicates that Mr. Maynard was a "disfellowshipped" (a term
synonymous with excommunicated) Jehovah's Witness who had been expelled from a congregation
in Concord, New Hampshire. Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at A-40, Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977). In addition, charges of disturbing the peace had been brought against him by
the Elders of the Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses in Claremont, New Hampshire because he
disrupted a religious meeting. Id. at A-41. The record also indicates that not all Jehovah's Wit
nesses shared Mr. Maynard's view that the license plate bearing the state motto was objectionable.
Brief for Appellees at 59 n.35, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705 (1977). This factor, however,
would not be enough to deprive him of his claim based on religious belief so long as he was sincere in
his view. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
138. In other contexts, the Court has been less sympathetic to claims based on protection of
individual identity. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239, 248 (1976) (regulation of police
officer's hair length and style upheld); Daniel v. Paul, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (rejecting claim that
constitutionally protected liberty was denied when plaintiff's reputation was damaged by two police
chiefs' distribution to merchants of a flyer identifying plaintiff as a shoplifter). For a critical analysis
of the reasoning and result in Paul, see Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 405, 426 (1977) (arguing that the Court's analysis "ignores the spiritual character of human
personality"). Although some constitutionally based protection for individual identity is available in
contexts raising a claim of personal privacy, see, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
{protecting the right of private possession of obscene material), no such claim was available in
Wooley because the Maynards were not asserting the right to behave as they wished in the privacy of
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displaying that message made them feel like traitors to their belief sys"
tern. In all these ways it infringed upon their freedom from compelled
association with an idea with which they disagreed. To the extent that
the first amendment as reflected in Barnette speaks to such an interest,
Wooley is consistent with it. The major thrust of Barnette, however, was
more concerned with the instrumental values served by the free speech
guarantee and less with its identity"reinforcing side. To that extent, the
values at stake in Wooley were different ones.
Thus, the Wooley Court's concerns appear to be two"fold. First, the
Court limited the tools available to government for the dissemination of
govemment"favored ideas. The government may advertise, promote, and
fund certain ideas, but cannot force unwilling citizens to participate in its
advertising campaign. This theme was, of course, apparent in Barnette
as well; 13 9 Justice Jackson's opinion recognized the need to check the
power of government so as to curb excesses that could lead us down the
road to a totalitarian state. 140 Second, Wooley limited infringement on
the freedom of individuals to associate only with ideas of their own
choosing. In this aspect of the opinion, the Wooley Court went a step
beyond Justice Jackson's primary concern in Barnette, supplementing a
concern for individual freedom of mind as a precondition for democracy
with the concept of protecting individual personality as an end in itself.
V. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
The Court's next confrontation with the Barnette principle came in
a distinctly different context. Only one month after Wooley, the Court
decided Abood v. Detroit Board ofEducation, 141 a challenge to an aspect
of Michigan law authorizing union representation for public sector em"
ployees. Michigan pennitted "agency"shop arrangements"-agreements
between a union and employer whereby nonunion employees represented
by the union were required to pay a service fee to the union. 142 The
service fee equalled what union members paid as union dues.
In Abood, an agency-shop arrangement was part of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Detroit Federation of Teachers and
the Detroit Board of Education. Two nonunion teachers filed lawsuits
charging that the service fee arrangement violated the constitutional
their home, but instead wanted to be free of government intrusion in the public activity of driving
their car.
139. See 319 U.S. at 642.
140. /d. at 640-41.
141. 431 u.s. 209 (1977).
142. The distinctions between agency-shop and union-shop arrangements are discussed infra
note 151.
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rights of teachers "who object to public sector unions as such or to vari
ous union activities financed by the compulsory service fees." 143
The Court viewed the case as presenting three not altogether separa
ble issues. One issue was the constitutionality of the agency shop, which
forced nonunion employees to support the union despite the decision of
those employees not to join the union. The challengers claimed this re
quirement violated their rights to freedom of association not in the tradi
tional sense of interfering with a desired association but in the sense of
compelling an undesired association. 144 In this respect, Abood was far
from the first time the Court had been confronted with such a claim. 14s
The second and third issues in Abood concerned the service fee re
quirement and the purposes for which the service fee money was spent.
Some of the funds supported the union's collective bargaining activities,
and the challengers objected to being forced to finance such activities
against their will. In addition, the challengers alleged that service fee
money was also used to promote political views, to support political can
didates, and to advance other ideological activities. 146 The challengers
claimed that they did not approve of these political activities and would
not willingly support them.
Both challenges to the use of service fee money raised a free speech
issue. In effect, nonunion employees were compelled to support activi
ties, ideas, and causes against their will. The form of that support was
fmancial, rather than a verbal committmetit as in Barnette or providing
advertising space as in Wooley. The question before the Court was the
extent to which the right to freedom of expression as defined in Barnette
and Wooley was implicated by forced financing.
All three issues in Abood required reference to first amendment con
straints on government-compelled sponsorship of ideas. Although the
connection between a compelled affirmation such as a pledge of alle
giance and compelled funding is obvious, a somewhat more complex re
lationship exists between compelled affirmation and compelled
association. The roots of that relationship are found in the intertwining
of the freedom of association and the freedom of expression.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that, although freedom of
association is not named in the first amendment, it is a correlative right
143. 431 U.S. at 211. The two lawsuits, both flied in state court, were identical except for the
fact that one, Warczak v. Board of Educ., 73 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 2237 (Jan. 19, 1970), was a
class action and the other, filed by D. Louis Abood and other named teachers, was not. The two
cases were consolidated in the trial court.
144. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213.
145. For a discussion of these earlier precedents, see infra text accompanying notes 150-58.
146. 431 U.S. at 232.
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inextricably linked to the specifically enumerated first amendment free
doms.147 Freedom of association must be protected to enable persons
with shared beliefs to join together, free from government interference, to
work toward a more general acceptance of their ideas. Collective activ
ity, in many cases, may be the most effective method for spreading new
ideas. Protecting only the right of individuals to engage in activities fos
tered by the first amendment-and not the right to associate with others
to engage in those activities-would greatly weaken the ability of diverse
and divergent viewpoints to be heard in the marketplace of ideas. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court has protected freedom of association in
a variety of contexts. 148
The argument of the nonunion teachers in Abood was that just as
there is a freedom to associate to pursue activities protected by the first
amendment, there is also a freedom not to asso.ciate. If one is forced to
associate with a group against one's will, the impact on the individual is
akin to the impact produced by the forced pledge in Barnette. In an
agency-shop situation, through the mechanism of selecting an exclusive
bargaining representative, nonunion employees are compelled to lend
their apparent support to and be represented by a group whose philoso
phy is at odds with the individual employee's own values. Moreover, by
requiring nonunion employees to pay a service fee, those employees are
forced to help finance the union's collective bargaining activities. The
forced funding therefore operates as an additional form of compelled as
sociation, tying the nominally nonunion employees into an even closer
involuntary relationship with the union. 149
Responding to the arguments advanced by the nonunion teachers,
147. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces
freedom of speech."); see also Emerson, Freedom ofAssociation and Freedom ofExpression, 14 YALE
LJ. I (1964) (discussing the difficulties with an independent constitutional doctrine of "freedom of
association"); Fellman, Constitutional Rights ofAssociation, 1961 SuP. Cr. REv. 74 (analyzing free
dom of association in the context of decisions of the 1960 Supreme Court Term); Raggi, An In
dependent Right to Freedom ofAssociation, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977) (considering the
potential of an independent constitutional doctrine of freedom of association).
148. The Court has struck down efforts to penalize individuals for membership in a disfavored
group, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957), and has prevented compelled disclosure of the names of association members when that
disclosure was likely to deter membership in the group, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960). The classic rationale for prohibiting compelled disclosure of association membership lists
was first set out in NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In Patterson, the
Court observed, "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indis
pensible to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs." Id. at 462.
149. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 ("To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining
agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to
associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so as he sees fit.").
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the Court linked two aspects of the Michigan agency-shop arrangement.
Compelling nonunion teachers to accept the union as their only collec
tive bargaining agent and requiring them to pay a service charge as their
fair share of the cost of collective bargaining activities were viewed by the
Court as raising a single constitutional issue. The challenge to the use of
service fees for non-collective-bargaining, ideological activities engaged
in by the union was treated as a separate constitutional issue.
In disposing of the first issue, that of the constitutionality of the
exclusive representation aspect of the agency shop and the required fee
for collective bargaining activities, the Court was able to point to prior
decisions approving of similar arrangements. As early as 1956, in Rail
way Employes' Department v. Hanson, 150 the Supreme Court upheld the
union-shop provision of the·Railway Labor Act 151 against a challenge
from nonunion railroad e171ployees. The Hanson claimants alleged that
their freedom of thought and association protected by the first amend
ment was violated by compelled association with a group whose political
and ideological views they did not share. 152 The Hanson Court re
sponded by pointing to the absence of any evidence in the record to show
that compelled membership would "forc[e] ideological conformity" 153
and lead to an impairment of free speech rights. In the absence of such
evidence, the facial validity of the union-shop provision was upheld.
Five years after Hanson, the Court once again had an opportunity to
rule on the compelled-association question in Lathrop v. Donahue, 154 a
150. 351 u.s. 225 (1956).
151. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952). The union-shop arrangement in Hanson differed somewhat from
the agency-shop provision in Abood. Under a union-shop agreement, all employees are required to
become members of the union as a condition of employment, and as union members, they must pay
all union dues and fees. In contrast, under an agency-shop arrangement, employees need not become
formal members of the union. Instead, they may opt to pay an agency fee to the union, the amount
of which is equivalent to union dues. In the Supreme Court's view, the union-shop arrangement
permitted under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), and the Railway
Labor Act, Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, § 152, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238, 1238-39 (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982)), is the "practical eqnivalent" of the agency shop, Abood, 431 U.S. at
217 n.10 (quoting NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 3'73 U.S. 734, 743 (1963)), because membership
in the union cannot be conditioned on anything other than the payment of dues and fees. NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 742 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,40-42
(1954). Thus, union membership amounts to nothing more than the payment of a sum of money, the
very thing required under the agency-shop arrangement. The Supreme Court has never fully re
solved the question of whether this "technical distinction" may have constitutional significance in
some contexts. General Motors, 373 U.S. at 744.
152. 351 U.S. at 236.
153. /d. at 238.
154. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961),
decided the same day as Lathrop, provided the Court with a similar opportunity. In Street, the
Court considered a further challenge to the Railway Labor Act's union-shop provisions. 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1952). Unlike the challengers in Hanson, the appellees in Street argued that a significant part
of the union dues was used by the union to contribute to political campaigns and promote political
causes with which they disagreed and that this use violated first amendment rights. The Supreme
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challenge to Wisconsin's integrated bar system. Under Wisconsin law,
an attorney had to be a dues-paying member of the State Bar of Wiscon
sin to practice law. Membership dues funded various activities including
investigating complaints of lawyer misconduct, promoting continuing
legal education to increase lawyer competency, creating study groups to
evaluate the state's judicial system and the quality of legal education, and
engaging in legislative and political lobbying activities. 155 The Wisconsin
system was challenged by an attorney who argued that he was being
compelled to support an organization that engaged in political and prop
aganda activities that he opposed in violation of his right to freedom of
association. The compelled support was in the form of fifteen dollars in
annual dues.
In evaluating the appellant's constitutional objection, the Court
looked first at the purposes the state intended to further through its inte
grated bar system-promoting "high standards of practice and the eco
nomical and speedy enforcement oflegal rights." 156 The Court held that,
in order to improve the quality of legal services, the state was permitted
to require that the costs of this effort be borne by the state's lawyers 157
and that the state's means were sufficiently tailored to the achievement of
the desired ends.1ss
In light of the Hanson and Lathrop holdings, the Abood Court could
Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question. As a matter of statutory construc
tion, the Court ruled that the Act did not vest the union with absolute discretion in the use of an
employee's dues. Under the Act, unions were not free to use compelled membership fees to promote
political activities opposed by the employee contributing that money. 367 U.S. at 768-69. Professor
Wellington has described the Supreme Court's decision in Street as "a slick but shallow performance
in the delicate art of avoiding constitutional questions through statutory interpretation." Welling
ton, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961
SUP. Cr. REv. 49, 73.
155. 367 U.S. at 828-31.
156. /d. at 833 (quoting In reIntegration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 283, 77 N.W.2d 602, 603
(1956)).
157. /d. at 843. The Court's conclusion that the burden imposed on the state's lawyers was
reasonable in light of the state's purposes was supported by reference to its earlier decision in Rail
way Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). As in Hanson, the Court found no interfer
ence with freedom of association "in light of the limitation of the membership requirement to the
compulsory payment of reasonable annual dues." 367 U.S. at 843.
158. 367 U.S. at 843. The issue of whether appellant's money could be used, over his objection,
to further the political agenda of the State Bar was reached on the merits by only five members of the
Court and those members were divided three-to-two. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion joined
by Justice Frankfurter, concluded that all political uses of the dues money were permissible. In
Justice Harlan's view this result was justified for a number of reasons. First, in opting for an inte
grated bar, Wisconsin was not guilty of any improper " 'establishment' of political beliefs" because
the political positions likely to be taken by the Integrated Bar were far from predictable. /d. at 853.
Second, requiring financial support for views one disagrees with is not likely to have a "substantial
limiting effect on one's right to speak and be heard" expressing a differing opinion. /d. at 856.
Finally, Justice Harlan distinguished Barnette because the contribution of money was a much Jess
"concrete and intimate" expression of belief in a cause than is recitation of the pledge of allegiance,
id. at 858, and because the government's purpose was not to promote a particular viewpoint. /d. at
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easily approve the legitimacy of the agency shop itselfl 5 9 and the require
ment that nonunion employees support the union's collective bargaining
activities. 160 The problem presented by the use of dues money for other
purposes was more troublesome. All past efforts to present this issue to
the Court had failed. 161 This time, however, the Court found the issue
858-59. Justice Whittaker, concurring separately, also appeared willing to uphold all uses of the fee
against a constitutional challenge. Id. at 865.
In contrast, in separate dissenting opinions, Justices Black and Douglas viewed the exaction of
money to support candidates and causes one fmds objectionable a clear violation of the first amend
ment. Justice Black believed the interference with an individual lawyer's ability to think and speak
freely outweighed the state's interest. Id. at 874. Justice Douglas carefully distinguished the Inte
grated Bar from the labor union. Although freedom of association might need to be compromised in
the interest of labor peace, forced association of members of a profession was not necessary to fur
ther any equally compelling purpose. Thus, Justice Douglas viewed the upholding of the union shop
in Hanson as providing no basis for upholding the Integrated Bar arrangement. ld. at 884.
159. The Court described the benefits of a system of exclusive representation:
The designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from
attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of
employment. It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work
force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization. It also frees the
employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and
permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not
subject to attack from rival labor organizations.
431 U.S. at 220-21. In addition, the Court focused on the necessity of such a system for public
sector employees such as teachers:
The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers' unions, holding quite different
views as to the proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance
procedures, each sought to obtain the employer's agreement, are no different in kind from
the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid.
Id. at 224. This conclusion was reached in large part on the authority of Railway Employes' Dep't.
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961). The appellants in Abood attempted to distinguish those cases on the ground that they in
volved private-sector employees, unlike the public school teachers in Abood, but the Court found
that distinction unpersuasive. 431 U.S. at 229. The Court recognized that significant differences
exist between public-sector and private-sector collective bargaining, but did not believe those differ
ences granted public employees greater first amendment rights than their private seetor counter
parts. Id. at 232.
160. The Court noted that, under the exclusive representation system, the union is charged with
the duty of representing all employees, including nonmembers: it must negotiate and administer a
collective bargaining agreement and handle grievances raised by employees, all of which involve the
expenditure of time and money. The agency fee fairly allocates costs of the union's work to those
who benefit from it. The only alternative would be for nonunion employees to be "free riders,"
noncontributing members who would enjoy the same benefits as those that paid dues. 431 U.S. at
222. The need to prevent free riders is not the only explanation that has been offered for why a
system of compulsory membership or compulsory dues is necessary. It has also been argued that
compulsory unionism is essential in order to create large, national labor unions. SeeM. OLSON, THE
LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 87 (rev. ed. 1971).
Although the agency-shop arrangement necessarily interfered with the right of nonunion em
ployees to associate, the Court concluded that such an interference was justified by the important
benefits to the structure of labor relations in the public sector produced by the arrangement. See
supra note 159.
161. The issue of the constitutionality of the use of money from mandatory fees for political
causes over the objections of some contributors had been raised previously. See Lathrop v. Dona
hue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway
Employes' Dep't. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In both Hanson and Street, the issue had not been
viewed as ripe for decision. In Lathrop, the issue had been addressed by five members of the Court
but no majority had agreed on a resolution. See supra note 158.
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ripe for decision.
As a starting point in its analysis, the Court confronted the relation
ship between free speech and making financial contributions to support
chosen views. In Buckley v. Valeo 162 the Court had recognized that con
tributions in support of political candidates were expressions of views by
the contributors. As expressions of political opinions, these activities
merited first amendment protection. 163 The Abood Court reasoned that,
because contributing money for the dissemination of a political idea pro
moted speech, requiring a contribution used to promote an idea opposed
by the contributor was compelled support for an idea.l64
This connection between the compelled service fee and compelled
expression clearly implicated the teaching of Barnette and led the Court
to conclude that a nonunion teacher could not be required to contribute
funds to support "an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of
holding a job as a public school teacher." 165 Although the union could
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
163. The Court in Buckley recognized that contributions to political candidates were a symbolic
statement of support, but upheld the constitutionality of ceilings on contributions imposed by the
Federal Election Act of 1971, as amended in 1974. See Federal Election Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (amended 1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S. C.§§ 431-56 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)). This result was justified because "[t]he quantity of co=unication by the contributor
does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." 424 U.S. at 21. The Court's willingness to equate
speech and the expenditure of money as a statement of support for a candidate has been criticized.
See Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
164. 431 U.S. at 234-35.
165. Id. at 235. The Court's conclusion in Abood that compelled funding of political causes is
constitutionally impermissible has spawned a series of lawsuits challenging other forms of compelled
fee arrangements. Mandatory student fees exacted by state colleges and universities are a primary
focus of this litigation. In Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983), university students who
disagreed with views expressed in the student newspaper challenged the use of mandatory student
fee money to fund the paper. Despite the students' reliance on Abood, the court rejected their claim
based on a balancing of interests. In weighing the competing claims, the court viewed the students'
interests as minimal. By contrast, the university's interest in funding the newspaper was important
because the newspaper played a vital role in accomplishing the educational mission of the university
by providing a forum for the expression of students' ideas.
In Gaida v. Blaustein, 772 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1985), the court offered a different analysis.
Students successfully challenged the exaction of a mandatory refundable fee to support the operation
of the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), an independent political organization.
Their argument, based on Abood, was that they could not be compelled, as a condition of attending
tlte university, to contribute to a political cause with wltich tltey disagreed. Id. at 1063. The univer
sity argued that PIRG made a contribution to the education of the students and that the educational
value of tlte organization justified university funding through a student fee. Id. at 1067. In its
opinion striking down the mandatory fee, the court found the university had failed to demonstrate
any compelling state interest to justify its funding arrangement. Id. at 1068. The court was careful
to distinguish cases involving objections to expenditures to support campus organizations that were
funded by a general activities fee. Id. at 1064. The critical factor in Gaida was that PIRG was an
outside political organization operating independently of the university. On tlte difficulties of draw
ing an analogy between union agency fees and mandatory student fees, see Comment, "Fee Speech":
First Amendment Limitations on Student Fee Expenditures, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 279, 292-95 (1984);
Note, The Constitutionality ofStudent Fees for Political Student Groups in the Campus Public Forum:
Gaida v. Blaustein and the Right to Associate, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 135, 164-67 (1983).
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spend funds on political activities not related to its collective bargaining
obligations, employees objecting to the advancing of those political ideas
could not be forced to contribute money toward their advancement. Re
alizing that drawing a line between the union's collective bargaining ac
tivities and other political activities would be difficult, the Court
nevertheless left that issue to a later day.l66
The Court's separate treatment of union activities related to collec
tive bargaining and other ideological activities was severely criticized in
Justice Powell's concurring opinion.l 67 Justice Powell concluded that
compelled union dues for public employees infringed first amendment
interests no matter what use of the funds was made by the union.l 68
"The ultimate objective of a union in the public sector," Justice Powell
noted, "like that of a political party, is to influence public decisionmak
ing in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its member
ship."169 For Justice Powell, compelling ideologically opposed teachers
"to affiliate with the union by contributing to it infringes their First
Amendment rights to the same degree as compelling them to contribute
to a political party." 170 This was just as true of compelled support for
166. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236. Also left for another day was the final resolution of the remedial
issue. The Court had no doubts about the goal to be achieved in designing a remedy: "the objective
must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees
who object thereto without restricting the Union's ability to require every employee to contnoute to
the cost of collective-bargaining activities." Id. at 237. However, the Court posponed consideration
of the achievement of that goal by court decree until the parties had exhausted an internal union
remedy permitting an employee to protest the use of fee money for political canses at the beginning
of each school year and to receive a refund of that part of the employee's serviee fee used for the
protested purpose. Id. at 240 n.41. The constitutional sufficiency of this union procedure was not
ripe for review. Id. at 242 n.45.
167. Justiee Powell's first disagreement with the majority reasoning stemmed from the opinion's
off-handed conclusion that clear precedent existed for upholding the agency-shop arrangement as
applied to public-sector employees. As Justiee Powell read the case law, the Court had found only
that statutory authorization of union-shop agreements voluntarily entered into by private employers
did not violate the first amendment. Id. at 250. That case law did not comment on the very differ
ent status of public employees and whether government employees could be eompeiled by their
government employer to pay union dues as a condition of employment. In Justice Powell's view,
"the government may authorize private parties to enter into voluntary agreements whose terms it
could not adopt as its own." Id.
168. Id. at 255.
169. Id. at 256.
170. Id. at 257. Justice Powell's views found support in the Court's decision of ouly one year
earlier in Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), a case involving a challenge to patronage dismissals
by the Sheriff's Office in Cook County, Illinois. A Republican sheriff was replaced by Richard
Elrod, a Democrat. Upon assuming his new position, Mr. Elrod followed the accepted practice of
requiring all non-civil-service employees who were not members of his party to either affiliate with
that political party, gain the support of the party, or be dismissed from their jobs, to be replaced by
party members. A number of employees who either had lost or were in danger of losing their jobs
filed a lawsuit claiming a violation of their first amendment rights to freedom of belief and associa
tion.
The Supreme Court agreed with their claim. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion identified the
patronage practices as forcing employees to switch their political allegiances under threat of losing
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collective bargaining· activities as for political activities, because
"[c]ollective bargaining in the public sector is 'political.' " 171
In Justice Powell's view, all compelled financing of union activities
seriously infringed the free speech and association rights of dissenting
teachers; therefore strict scrutiny of the government purpose was neces
sary. Under that scrutiny, the government's case was devoid of the nec
essary justification. Two state purposes had been asserted: first, that
exclusive union representation was necessary to prevent the confusion
and conflict that would flow from authorizing more than one union to
represent members of a single group of employees and negotiate with
their employer on their behalf; and second, related to the first, that under
an exclusive representation system it was necessary to prevent "free rid
ers" from benefitting from union representation.l 72
Justice Powell remained unconvinced by these explanations and
concluded that the government had failed to meet its burden of proof.
The restrictive effects of the arrangement-preventing minority employ
ees from being represented by their own union and from negotiating di
rectly with their employer-had not been proven necessary to promote
important government interests. 173 Similarly, on the record before the
Court, he found the government had not demonstrated that the payment
of fees by dissenting employees was needed to serve the interest of labor
peace and to avoid the free rider effect. 174
their jobs. Such coerced association and belief implicated the teachings of Barnette and, therefore,
violated the first amendment. Moreover, the first amendment did not permit requiring political
allegiance as a condition of public employment unless the government could show it was utilizing the
least restrictive means to achieve a vital end. /d. at 363. That standard was not satisfied by the
government except as to those employees who held policy-making positions. /d. at 372-73. Interest
ingly, Justice Powell relied on Elrod in his opinion in Abood but had dissented in Elrod. His Elrod
dissent had questioned whether any first amendment right was implicated by the patronage system
challenged in that case. /d. at 380. In addition, to the extent that first amendment rights were
infringed, Justice Powell viewed the infringement as minor and outweighed by the benefits of the
system. /d. at 382.
Four years after its decision in Elrod, the Court in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), consid
ered an additional challenge to patronage dismissals. This time the Court made clear that the dis
charged employees need not show that they had "been eoerced into changing, either actually or
ostensibly, their political allegiance." /d. at 517. Because Elrod had been decided on the ground
that party affiliation was an unconstitutional condition, all the employees needed to demonstrate was
that their discharge had resnlted from their failure to be affiliated with the appropriate political
party. Once such a showing was made, it was up to the government employer to "demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office in
volved." /d. at 518.
171. 431 U.S. at 257.
172. /d. at 260.
173. /d. at 262.
174. /d. at 262-63. In addition to the inadequacy of the government's justification for the intru
sion on first amendment interests, Justice Powell objected to the procedural burdens imposed on a
nonunion employee who disagreed with some union uses of fee money. Such employees were re
quired to announce their opposition to certain union activities on ideological grounds. In addition,
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Although the majority and Justice Powell differed in their reason
ing, both opinions embodied a common assumption in that they relied on
the aptness of the analogy between the compelled fmancial support in
Abood and the compelled affirmation in Barnette. It was assumed that
because there was a free speech right to contribute, there correlatively
had to be a right not to contribute. Although this causal assumption was
made, neither opinion explored whether a parallel really existed between
nonunion teachers forced to pay union dues and Jehovah's Witnesses
forced to salute the flag.
Analyzing this proposition requires returning to the Barnette deci
sion and to the dual values protected by preventing governmental imposi
tion of ideas: the long-term benefits society receives from innovative
thinkers in its midst, and the individual's right to be one's own person.
In exploring the impact on these objectives of requiring payment of union
dues by nonmembers, separate attention should be given to the two as
pects of the problem viewed as constitutionally distinct by the Abood ma
jority opinion: first, forced support for collective bargaining activities;
and second, payment for union political activities. An initial question is
the impact that the agency-shop arrangement has on personal autonomy.
The agency shop interferes with individual freedom to choose the
kind of person one wishes to be to the extent that the individual objects
to being forced to become a union supporter or a person represented by a
union. If the individual's true self is antiunion-based on a belief in
speaking for oneself and not as part of a group or through a representa
tive--that self is compromised by the agency-shop arrangement. The ef
fect is at least as intrusive as the state motto embossed on their license
plate was for the Jehovah's Witnesses in Wooley. In fact, to the extent
that the protection extended to individuals also includes a right to con
trol how they will appear to the world, the impact of the agency shop is
even more destructive of individual rights: there is a greater likelihood
that every worker in an agency shop will be considered a union supporter
than that someone will be viewed as a believer in a state motto because it
appears on their license plate.
This same individual resentment at forced association will be exper
ienced by an employee whether the compelled act is contributing to
the employees were then put to the task of instituting a proceeding to establish what percentage of
the union's budget had been allocated to non-collective-bargaining activities that were offensive to
the political views of the employee. Only after such a proceeding would these employees be entitled
to a rebate of the share of their dues that had been expended for such purposes. In Justice Powell's
view, this procedure reversed the first amendment norm by shifting the burden of proof from the
government to dissenting employees. Id. at 254-55. The majority viewed the adequacy of the rebate
procedure as not ripe for decision. See supra note 166.
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union collective bargaining activities or financing union-supported polit
ical causes. If the union endorses Candidate X or lobbies for the passage
of Bill Y, dissenting employees will feel that their ability to control both
who they are and the image they present to the world has been compro
mised by forced contributions to union support of these causes. Interest
ingly, there seems to be no difference in the degree of offensiveness to the
individual between being compelled to support union political and
nonpolitical activities. How offended an employee will be may reflect
how opposed the individual employee is to the union itself rather than to
any particular cause it supports; some may more deeply resent the use of
service fees for union labor representational activities, while others may
be more annoyed at supporting some union-approved political causes,
and still others may resent them both equally.
Thus, if one takes the view that Barnette recognizes the integrity of
individual identity as a facet of first amendment protection, the service
fee requirement in all of its aspects raises a valid claim of first amend
ment interference. It may be, as the Abood majority argued, that the
government has a sufficiently compelling justification for forced funding
of collective bargaining activities, 175 but that it cannot justify required
funding of political and ideological causes. Both situations, however,
give rise to the same claim of infringement of a protected interest. 176
Analyzing the infringement of the individual's willingness to be as
sociated with dissident ideas-the societal concern at the heart of Justice
Jackson's Barnette opinion-is somewhat more complex. From the per
spective of this instrumental value, the situation of the nonunion em
ployee in Abood is very unlike that of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Barnette
or Wooley. Under the agency-shop arrangement, the nonunion employee
is not forced to take a pledge of allegiance to union ideals or to belong to
the union in any technical sense. 177 The dissident employee is not even
forced to advertise the union's message and never wears the "union la
bel." The employee's forced association is less personal and direct-it
consists of paying a fee to the union knowing that the union will use the
money to support its activities. Although that may make an individual
react with resentment, the compelled association is no more active than
175. 431 U.S. at 222.
176. A similar conclusion has been expressed elsewhere in more extreme terms: "Can there be
any doubt that the state's requirement that dissenting public employees contribute monies to an
organization engaged in objectionable political or ideological activities violates the First Amend
ment, even if the compelled contribution is limited to the organization's collective bargaining ex
penses?" Pulliam, Legal Aspects of Exclusive Representation: Ruminations on the Private-Public
Sector Analogy, 5 J. LAB. RES. 351, 367 (1984).
177. See supra note 151.
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that.I 78
Despite this obvious difference in the degree of the activities com
pelled in Abood and Barnette, the critical question is whether a nonunion
employee will be less willing or likely to assert antiunion positions after
being compelled to pay union dues and to accept represention by the
union in collective bargaining.I 7 9 Because an agency shop forces the
nonunion employee into dependency on the union, this forced association
may well reduce the employee's zest for antiunion activities. Coopta
tion Iso is possible, if not probable, in this setting. Because the union
and no other organization or individual, including the employee-repre
sents the workers, an employee must work with the union to have per
sonal views taken into account. This circumstance tips the scales in favor
of becoming one of them instead of remaining a dissident.
Thus, even though the level of the compulsion is not as active as in
Barnette or Wooley, the same threat exists for the diversity of ideas in the
marketplace, or more particularly the workplace. From this analysis, it
appears that Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Abood is correct in
178. This view of the extent of the forced association in Abood is consistent with the view ex
pressed in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 858 (1961):
What seems to me obvious is the large difference in degree between, on the one hand, being
compelled to raise one's hand and recite a belief as one's own, and, on the other, being
compelled to contribute dues to a bar association fund which is to be used in part to pro
mote the expression of views in the name of the organization (not in the name of the dues
payor), which views when adopted may tum out to be contrary to the views of the dues
payor. I think this is a situation where the difference in degree is so great as to amount to a
difference in substance.
/d. at 858. For a further discussion of the Lathrop case, see supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
179. Under many public-sector labor relations laws, the union's involvement with the nonunion
employee extends beyond the payment of an agency fee and the representation of those employees as
their exclusive bargaining agent. Thus, the union may play a role in the resolution of any employee/
employer grievance. That role may vary from the union having exclusive control of access to the
grievance mechanism, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.211 (West 1978) (making desig
nated representative of public employee unit its exclusive representative), construed in Mellon v.
Board ofEduc., 22 Mich. App. 218, 177 N.W.2d 187 (1970), to the union grievance procedure being
optional. Under some statutes, if the nonunion employee opts to complain to the employer without
resorting to the union grievance procedure, the union representative has the right to be present at
any conference between the employee and employer and no settlement of the dispute may violate the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1606(b) (Smith-Hurd
1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 5 (West 1976). See generally Finkin, The Limits of
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980) (discussing the limits that
should be imposed on collective bargaining agreements in both the public and private sectors); Note,
Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty ofFair Representation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 752 (1976) (considering whether right of public employees may be determined through infor
mal contract procedures consistently with the fourteenth amendment's due process clause).
180. Cooptation is defined as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or
policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or
existenee." P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS-A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL
ORGANIZATION 13 (1949) (emphasis omitted).
The process of cooptation has been well described in the social science literature. See, e.g., J.S.
COLEMAN, CoMMUNITY CONFLICT 17 (1957); W. GAMSON, POWER AND DISCONTENT 135-39
(1968); C.W. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 348-49 (1956); P. SELZNICK, supra, at 13-16.
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arguing that the Court's casual treatment of the constitutionality of the
public sector agency-shop arrangement is unjustified in light of first
amendment principles. lsi
Ironically, it appears that the constitutional problem taken most se
riously by the majority in Abood-union use of service fee money to sup
port political causes opposed by some nonunion employees-actually
poses a lesser threat to the instrumental values underlying the first
amendment preserved in Barnette. Assuming that some of the service fee
money is used to suppport candidates and causes opposed by dissident
employees, what effect will that fact have on those employees? Will they
be less likely to speak out on those issues? Will the union's assertion of
one view make them less likely to speak out in favor of an opposing view?
This seems unlikely. The union's political involvement is not a surrogate
for involvement on the part of individual employees because employees
have not given their proxy to the union, authorizing it to participate in
the political process in their stead. The union may be their exclusive
representative at the collective bargaining table, but not in the voting
booth. 182 The employee loses no freedom to work for candidates or
causes. 183 In fact, it is just as likely that the employee will become more
politically involved. Union support of one view may be the catalyst that
turns an employee's passive belief in an opposing view into an active in
volvement. Upgraded political involvement may grow out of annoyance
that dues are being used by the union to further causes or candidates the
employee opposes. Thus, the danger posed by union expenditures for
political activities does not seem nearly as serious as the fear of forced
conformity expressed in Barnette. Although the use of compulsory dues
for political purposes may intrude on the right of selfhood, it does not
inevitably infringe on individual willingness to contribute to the market
place of ideas.
181. See supra note 167 and text accompanying notes 167-74.
182. The union may not even be able to influence "willing" union members to endorse the
union's political positions. For example, 45% of union households voted for Ronald Reagan in the
1984 presidential election despite union support for Walter Mondale. Raskin, Labor's Grand Illu
sion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 52.
183. The participation of public employees in political activities is curtailed by statutory limita
tions. For a description of these limitations at both the state and federal level, see Developments in
the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611, 1651-60 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Public
Employment]. The constitutionality of such legislation has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606-18 (1973) (upholding Oklahoma statute restricting
the partisan political activities of classified state employees); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557-81 (1973) (upholding§ 9(a) of the Hatch Act,
5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1982), which prohibits federal employees from playing an active role in polit
ical campaigns, running for local office, and engaging in other significant partisan political
activities).
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PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins

The doctrine first announced in the '1940s through Barnette had lan
guished during the fifties and sixties and finally picked up steam in the
1970s with Wooley and Abood. In both cases the Barnette principle had
been successfully invoked and expanded to cover situations involving
something less than a compelled affrrmation of a government-dictated
belief. Finally, in 1980 with the Supreme Court's decision in Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 184 the Court identified a terminus for the Bar
nette doctrine. Confronted with a claim of forced participation in the
dissemination of an idea, the Court distinguished the situation from that
of earlier cases.
In Prune Yard a group of high school students had solicited signa
tures for a petition declaring opposition to a United Nations resolution
against Zionism. In order to obtain signatures, they had set up a table at
the privately owned PruneYard Shopping Center in Campbell, Califor
nia. After being asked to leave the shopping center by a security guard,
they flied suit in the California Superior Court alleging they had a right
of access to the shopping center. 185 On appeal, the California Supreme
Court agreed with the students and ruled that such a right existed under
the California Constitution's protection for speech and petitioning. 186
After this decision, the shopping center and its owner appealed to the
United States Supreme Court arguing that California's interpretation of
its state constitution violated their rights under the fourteenth amend
ment.187 The first amendment argument made by appellants was that "a
private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by
184. 447 u.s. 74 (1980).
185. The California Superior Court of Santa Clara County ruled that the high school students
had no right of access to the shopping center under either the state or federal constitution. That
decision was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Id. at 77-78.
186. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 860 (1979). Article I,§ 2 of the California Constitution read: "Every person may freely
speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Section 3 of art. I stated that
"people have the right to ... petition government for redress of grievances ...." The California
Supreme Court noted that these provisions gave greater protection to free speech than did the first
amendment of the United States Constitution and held that the students' activities were thus pro
tected. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 910, 592 P.2d at 346, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859, 860 (quoting
Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975)).
187. Their first two constitutional claims-that the state had "taken" their property without just
compensation and, that they had been deprived of property without due process of law-were re
jected by the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the "taking" claim on the ground that there was
no showing that the commercial value or usefulness of the property had been unreasonably impaired
by granting appellees access rights. 447 U.S. at 83. The fourteenth amendment due process argu
ment failed because the state's action was justified by its desire to promote freedom of expression.
Id. at 85.
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the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others." 188
Appellants relied on Wooley and Barnette for authority to support this
claim, but Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court distinguished both
cases.
Wooley was found inapplicable for three reasons. First, a distinction
existed because the message in Wooley had been dictated by the govern
ment itself. 189 In contrast, the government was not disseminating any
particular message in the shopping center but was granting members of
the public an access right so that they could display whatever messages
they chose. Furthermore, in Wooley the law forbade the Maynards to
cover up the state's motto, but the center's owner could "disavow any
connection with the message by simply posting signs." 19° Finally, unlike
the Maynards' automobile, the shopping center was a business establish
ment generally open to members of the public. It was therefore unlikely
that the message disseminated by the students on shopping center prop
erty would be taken to represent the views of the center as opposed to the
students. 191
Barnette posed no greater difficulties. The government was not ask
ing the center to communicate their agreement with a government-spon
sored idea. 192 The center's owner was not asked to adopt any position,
only to provide a fornm for the expression of the ideas of others, and was
entitled to identify those ideas as ones he disagreed with.I93
188. Id. at 85.
189. Id. at 87.
190. Id. In reality, the shopping center could not "cover up" the message of the high school
students, although it could announce that the center did not share the views being expressed, thereby
disavowing any association between the center and the message. Justice Rehnquist had dissented in
Wooley and argued that the Maynards had not been placed "in the position of either apparently or
actually 'asserting as true' the message." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). The shopping center owner's position was closely analogous, making Justice Rehn
quist's position in the two cases consistent. The self-help remedy Justice Rehnquist suggested for the
Maynards-a disclaiming bumper sticker, see supra note 135-thus was promoted from a dissenting
view in Wooley to part of the majority opinion in PruneYard; see also infra note 193 (discussing right
to disavow in other cases).
191. 447 U.S. at 87.
192. Id. at 88.
193. The Supreme Court also distinguished Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974), in which the Court struck down Florida's right-of-reply statute. See supra note 117.
The Court pointed to the fact that the decision in Tornillo rested on the impermissibility of telling a
newspaper what to print and the fact that the statute might deter the publication of critical com
ments about candidates for public office. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88.
The Court's attempts to distinguish Tornillo from PruneYard ignored some interesting similari
ties between the cases. In both, the compelled message was not sponsored by the government but
came from a member of the public, albeit in Tornillo a candidate for public office. Also, in both
cases there was a right to disavow. In Tornillo, the newspaper's labeling an article as a candidate's
reply to critical comments previously printed by the paper would serve as a disavowal of the views
expressed in the article. Finally, in both cases there was little possibility that the message would be
assumed to reflect the views of the provider of the forum. In the newspaper's case, this would be
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Two separate concurring opinions in PruneYard commented further
on the free speech issue in the case. Justices White and Powell agreed
that there was no merit to the claim of interference with freedom of ex
pression by the shopping center owner. Both also agreed, however, that
the first amendment claim would not be so easily disposed of were other
circumstances presented to the Court.l94
Justice Powell elaborated on the circumstances in which a more suc
cessful free speech claim might be raised. Three factors, none present in
PruneYard, would be important: first, the likelihood that customers
would suppose the views expressed in appellees' petitions reflected the
opinions of the property owner; second, an objection to the specific ideas
being asserted; and third, the possibility that the views communicated
will be so objectionable that a property owner would feel compelled to
respond even in the absence of any confusion as to source.
Justice Powell saw Wooley as applicable to all property owners and
as permitting "a person [to refuse] to allow use of his property as a mar
ketplace for the ideas of others." 195 This principle applied equally
whether the state mandated a message of its own or whether it created
access for third parties. In either situation, the property owner was faced
with an untenable choice: either permit the speech and allow it to be
interpreted as the property owner's own message, or be forced to disavow
it, thereby giving up the right to remain silent. 196 The ideas expressed
could be so objectionable to the property owner that, even in the absence
of confusion as to source, a response would be dictated by the conscience
of the owner. The state, by creating the right of access, would in effect
even less likely because the reply would be labeled so as to disassociate the paper from the views
being expressed. These factors were considered in Prune Yard (and in the Wooley dissent, see supra
notes 135, 190), but played no role in the Court's invalidation of a "compulsion" statute in Tornillo.
One is left with the impression that compulsion against the press may more easily violate first
amendment rights than compulsion directed against a nonmedia speaker. This view, is of course,
inconsistent with the Court's oft-expressed viewpoint that the press has no special status under the
first amendment. E.g., First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972). Not all of the Justices, however,
accept this position. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571-72 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur Constitution does not explicitly protect the practice of
medicine or the business of banking from all abridgement by government. It does explicitly protect
the freedom of the press."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., joined by
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("The Court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects
a disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our society."). Justice Stevens
dissented separately in Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 577, as did Justice Douglas in a companion case to
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 71 1 (dissenting in United States v. Caldwell).
194. 447 U.S. at 96 (White, J., concurring); id. at 97-101 (Powell, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 97. Justice Powell also read Abood to support constitutional protection against being
compelled to lend support to an objectionable idea. Because the students had not argued that Abood
supported their claim, id. at 98 n.2, Justice Powell only briefly discussed the case.
196. Id. at 99.
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compel the owner to speak out in opposition to the views being expressed
on the property.
The PruneYard majority, in contrast to Justice Powell, found the
situation easily distinguishable from both Wooley and Barnette. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the majority took the view that the identity of
the promulgator of the sentiment being expressed is key. 197 Justice Pow
ell disagreed with that approach 19 8 and treated as the crux of the matter
the level of the coerced individual's antipathy to the message. If the core
value protected by the Barnette doctrine is the nonconforming individ
ual's right to be free from government efforts to stamp out the urge to be
different, then Justice Rehnquist is clearly correct. It is only when the
message being fostered comes with a government seal of approval that an
individual's own views are at risk. If the government simply requires
access, instead of one insistent message, the result is a cacophony of ideas
unlikely to affect a property owner's independence of thought. The
source of the coerced message is not critical only if the central value is
vindication of personality. In that case, the property owner's reaction to
being forced to provide a forum would be more important than the iden
tity of the speaker given access to that fornm. Under this approach, the
individual's resentment at forced association with a detested cause wonld
be enough to raise a claim of constitutional right. Thus, the opinions of
Justices Rehnquist and Powell represent significantly different points of
view about the interests deserving of constitutional protection through
the free speech guarantee. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is con
cerned with individuality only as an instrument of democratic self-gov
ernment, but Justice Powell's opinion focuses on individuality for the
sake of the individual.
Another factor stressed by the majority opinion and criticized by
Justice Powell is the opportunity to disavow, 199 a method the majority
advanced for reducing the level of forced association. Although the
property owner must allow the speech to take place on the owner's prop
erty, at least the owner can disassociate himself from any disagreeable
ideas expressed so as to avoid appearing to support them. This means
property owners can set the record straight and not appear to others
what they are not; they can protect their own persona as they appear to
the world. Although the majority viewed this possibility as an advan
197. Id. at 87.
198. Id. at 98 ("But even when no particular message is mandated by the State, First Amend
ment interests are affected by state action that forces a property owner to admit third-party
speakers.").
199. See supra notes 135, 190, 193.
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tage, Justice Powell saw it as a burden because disavowal forces individu
als to make a public statement when they would rather be silent.
On closer examination, it appears that the opportunity to disavow is
nothing more than a make-weight in this discussion. Unless the individ
ual's ideas are themselves illegal so that their utterance can be punished,
or unless they have been required to swear allegiance to a particular idea
(as in the oath situation) so that disavowal amounts to perjury, there is
always an opportunity to disavow. As Justice Rehnquist had urged in
Wooley, a bumper sticker placed alongside the license plate would have
been an effective method of disavowal. 200 Even in Barnette, a public
statement of opposition to the pledge might have been made (and was) by
the Jehovah's Witnesses, but that would have been beside the point. Jus
tice Jackson's fear was not that compelled affirmers lacked an opportu
nity to disavow, but that they would cease to feel like speaking out
against the state-mandated message. Their objection to the government's
idea would be swept away in the tide of compelled conformity.
Although the opportunity to disavow may be irrelevant from the
perspective of the instrumental values behind Barnette, it has slightly
more relevance in the area of protection of personality. From that per
spective, if there is a chance to assert a differing view, at least individuals
have the chance to correct the record. They need not leave people with
the impression that they are something or someone that they are not.
This ability to set the record straight, however, is not without its costs, as
Justice Powell correctly pointed out. Utilizing this corrective measure
requires taking a public position, which in itself may violate notions of
privacy that individuals hold dear. Although the opportunity to disavow
may make the case marginally less offensive from the viewpoint of the
protection of individual personality, the associated costs suggest that this
factor should be given little constitutional significance.
The last factor stressed by the Prune Yard Court's majority opinion
is that the views expressed on shopping center property are not likely to
be assumed to be those of the owner. There is a clear relationship be
tween this factor and the opportunity to disavow because both concern
public perception of an individual and not the subjective impact on that
individual. Even if the public does not associate the ideas expressed with
the owner's personal viewpoint, the individual will still feel forced to pro
vide a showcase for disagreeable views. The forced association exists in
the property owner's mind even if it does not exist in the perceptions of
the public.
200. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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This factor, however, is not without significance. If the nature of
the compulsion creates no impression that the individual is expressing a
viewpoint, then it is unlikely that the individual's freedom of mind has
been affected in any way that threatens the democratic process. Addi
tionally, from the point of view of protection of individual personality, if
the public is not likely to view an individual as having made any state
ment of personal philosophy, the individual will not have been put in the
position of giving a false impression to others. Moreover, the individual
will not have to choose between that impression and speaking out when
silence would be preferred.
In light of these comparisons, the conclusion seems inescapable that
PruneYard was rightly decided. Because the message is not the govern
ment's and, equally important, because the forum is created for a variety
of messages, rather than a single message repeated over and over again,
no likelihood exists of casting a pall on the unorthodox ideas of the prop
erty owner. Thus, the value of central concern in Barnette is not
threatened. The comparison to Wooley with its concern for individuality,
however, could lead to a different result. In Prune Yard, the record was
barren as to whether the property owner disagreed with the substance of
the petition,201 and the possibility of the public's connecting the owner
with the petition was remote; therefore, in Prune Yard, neither the prop
erty owner's identity nor the ability to project that identity was
compromised.
A different conclusion might be appropriate, however, if an owner,
like the Jehovah's Witnesses in Wooley, objected to a forced association
with ideas the property owner opposed. In such a case, the Wooley pre
cedent would be much more compelling. Although the views conveyed
by the unwanted message are not likely to be imputed to the owner, this
same factor was also present in Wooley. Whether a particular message
infringes on the property owner's first amendment rights may tum on
whether a subjective or an objective test is employed. If owners feel of
fended by forced association with an idea and feel it presents them to the
world in a false light this would-under a subjective test-be enough to
give rise to a constitutional objection. An objective test, however, de
mands that reasonable people would assume the owner's own views were
being expressed. 2o2
201. 447 U.S. 74, 101 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring).
202. An analogous problem exists in the symbolic speech area. The question is whether the
symbolic communication needs to be understood by its intended audience or whether it is enough if
the communicators believe they are engaged in an expressive activity even if their act is unlikely to
be understood by others. The answer given by the courts under the symbolic speech doctrine is that
an objective standard governs. The conduct can qualify as protected expression only if the symbolic
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Concern for the protection of personality involves more than a fear
that the government is standing in the way of an individual's ability to
appear to the world in a desired way. In protecting this interest, it may
be equally important that individuals subjectively feel that they are able
to present themselves to others as they wish, even if no real danger of a
false impression exists. On the other hand, protecting an individual's un
realistic reaction (because no one would in fact confuse that person with
the message expressed by others) may push the first amendment beyond
any logical stopping place.
The PruneYard situation clearly involves more complex overtones
than the Court was prepared to deal with on the basis of the facts
presented. Although Barnette itself is not truly implicated in such a situ
ation, Wooley and Abood provide closer analogies. Identifying the limits
of first amendment protection when freedom of personality is the value
being protected is obviously problematic.
VII.

The 1983 Supreme Court Term

A series of cases that raised claims of protection from compelled
expression and association marked the 1983 Supreme Court Term.203
communication is likely to be understood by its audience. Clark v. Community for Creative Non
Violence, 468 U.S. 288,294 (1984); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
For a variety of reasons, an objective standard, focusing on understandability, may be justified when
attempting to define the limits of protected symbolic expression. See Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68
CoLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1113-16 (1968) (arguing that an objective standard assures substantial pro
tection for symbolic conduct and is consistent with the purposes of the first amendment). A similar
approach may be inappropriate, however, in compelled-expression cases because the focus is on
impermissible impact on a particular individual, and not on communication to an audience.
203. In the period between Prune Yard, decided in 1980, and the 1983 Term, the Court decided
only one case containing extensive references to Barnette. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982). In Pico, a number of students had filed suit claiming the school board violated their first
amendment rights by removing a number of books from school libraries because of their objectiona
ble content. The district court granted summary judgment before trial in favor of the school board.
Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The judgment was reversed on appeal
and the case was remanded to the district court for trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether any first amendment limitations restrain the discretion of a school board in decid
ing to remove books from school libraries and whether, in the circumstances of the case before it,
these constitutional limits had been exceeded. 457 U.S. at 863.
By a five-to-four vote, the Court decided in favor of the students and remanded the case for
trial. Actually, the Court was even more closely divided than its voting pattern indicates. Although
voting \\ith the majority, Justice White refused to reach the constitutional issue of "the extent to
which the First Amendment limits the discretion of the school board to remove books from the
school library." Id. at 883. Instead, he read the record as raising a factual dispute between the
parties as to the reasons for the removal of the books and found it unnecessary to reach the difficult
constitutional question until that dispute had been resolved at trial.
Seven members of the Court filed separate opinions, with four justices citing to Barnette at least
once. In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan relied on Barnette to condemn the notion of an
"officially prescribed orthodoxy." Id. at 871. Thus, for Justice Brennan, if the removal decisions had
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Although Barnette was cited only twice (in two dissenting opinions204)
and never discussed at length, the extension of Barnette that occurred in
Abood returned to center stage in three major opinions. The trilogy of
cases included Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship
Clerks, 205 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 206 and Minnesota State Board
for Community Colleges v. Knight. 207 Of these, Knight raised the most
difficult problem in light of the Barnette precedent and provoked the
most extensive opinions by members of the Court. All three decisions,
however, must be examined to identify the Court's current view of this
doctrinal area.
Least surprising was the Court's eight-to-one decision in Ellis. The
case raised several issues that the Court had specifically left unresolved in
Abood. The challengers in Ellis were nonunion clerical employees of
Western Airlines. When their complaint was filed, the exclusive bargain
ing representative for the Western Airlines clerical employees was the
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (BRAC). In ac
cordance with provisions of the Railway Labor Act permitting the
agency shop, 208 nonunion airline employees, although not compelled to
join the union, were required to pay an agency fee that equalled the
amount paid in the form of union dues by union members. The nonun
ion employees did not challenge the agency-shop arrangement itself, 209
but did object to certain union expenditures and to the rebate procedure
that refunded their shares of money spent on union ideological
activities. 210
The employees specifically objected to the expenditure of funds for
six types of union activities: the national convention held by the union
been based on a disagreement with the "anti-American" ideas in the books, the decisions would be
constitutionally improper.
Justice Brennan's reliance on Barnette as precedent for this proposition seems iii-conceived.
Whatever ambiguities may remain as to the meaning of Justice Jackson's opinion in that case, it is
clear that Justice Jackson did not intend to deprive the government of all mechanisms for spreading
favored ideas. Instead, his opinion condemns one means to this end, compelled agreement with
government-prescribed ideas. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. No such compulsion is present in the con
text of the public schoo11ibrary. See Harpaz, A Paradigm ofFirst Amendment Dilemmas: Resolving
Public School Library Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 34 (1981).
204. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 297 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 310 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. 466 u.s. 435 (1984).
206. 468 u.s. 609 (1984).
207. 465 u.s. 271 (1984).
208. 45 u.s.c. § 152 (1982).
209. Such a challenge was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's opinions in Railway Employes'
Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Hanson is discussed supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. Abood and later cases posing first
amendment challenges to collective bargaining arrangements are the subject of supra Part V.
210. See supra note 174 (discussing rebate system as a remedial measure).
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every four years; litigation not involving the union as a bargaining unit;
the union's monthly magazine; social activities; the union's death benefits
program; and the union's organizing efforts. 211 The Court's task was to
decide which of these activities could be funded with agency fees paid by
nonunion employees. The need to engage in such precise line-drawing
had been identified in Abood but that task had been reserved for some
other time. 212 With Ellis, that time had finally arrived. 213
Because three items on the list of challenged expenditures were stat
utorily impermissible,214 or moot, 215 the Court decided the constitutional
question raised only on the remaining three, authorized expenditures.
The Court reiterated and strengthened the holding of Abood-the
agency-shop arrangement was a justifiable interference with the first
amendment right to refuse to associate. 2 16
The precise first amendment issue was whether money spent on the
union's convention, union social activities, and the nonpolitical articles
printed in the union's monthly magazine involved "additional interfer
ence with the First Amendment interests of objecting employees, and, if
so, whether they are nonetheless adequately supported by a governmen
tal interest."217 The Court decided that the social activities were objec
tionable only because they were union activities, and for no other
reason. 218 Therefore, because spending on these activities did not add to
211. 466 U.S. at 440.
212. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236.
213. Part of the controversy was resolved without reaching the first amendment issue. The
Court initially asked whether each use made of monies paid by nonunion employees was authorized
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982). In International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750 (1961), the Court had managed, through the process of statutory construc
tion, to avoid the resolution of a similar first amendment challenge to the Railway Labor Act. See
supra note 154. On the statutory construction issue, the Court distinguished between authorized and
unauthorized expenditures; union expenses were justified if "the challenged expenditures are neces
sarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative
of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues." Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.
214. Two categories of expenditures were found to be beyond the Act: (1) organizing activities
through which the union attempted to recruit new members; and (2) the expenses of litigation not
arising out of the collective bargaining activities of the union. 466 U.S. at 451-53. This restrictive
view of the categories of union expenditures that can be imposed on dissenting employees because of
the free-rider rationale has already been criticized. See Public Employment, supra note 183, at 1733.
215. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 454. After the filing of the lawsuit, the defendant union had been decerti
fied as the bargaining representative for the Western Airlines' employees. Thus, the claim for in
junctive relief against union expenditures had become moot. What remained was the claim for a
refund of money improperly expended by the union and interest on that money. Id. at 442. The
Court decided that because the money paid into the death benefits system entitled the objecting
employees to benefits under the program, equitable considerations did not require a rebate of this
money. Id. at 454-55.
216. See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
217. 466 U.S. at 456.
218. ld.
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the interference with first amendment rights imposed by the agency-shop
arrangement itself, there could be no constitutional objection.
The challenge to spending on the convention and the union publica
tion, however, raised somewhat more serious issues. Both activities in
volved communication of ideas: the convention established union policy
and identified collective bargaining goals, and the monthly magazine was
the union's method "of communicating information concerning collec
tive bargaining, contract administration, and employees' rights to em
ployees represented by BRAC."219 Despite their communicative
function, however, these activities were viewed as imposing little addi
tional burden on the rights of nonunion employees. In addition, both
activities were justified by the same concerns that supported the agency
shop itself. 220 After concluding that all three expenditures were constitu
tionally permissible uses of the money contributed by nonunion employ
ees, the Court ended its discussion by asserting that, as a policy matter,
the union needed to have "flexibility in its use of compelled funds." 221
219. Id. at 450 (quoting from Ellis v. Brotherhood ofRy., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065,
1074 (9th Cir. 1982)). In challenging that portion of dues spent on the publication of a monthly
magazine, no issue was raised regarding the "political" articles contained in the magazine. Under
the then existing rebate program, objecting employees received a rebate for expenses resulting from
publication of the political content of the magazine. This procedure required the calculation of the
number of lines in the magazine "devoted to political issues as a proportion of the total number of
lines." Id. One issue in Ellis was the costs of producing the part of the magazine that informed
union members about the union's collective bargaining activities. Id. at 450-51.
220. Id. at 455.
221. Id. at 456. A second aspect of the Court's opinion concerned the constitutionality of the
union's use of a rebate procedure to return to nonunion employees their share of service fees allo
cated to non-collective-bargaining activities. The Court acknowledged that prior cases had sug
gested a rebate scheme would be adequate. Id. at 443 (discussing Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431
U.S. 209, 238 (1977); Brotherhood ofRy., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1960)). The Court, however, held
that the rebate approach did not keep the union within the statutory guidelines. The union proce
dure required each employee initially to pay the entire service fee. At a later time, dissenting em
ployees received a refund. The Court viewed this temporary interest-free borrowing of a portion of
the service fee money as impermissible. 466 U.S. at 444. The Court suggested two possible alterna
tives: "advance reduction of dues and/or interest-bearing escrow accounts." Id. Thus, if the non
union employees were required to pay the entire fee, they were entitled to receive interest on the
money rebated to them.
Two years after its decision in Ellis, the Supreme Court again ruled on the procedural issues
surrounding the return of service fee money to dissenting employees. In Chieago Teachers Union v.
Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986), the Supreme Court identified three critical requirements for a con
stitutionally adequate system for protecting the interests of nonunion public employees. First, reiter
ating its concern in Ellis, the Court required the union to adopt a plan that would avoid even
temporary improper funding of ideological activities. Id. at 1075. The union was required to hold
the amount of the fees reasonably in dispute in an interest bearing escrow account. Id. at 1078.
Second, the Court required that "potential objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the
propriety of the union's fee." Id. at 1076. Finally, the Court imposed a new requirement that the
union make available a procedure to nonunion employees for raising their objections that would
provide "a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker." Id. Applying these three
criteria, the Court found the union procedure in Hudson to be constitutionally deficient because it
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The Court's decision in Ellis broke no new ground. 222 It attempted
to draw a line accurately reflecting the distinction created in Abood be
tween collective bargaining and political activities, and it did so even to
the absurdity of forcing the union to calculate the number of lines de
voted to political causes in the union magazine and to compute the rebate
due nonunion employees for those lines. 223
It is difficult to imagine how such a system really protects any sig
nificant first amendment concerns of the nonunion employees. The mag
azine is mailed to nonunion employees, but, because they are not forced
to read it, 224 they can avoid being influenced by its views. Unlike the
visible license plate or recited pledge, the political message in the union's
magazine may never even be seen-much less "worn"-by the dissident
individuals. Should they leaf through the magazine, the employee would
see, in addition to articles about political issues, "articles about negotia
tions, contract demands, strikes, unemployment and health benefits, pro
posed or recently enacted legislation, general news, products the union is
boycotting, and recreational and social activities." 225 Nonunion employ
ees are just as, if not more, likely to be upset by news about negotiations
and contract demands as by any political article. The former informa
tion, unlike the latter, is likely to impact on the terms and conditions of
their employment and, in addition, involves subjects about which they
are powerless to do anything short of resigning their jobs. Those union
negotiated job conditions will affect them on a day-to-day basis; by com
parison, union views on legislation and political causes are likely to pro
duce no more than a momentary annoyance, are unlikely to be assumed
did not "provide an adequate explanation for the advance reduction of dues," and because the proce
dure lacked objectivity in that it was completely under the control of the union. Id. at 1077.
222. The Court's analysis in Ellis provoked only one partial dissent. Although Justice Powell
agreed with most of Justice White's opinion for the Court, he disagreed with the Court's treatment
of expenses associated with the union's convention. Applying the same test adopted by the majority
in assessing the range of union activities permitted under the Railway Labor Act, Justice Powell
found that the union had failed to show that all aspects of the convention were related to the union's
collective bargaining duties. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 459-60. Although it was a forum for establishing
union policy on collective bargaining, it also was used to promote the union's political goals. Politi
cians appeared prominently on the list of convention speakers and no claim was made that their
presence was related to the union's collective bargaining role. Even if all convention activities were
within the statutory authorization, Justice Powell argued, convention politicking raised first amend
ment problems. After Abood it was clear that dissenting employees could not be forced to contribute
to political causes with which they disagreed. Thus, even if permitted by statute, such a use of
nonunion employees' fees violated the first amendment. Id. at 461.
223. See supra note 219.
224. When they receive the union magazine in the privacy of their home, such employees are not
in the position of a captive audience because recipients of unwanted mail can avoid its objectionable
content. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) ("The cus
tomer of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring
the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.").
225. 466 U.S. at 450.
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to be the views of the employee, and can be disavowed or combatted by
contributions to or work for groups that take opposing positions. It is
hard to see how the expenditure of a few pennies of an employee's money
amounts to any greater annoyance than the imposition on the property
owner accepted in Prune Yard. In that case, even though the shopping
center was opened up to proponents of alien causes, the Court was able
to view the imposition on the individual owner as not amounting to an
invasion of first amendment rights.
Coming after Prune Yard, Ellis makes even more obvious the distor
tion offirst amendment interests that took place in Abood. Although the
line drawn in Abood quantitatively reduced forced monetary contribu
tions required of nonunion employees, it did so in a way that created no
qualitative protection for the first amendment rights of nonunion em
ployees working in an agency shop.
The problem of compelled association, which the Court in Abood
understood to be inextricably connected to the kind of compelled expres
sion outlawed in Barnette, arose a second time during the 1983 Supreme
Court Term in a vastly different context. In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 226 the Jaycees argued that application of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act, 227 outlawing discrimination in places of public accommoda
tion on the basis of sex, to their organization's male-only membership
standards violated the Jaycees' right to freedom of association under the
first amendment. The Eighth Circuit had agreed with their claim, find
ing that because "the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by
the membership, is a not insubstantial part of what it does," the Jaycees'
right to choose its members was protected by the freedom of associa
tion. 228 The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision with seven
members of the Court participating. 229
The basic thrust of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court was that
Minnesota's antidiscrimination law was not designed to suppress expres
sion, that it promoted a compelling governmental purpose, and that it
did so through the use of the least restrictive alternative. Justice Brennan _
noted that the Constitution protected the "freedom not to associate," 230
but he was not convinced that the Jaycees had demonstrated any signifi
226. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). The name "Jaycees" is derived from the organization's formal name.
the Junior Chamber of Commerce.
227. MINN. STAT. § 363.01-.14 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
228. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
229. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did not participate in the consideration of the
case.
230. 468 U.S. at 623 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)).
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cant infringement on that freedom. 231 Their case was supported only by
unproven assumptions about the impact of being required to admit wo
men to membership. The Court held that even if there was such an in
fringement, the government had sufficiently justified its action. 232
Only Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Roberts. While agreeing
with the result reached, she expressed profound disagreement with the
analysis employed by the majority opinion for two reasons: in one re
spect, the opinion underprotected groups that engaged in expressive ac
tivities receiving the full protection of the first amendment; and in
another respect, it overprotected associations of persons who banded to
gether for commercial purposes. 2 3 3
The first type of association, one "predominantly engaged in pro
231. Justice Brennan recognized two distinct categories of freedom of association. Id. at 617-18.
One category protects intimate relationships as an element of personal-liberty. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (describing the right to marry as a fundamental right of pri
vacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Moore v. City of E. Cleve
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extending protection of due process clause beyond nuclear family); Karst,
The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (defining "freedom of intimate asso
cation," and discussing the values at stake and the constitutional doctrines that nurture freedom of
intimate association). The other involves the right to associate in order to engage in expressive
activities. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (ordi
nance limiting amount of contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures
violates first amendment rights of association and speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(litigation activities of NAACP are protected forms of expression and association). The Jaycees
argued that both types of associational interests had been infringed. Justice Brennan dismissed the
Jaycees claim to interference with a personal relationship on the ground that the Jaycees were a large
and unselective organization. 468 U.S. at 620-21. Their claim to an invasion of the right to associate
for the purpose of speaking was meritorious, however, because the Jaycees take public positions on
political issues and engage in lobbying and fundraising. Id. at 623, 626-27. The evidence in the
record convinced Justice Brennan that the invasion involved would be only incidental. Id. at 628.
232. Id. at 628-29. The compelling interest promoted by Minnesota was "[a]ssuring women
equal access" to the "various commercial programs and benefits offered to members" of the Jaycees.
Id. at 626. This conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court assertions that a governmental purpose
of eliminating discrimination satisfies the compelling interest component of strict scrutiny review.
E.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-48 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 604 (1983). Because the Jaycees' discriminatory membership policies produced harms that
were unrelated to the organization's exercise of the right to communicate its ideas, the state was free
to eradicate these harms by means that were narrowly tailored to achieve such ends. 468 U.S. at
628-29. This balancing analysis departs from the absolutist position that compelled expression is per
se inappropriate to achieve a legitimate or even compelling government end. It is far from clear,
however, that this absolutist view represents even Justice Jackson's approach in Barnette, see supra
note 28, let alone the view of the Court in more recent cases. For example, in Abood, the Court
concluded that the compelling government interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding free riders
justified the agency-shop arrangement and the requirement that nonunion employees finance the
union's collective bargaining activities undertaken on their behalf. 431 U.S. at 220-23.
Justice Brennan also rejected a claim by the Jaycees that the Minnesota law was unconstitution
ally vague and overbroad. The statute had been construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court to
apply to the membership policies of organizations that were "public" when viewed from the perspec
tive of their "size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of public facilities," 468 U.S. at 629, and
not to apply to private organizations. In Justice Brennan's view, this limiting construction had
eliminated any problems of vagueness and overbreadth. Id. at 630-31.
233. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tected expression,"234 was, under Justice Brennan's analysis, given the
burden of "making a 'substantial' showing that the admission of unwel
come members 'will change the message communicated by the group's
speech.' " 235 Justice O'Connor believed that such a burden imposed an
unreasonable and unrealistic limit on the ability of an association en
gaged in first amendment speech to select its membership. It was unclear
just how such a burden would be met and why it was imposed in the fust
place.
Even more fundamentally, Justice O'Connor disapproved of the ma
jority's failure to distinguish between expressive associations and com
mercial associations. In Justice O'Connor's view, expressive associations
were entitled to the full complement of fust amendment protections for
all their activities,236 but commercial associations could claim only mini
mal constitutional protections and could be subject to rational state regu
lations. 237 Distinguishing between the two types of associations required
focusing on an organization's purposes and the purposes of its member
ship in joining the group.
Recognizing that this classification would not always be easy to
make, Justice O'Connor nevertheless believed that such a dividing line
was constitutionally mandated. 238 Some clear examples from past cases
were available as starting points. On the one hand, a large commercial
law fum is an association for commercial purposes; partnership decisions
are therefore subject to rational state regulation to assure nondiscrimina
tory practices. 239 On the other hand, an association engaged in lawyer
ing activities in order to further social goals is an expressive
association; 240 any regulation of its membership, solicitation, recruit
ment, or other association practices should be subject to strict judicial
review. "Protection of the association's right to define its membership
derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive associa
tion is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the defini
tion of that voice."24I
234. Id. at 635.
235. Id. at 632 (quoting Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court, id. at 627, 628).
236. Id. at 633.
237. Id. at 634.
238. Id. at 636-37.
239. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that allegation by former associ
ate that law firm's decision not to invite her to become a partner was a product of sex-based discrimi
nation stated a claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)).
240. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429-30 (1963) (holding that NAACP efforts to end racial
discrimination by instituting civil rights litigation are protected by the first amendment and cannot
be regulated by the state in a way that discourages such activities in the absence of a substantial state
interest).
241. 468 U.S. at 633.
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Justice O'Connor found additional support for her view in the
Court's treatment of labor unions. AB she interpreted past cases, if the
regulation of unions in their role as protector of the business needs of
employees was challenged, the state could justify its regulation by show
ing ouly that it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate end. 242 Such
was the case in Abood, when the Court ruled that nonunion employees
could be compelled to support the union's collective bargaining activities.
Conversely, when the union promoted ideological goals, individuals
could not be compelled to participate in such activities if they objected to
the ends being promoted.243
Justice O'Connor argued that the activities of the Jaycees should be
examined to determine whether it was a commercial or expressive associ
ation. To be an expressive association, it was not enough that an organi
zation engaged in some expressive activities. -Instead, sueh activities had
to represent the predominant character of the organization. This distinc
tion was critical in the case of the Jaycees. The organization did support
certain political causes,244 but this did not represent the primary focus of
the organization. Instead, the group mainly devoted itself to training
members in the skills of solicitation and management in order to enhance
business expertise. 245 Toward this end, much time and attention was de
voted to encouraging members to sell memberships in the Jaycees. Jus
tice O'Connor viewed this agenda as directed at commercial activities,
justifying Minnesota's imposition of rational regulations on the opera
tions of the Jaycees.246
In Roberts, the Jaycees raised claims of unconstitutional compulsion
under both the expressive and associational strands of the compulsion
doctrine. Arguing that the state forced the admission of persons to mem
bership against the organization's will was the reverse of the objection
raised by nonunion employees under an agency-shop contract. The em
ployees in that setting were being forced to belong to an organization
against their will; in Roberts, the constitutional objection was that an
association should have the right to select its own members to make cer
tain they will support and work toward the organization's goals. With
out membership control, the organization might be forced to accept
members who would impede the association's efforts, either by unwilling
242. Id. at 637.
243. Id. at 638.
244. The opinion of the Court of Appeals recited a lengthy list of political issues on which the
national Jaycees and their state and local affiliates had taken public positions. See McClure, 109
F.2d at 1569-70.
245. 468 U.S. at 639.
246. Id. at 640.
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ness to commit time and energies or by purposefully setting out to sub
vert the organization.247
The second claim raised by the Jaycees related to the impact of a
state-mandated change in membership policy on the message communi
cated by the organization. As a male-only association, the Jaycees pro
ject an organizational image that will be altered by the forced admission
ofwomen. 248 The Jaycees argued that this projected image is the organi
zational equivalent of a personality. Just as Barnette and Wooley protect
an individual's chosen persona, in Roberts the argument was that Minne
sota interfered with the personality the Jaycees wished to project to the
public. In addition to an adverse effect on its chosen image, there was a
further claim of a compelled message. Left on their own, the Jaycees
would promote the interests of men in business and not concern them
selves with issues of equal treatment for women in the business world.
With a change in membership to include women as voting members,
these new members may force the organization to alter its agenda and to
espouse causes it would not have supported in its male-only days.249
These multiple claims of first amendment infringement merit more
thorough consideration than they received in the majority or concurring
opinions in Roberts. Moreover, the interests at stake in Roberts shonld
be compared with the Court's previous concerns in cases raising claims
of protection from compelled association and expression. In Prune Yard,
Justice Rehnquist identified three distinguishing characteristics that
made the case less constitutionally troublesome: the message dissemi
nated did not originate with the government, there was a chance to disa
vow, and the views expressed would not be assumed to be those of the
shopping center owner. 250 Applying those criteria to the Roberts facts
produces an interesting result. Although it was true in Prune Yard that
the anti-United Nations Resolution message was not sponsored by the
government, that is not the case in Roberts. As a result of compelling the
Jaycees to admit women, the government was making it likely that the
247. But see id. at 627 ("The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the
interests of young meu, and it imposes no restrictious on the organization's ability to exclude individ
uals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members.").
248. But see id. at 627. ("[A]ny claim that admission of women as full voting members will
impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenu
ated at best.").
249. As the lower court noted:
If the statute is upheld, the basic purpose of the Jaycees will change. It will become an
association for the advancement of young people. Young men will no longer be its only
beneficiaries. It is natural to expect that an association containing both men and women
will not be so single-minded about advancing men's interests as an association of men only.
McClure, 709 F.2d at 1571.
250. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980), discussed supra Part VI.

883

Texas Law Review

Vol. 64:817, 1986

organization would promote economic justice for both men and women,
a viewpoint different from the previous position taken by the Jaycees. 251
Although this transformation was not explicitly dictated by the govern
ment-ordered membership policy, it is a highly probable outcome of the
government action. The government has altered the organization's struc
ture in such a way as to make highly likely a change in the organization's
message, one consistent with Minnesota's public policy as reflected in its
Human Rights Act.2s2
The second PruneYard factor is the opportunity to disavow. In
Roberts, to the extent that the Jaycees organization was transformed
from male-only membership to a mixed-gender organization and now
supports the advancement of both males and females in business, there is
no opportunity to disavow these new views. Because the views are an
inevitable result of its new membership, the organization cannot disasso
ciate itself from the interests of some of its members.
The third factor is the probability that the pro-equality viewpoint of
its women members will be imputed to the organization. As full voting
members of the Jaycees, women will influence the organization's policies
and public positions, and they will be assumed to speak for the
organization.
Although none of the three critical factors were satisfied in
Prune Yard, the opposite is true in Roberts. In light of this, Justice Bren
nan's brief treatment of the Jaycees' first amendment argument seems
251. The Jaycees philosophy is summarized by the Creed adopted by the organization as part of
its bylaws:
We believe
That faith in God gives meaning and purpose to human life;
That the brotherhood of man transcends the sovereignty of nations;
That economic justice can best be won by free men through free enterprise;
That government should be of laws rather than of men;
That earth's great treasure lies in human personality;
And that service to humanity is the best work of life.
Article 2, By-Laws of the United States Jaycees, reprinted in McClure, 109 F.2d at 1562 (emphasis
added).
The possibility that a compelled change in the membership policy of the Jaycees will produce a
change in the organization's philosophy as reflected in its Creed is suggested in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals:
But some change in the Jaycees' philosophieal cast can reasonably be expected. It is not
hard to imagine, for example, that if women become full-fledged members in any substan
tial numbers, it will not be long before efforts are made to change the Jaycees Creed.
Young women may take a dim view of affirming the ''brotherhood of man," or declaring
how "free men" can best win economic justice. Such phrases are not trivial. The use of
language betrays an attitude of mind, even if unconsciously, and that attitude is part of the
belief and expression that the First Amendment protects.
Id. at 1571.
252. "An organization of young people, as opposed to young men, may be more 'felicitous,'
more socially desirable, in the view of the State Legislature, or in the view of the judges of this Court,
but it will be substantially different from the Jaycees as it now exists." McClure, 109 F.2d at 1571.
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inappropriate. Even when a significant first amendment claim exists, the
government may be able to justify the invasion of first amendment inter
ests;253 however the case should not have been decided without a serious
treatment of the Jaycees' first amendment argument. 254
The third case during the 1983 Term involving compelled associa
tion and expression was Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges
v. Knight. 255 Of the three 1983 cases, it is by far the most difficult to
evaluate. In Knight, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to
an aspect of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act
(PELRA). 256 Under the Act, public employees had the right to select an
exclusive bargaining representative to "meet and negotiate" with their
government employer over the "terms and conditions of employ
ment."257 In addition, professional employees were given the right to
"meet and confer" with their employer on "employment related-ques
tions not subject to mandatory bargaining."258 The professional employ
ees were required to choose a representative for these "meet and confer"
sessions. If an exclusive bargaining agent had been chosen, that agent
253. See supra note 232.
254. A claim quite similar to the somewhat novel first amendment argument raised unsuccess
fully by the Jaycees in Roberts has been raised in at least one other recent lawsuit. In Gay Rights
Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., No. 5863-80 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd, 496 A.2d 567,568 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) (original appellate decision vacated and
rehearing ordered after filing of supplemental briefs), two student organizations promoting the cause
of "gay pride" sued Georgetown University for its refusal to grant official recognition to the organi
zations, claiming the university's actious violated the Human Rights Act of the District of Colum
bia, D.C. CODE .ANN. § 1-2501 to 2557 (1981), by discriminating on the basis of sexual preference.
The University contended that being forced to recognize the student groups would violate the Uni
versity's right to freedom of religion-the University is affiliated with the Catholic Church and the
Church's position is that a homosexual lifestyle is morally objectionable.
Although Georgetown University did not make a first amendment freedom of expression argu
ment, this claim was raised on their behalf by an amicus brief. Brief of Arthur B. Spitzer, Amicus
Curiae, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Georgetown Amicus Brief]. Requiring the University to grant recognition to the two gay
rights groups, thereby subsidizing their activities, would be to compel the university to support the
groups despite the University's disapproval of their activities and purposes. /d. at 28-36. Spitzer
argned such compelled support violates the principles announced in Barnette, Wooley, and Abood,
and viewed Prune Yard and Roberts as distinguishable. He distinguished Prune Yard on the ground
that the University in fact permitted the plaintiff groups to use its facilities, and that nothing the
Court said in Prune Yard required more than access to facilities. Because the plaintiff groups sought
subsidization and endorsement, the case went beyond PruneYard. /d. at 34 n.28. Roberts was distin
guished because, unlike the showing made by the Jaycees, "Georgetown has established clearly in
the record the manner in which subsidizing the plaintiffs' activities would infringe its ability to
communicate its message, rather than the plaintiffs' contrary message, to the university community
and to the broader community." /d. at 35.
255. 465 u.s. 271 (1984).
256. MINN. STAT. § 179A.01-.25 (1984).
257. 465 U.S. at 274; see MINN. STAT. §§ 179.65, 179.66 (1982) (current versions at
§§ 179A.06(5), 179A.07(2) (1984)).
258. 465 U.S. at 274; see MINN. STAT. §§ 179.63, 179.65, 197.73 (1982) (current versions at
§§ 179A.03(19), 179A.06(4), 179A.08 (1984)).
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also served as the "meet and confer" representative, and the public em
ployer was not free to "meet and confer" with any other members of the
bargaining unit, even to discuss policy matters not subject to mandatory
bargaining. zs9
Under PELRA, the faculty at twenty community colleges in the
Minnesota community college system formed a single bargaining unit
and selected the Minnesota Community College Faculty Association
(MCCFA) as their exclusive bargaining agent. To carry out their charge
to meet and confer with the state board operating the community college
system (the Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges), MCCFA
organized meet-and-confer committees on individual campuses. The rep
resentatives on these committees were all faculty members who belonged
to MCCFA. Nonmembers were able to communicate their views
through nnoffi.cial channels, but could not participate in the meet-and
confer sessions. 260 The subjects before these committees included "the
selection and evaluation of administrators, academic accreditation, stu
dent affairs, curriculum and fiscal planning."26 I
In 1974, a group of community college faculty members who did not
belong to MCCFA filed suit challenging the constitutionality ofPELRA
in so far as it permitted MCCFA to (1) be the exclusive representative for
mandatory bargaining and (2) control the selection of meet-and-confer
representatives. Although the challenge to the exclusive representative
system for mandatory-bargaining subjects failed on the authority of
Abood, 2 6 2 the three-judge district court found the method of choosing
meet-and-confer committee members violated the rights of freedom of
speech and association of the non-MCCFA faculty. The Association and
the State Board for Community Colleges appealed to the Supreme Court,
which reversed the district court's finding that appellees' first amend
ment rights were violated by PELRA.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that the meet
259. 465 U.S. at 274-75; see MINN. STAT. § 179.66(7) (1982) (current version at § 179A.07(4)
(1984)).
260. 465 U.S. at 275. Despite the Act's formal prohibition against "meet and confer" sessions
with other members of the bargaining unit, the employer may meet informally with other public
employees to hear their views. This practice is permitted so long as these meetings do not interfere
with the rights of the exclusive representative. See MINN. STAT. §§ 179.65 (1), 179.66 (7) (1982)
(current version at§ 179A.07(4) (1984)).
261. 465 U.S. at 276.
262. Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. I, 5 (D. Minn. 1982).
On appeal, this aspect of the three-judge district court's decision was summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983), although the Court later reversed the district court's holding
that the "meet and confer" provisions of PELRA deprived nonmembers of their constitutional
rights. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. at 279.
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and-confer sessions were not a public forum263 and that appellees-either
as members of the public or as public employees-had no constitution
ally protected right to be heard by a state policy-making body. 264 Fur
thermore, non-MCCFA members were free to express their views on the
subject of educational policy and were free to associate with whomever
they chose because membership in MCCFA was not required by
PELRA.265 Finally, appellees' equal protection claim was rejected on
the ground that the state's decision to give MCCFA a unique role in the
meet-and-confer process was rational. 2 66
Justice O'Connor saw Knight as a right-of-access case without a
constitutional basis and in no way involving compelled behavior.
Although faculty members might feel some pressure to join MCCFA in
order to participate in meet-and-confer sessions, this pressure was not
considered adequate to give rise to a claim of compelled association. 267
The situation in Knight was viewed differently by the dissenting Jus
tices. Justice Brennan's brief separate dissent portrayed PELRA as pos
ing a Hobson's choice for non-MCCFA faculty members because it
compelled them to abandon one of two rights protected by the first
amendment:
On the one hand, those faculty members who are barred from par
ticipation in "meet and confer" sessions by virtue of their refusal to
join MCCFA have a First Amendment right to express their views
on important matters of academic governance to college adminis
trators. At the same time, they enjoy a First Amendment right to
be free from compelled associations with positions or views that
they do not espouse. In my view, the real vice of the Minnesota
Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) is that it im
permissibly forces nonunion faculty members to choose between
these two rights. 268
In Justice Brennan's opinion, the choice presented was constitutionally
unacceptable.
Justice Brennan's evaluation of the case was influenced by his con
263. See Knight, 465 U.S. at 280 ("A 'meet and confer' session is obviously not a public fo
rum."); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983) (inter
school mail system was not a public forum because it has not traditionally been available to members
of the public for speech nor had the government designated it as a public forum). But see City of
Madison Joint School Dist. No.8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174
75 (1976) (school board meetings are a public forum).
264. 465 U.S. at 283.
265. /d. at 289-90 n.ll. The PELRA system is the equivalent of an agency shop. Public em
ployees do not need to join MCCFA. They are, however, required to pay a fair-share fee to defray
the costs of the negotiations conducted by the exclusive representative on their behalf. See MINN.
STAT. § 179.65(2) (1982) (current version at§ 179A.06(3) (1984)).
266. 465 U.S. at 291-92.
267. /d. at 289-90.
268. /d. at 295-96 (footnote omitted).
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elusion that the meet-and-confer process played a crucial role in the for
mation of academic policy for the community colleges. That conclusion
was reinforced by his belief that "many non-union faculty members view
participation in the meet and confer process as 'essential to their role on
the faculty.' " 269 Because the only way to participate in the meet-and
confer process was by joining MCCFA, significant pressure existed for
faculty members to "abandon their personal or ideological objections to
associating with MCCFA." 270 Placing faculty members in such an un
tenable position unnecessarily infringed on their first amendment rights,
Justice Brennan argued, and the government could not justify the exclu
sivity of the meet-and-confer sessions on the same grounds that sup
ported exclusivity in the collective bargaining context. 271
Justice Stevens, in a lengthier dissent joined by Justices Brennan and
Powell, approached PELRA from a different but related perspective. He
saw the exclusivity principle in the meet-and-confer context as effectuat
ing a forbidden form of viewpoint discrimination. 272 Only association
members had a meaningful chance to communicate their views to college
administrators on academic policy matters, and those with opposing,
views were consequently screened out by the statute. In Justice Stevens'
view, the statute was "invalid because the First Amendment does not
permit any state legislature to grant a single favored speaker an effective
monopoly on the opportunity to petition the government."273
For the issues raised in this Article, the significant aspect of Knight
is the disagreement between Justices O'Connor and Brennan over
whether the Minnesota statutory scheme was a form of unconstitutional
compelled association because it pressured faculty members to join
MCCFA. In Justice O'Connor's view, pressure did not equal compul
sion; in Justice Brennan's opinion, pressure in the form of deprivation of
significant rights amounted to hnpermissible compulsion. Returning
once again to a values discussion and to the three PruneYard factors
helps in deciding which is the better view.
Ever since Barnette, the key value has been protection against forced
269. Id. at 298 (quoting from Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at A-51).
270. Id. at 299.
271. Id. at 299-300.
272. Justice Stevens has stressed in several other recent cases his concern with viewpoint dis
crimination as a chief vice forbidden by the first amendment. See FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364,413-15 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 803-04 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
essential concern embodied in the First Amendment is that government not impose its viewpoint on
the public or select the topics on which public debate is permissible.").
273. 465 U.S. at 301.
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conformity to government-supported ideas. To the extent that a govern
ment employee feels pressured to join the organization that serves as the
exclusive bargaining representative for that employee, it is unlikely the
government is attempting to indoctrinate the employee to accept certain
ideas. In Knight the faculty association was elected by faculty vote and
the government employer could not have easily anticipated either the
particular entity that would be elected or what the association's views
would be on particular collective bargaining issues or on issues of aca
demic policy. The government's purpose was to negotiate with a single
employee representative, thereby reducing confusion and easing the task
of agreeing on collective bargaining terms. 274 Even if the nonunion pub
lic employee were to succumb to pressure and join the union, the govern
ment would have no guarantee that any subsequent change in the
attitudes and outlook of that employee would favor government-spon
sored ideas. Thus, unlike the state purpose asserted in Barnette and
Wooley, the government motive for imposing pressure to conform was
not to spread a particular idea or squelch any disfavored belief. In this
sense, the Knight case is more like Prune Yard than Barnette.
In its potential impact on personality, however, the situation in
Knight is more troublesome. To the extent a faculty member was moti
vated to join MCCFA by the desire to play a significant role in the for
mation of academic policy, there is a possibility that such a decision
would affect the personality of that individual. Whether the impact
would be directly upon the individual or only perceived by the world is
hard to know. Under PELRA, active participation in the meet-and-con
fer process would be possible only if one was selected as a meet-and
confer representative. Thus, it is probable that nominal MCCFA mem
bership would not bring about this result, and because active association
membership would maximize the chance of gaining a place on a meet
and-confer committee, some identifiable change in the individual could
well occur. To be selected, some degree of conformity to association
views might be necessary.
PruneYard-in addition to involving no government-sponsored
message-focused on two additional factors: the opportunity to disavow
the alien message and the likelihood an individual would be assumed to
share the ideas of the group with which he or she is forced to associate.
In the Knight situation no real disavowal of association views would be
possible. Such disavowal would probably eliminate any benefit to the
individual from joining MCCFA; on a campus where a majority of the
274. For a more extensive discussion of the rationales underlying exclusive bargaining represen
tation, see supra note 159 .
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faculty belonged to MCCFA, disavowal would doom a faculty member's
chances of gaining a place in the meet-and-confer process. In contrast,
nonunion employees in Abood were easily able to disavow any political
positions taken by the union that served as their collective bargaining
representative. 275
The final PruneYard factor was the likelihood that an individual
would be associated with the group's views. Although this could occur
for association views on widely publicized collective bargaining issues,
such a result would be less probable on issues of academic policy for
which a party line might not even exist. In fact, what the appellees in
Knight pressed for was a role in the process whereby academic policy
positions were formed. Individuals successful in gaining such a role
could influence faculty views on matters discussed at the meet-and-con
fer sessions, a result at least as probable as that they would be associated
with preestablished MCCFA views. Thus, on balance, the danger that
an individual would be associated with the views of the collective bar
gaining representative is no more likely in Knight than it would be in
Abood or in any other agency-shop situation. This factor therefore is not
of special significance in the Knight setting.
From the twin perspectives of first amendment values and the
PruneYard factors, the vices of the meet-and-confer provisions in
PELRA added some further first amendment burdens to those already
imposed by the decision to select an exclusive bargaining agent. As the
earlier analysis of Abood shows, a major interference with first amend
ment freedoms occurs under any agency-shop arrangement that gives a
union power over all workers, even nonunion employees.276 A careful
look at the Knight facts, however, demonstrates that additional problems
are created by compelling actual association membership as a condition
for involvement in the meet-and-confer process. Those burdens pose a
threat to the integrity of individual personality, a threat exacerbated by
the fact that a faculty member forced to join the association is unable to
disavow its views without sacrificing any real chance of involvement in
the meet-and-confer process. Any defense of the Court's decision to up
hold the requirement of association membership in Knight, especially
when contrasted with the Court's willingness to strike down the use of
compelled fee money for political purposes in Abood, must be based on
differences in the level of government justification required to permit im
positions on first amendment interests, and not on the conclusion that
first amendment values are less at risk in Knight.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
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VIII.

Pacific Gas & Electric

Since the trilogy of compelled expression cases decided during the
1983 Supreme Court Term, the Court has decided one potentially signifi
cant case involving a compelled expression claim. In Pacific Gas & Elec
tric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 277 the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) or
der directing the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) to insert
periodically certain materials in its billing envelopes. In contrast to its
offhanded rejection of the compelled expression and association claims in
Roberts and Knight, in Pacific Gas & Electric the Court once again up
held such a claim as a serious intrusion on first amendment rights.
The ruling challenged in Pacific Gas & Electric was prompted by
PG&E's practice of distributing a company newsletter along with its
monthly bills. 278 In 1980, a group objecting to utility rates asked the
CPUC to forbid the utility's inclusion of political editorials in its billing
envelopes. The group, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), ar
gued that ratepayers should not have to finance political speech engaged
in by the utility. In ruling on TURN's request, the CPUC found that the
surplus space279 in the billing envelopes was the property of the utility's
customers. The Commission decided to apportion this space between the
ratepayers and the utility. Finding that TURN "represented the inter
ests of 'a siguificant group' of appellant's residential customers," 280 the
CPUC permitted TURN to use extra billing envelope space four times a
year over a two-year period to communicate its views to ratepayers. 281
The Commission stated that ratepayers would receive more of a benefit if
their envelope space was used to disseminate a variety of views and not
just the views of the utility.282
277. 106 s. Ct. 903 (1986).
278. The newsletter contained editorials, public interest features, and information on energy con
servation and payment plans offered by the utility. /d. at 905.
279. Surplus space was defined by the CPUC as "the space remaining in the billing envelope,
after inclusion of the monthly bill and any required legal notices, for inclusion of other materials up
to such total envelope weight as would not result in any additional postage cost." /d. at 906 (quoting
Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at A-2 to A-3).
280. /d. at 906 (quoting Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at A-15). TURN's appropriate
ness as a representative of the residential customers was based on TURN's participation as an inter
venor in ratemaking proceedings.
281. The Commission authorized TURN to use the space for fundraising and to communicate
its views to the customers. No limit was placed on the content of TURN's speech in the mailings,
except that it was "required to state that its messages [were] not those of [the CPUC]." /d. at 906
07. TURN was entitled to use more than surplus space so long as it paid the extra mailing costs. /d.
at 906.
282. /d. Two qualifications accompanied the ruling. TURN was required to identify its materi
als as expressing its views and not the views of the utility, and the Commission held open the possi
bility that it would allow other groups access to the billing envelopes in future rulings. /d. at 907.
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After the California Supreme Court refused to review the Commis
sion's order, PG&E appealed the CPUC decision to the Supreme Court
claiming the order required it to distribute, in violation of the first
amendment, a message with which it disagreed. In a five-to-three deci
sion,283 the Court reversed the Commission's order.
Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion,284 viewed appellant's newslet
ter as the first amendment equivalent of a newspaper. 285 His opinion
invalidated compelled access to the billing envelope on the same grounds
that the Court had used previously in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo 286 to strike down a state law granting a right of reply to unfavor
able editorial commentary in the pages of a newspaper. 287 In drawing
this analogy, the opinion emphasized that the right not to speak served
the same societal purposes as the right to speak2SS_both assure that pub
lic debate on public issues is vigorous. Compelling access as a penalty for
expressing certain viewpoints tends to discourage the expression of those
viewpoints because the potential speaker often chooses silence to avoid
the penalty.2s9
283. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration of the case.
284. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan and
O'Connor. Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Rehn
quist dissented, joined in part by Justices White and Stevens, and Justice Stevens wrote an additional
dissent.
285. Justice Powell was of the view that the newsletter's content was close enough to that of a
traditional newspaper to merit the full protection of the first amendment and not the lesser level of
protection afforded commercial speech, even though its author was a corporation. Id. at 907-08.
286. 418 u.s. 241 (1974).
287. See supra note 117.
288. 106 S. Ct. at 909, 912.
289. Id. at 908. This deterrent effect is somewhat different than that of the typical compelled
expression case in which the compelled expression is less easily avoided. In Barnette, the only avail
able avoidance technique was to attend private school; in Wooley, the Maynards would have to
refrain from driving an automobile; in Abood, the nonunion employees would have to seek other
employment; and in PruneYard, the center owner would have to sell his shopping center. In all
these cases, because the plaintiff's speech did not trigger the obligation to accommodate the un
wanted speech, changing the content of one's speech could not avoid the obligation. The compelled
access provision in Pacific Gas & Electric, like the Florida right-of-reply law in Miami Herald Pub
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), was viewed, therefore, as a more subtle device; a subcat
egory of compelled expression that is objectionable on somewhat different grounds.
The analogy between Pacific Gas & Electric and Tornillo was viewed as compelling despite
recognized differences between the two cases. In Tornillo, by avoiding an editorial position critical
of the qualifications of a candidate for political office, the newspaper could avoid any right-of-reply
obligation because access was triggered only by the paper's expression of particular views. In Pacific
Gas & Electric, access rights did not turn on the utility's engaging in the expression of any specific
views. 106 S. Ct. at 910. The access decision was based on the Commission's view that the ratepay
ers owned the extra envelope space and that their interest would be better served by periodically
receiving information from TURN. It seems unlikely, given the Commission's property right basis
for its rule, that even the total abandonment of the utility's monthly newsletter would eliminate the
rights granted to TURN. I d. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, access was not granted
to the pages of the utility's own newsletter as it was to the pages of the Miami Herald. Id. at 909 n.7.
Despite these differences, the cases were viewed as having one important deterrent effect in common.
Although refraining from expressing political views could not completely avoid access by TURN,
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In reaching the conclusion that the CPUC order was unconstitu
tional, Justice Powell distinguished PruneYard 290 on three grounds.
First, the shopping center owner in Prune Yard had not alleged that his
own speech would be altered by the presence of students protesting
United Nations action; therefore, his right to speak was not burdened. In
contrast, PG&E's right to speak was burdened in several ways: it might
decide to alter the content of its speech to discourage debate on its views
by TURN291 or feel compelled to respond to opinions expressed by
TURN with which it strongly differed. 292 The second distinction was
that the center property was open to the public in a way that the utility's
billing envelopes were not. 293
The third distinction was that the shopping center, open to all
speakers regardless of the content of their speech, was a content-neutral
public forum. In Pacific Gas & Electric, access decisions by the Commis
sion discriminated among those seeking access based on the viewpoint
they wished to express.294 The Commission's goals in ordering access
were to intrude into the marketplace of ideas and to artificially magnify
the views of the utility's opponents by giving those views greater visibil
ity.295 Justice Powell reasoned that opponents of the utility were the benJustice Powell speculated that the utility's realization "that whenever it speaks out on a given issue,
it may be forced-at TURN's discretion-to help disseminate hostile views" might discourage it
from expressing such views. Id. at 910.
290. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed supra Part VI.
291. 106 S. Ct. at 910.
292. /d. at 911. The view that a compelled response is objectionable under the first amendment
is consistent with Justice Powell's opinion in PruneYard. Concurring in the outcome of that case,
Justice Powell distinguished cases in which the owner of the property opposed the views being ex
pressed on his property and might, therefore, feel compelled to respond to those views. For a discus
sion ofJustice Powell's concurring opinion in PruneYard, see supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
In Pacific Gas & Electric, Justice Powell found the forced-response aspect of the Commission
order no less objectionable, even though the compelled speaker was a corporation. Id. at 912. In
addition to finding the appellant's corporate character not significant, Justice Powell saw no special
importance in the fact that the compelled speaker was a regulated utility. Id. at 912 n.l4.
One further manner in which the access order affected PG&E's free speech rights was suggested
in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion. By virtue of the order, PG&E was deprived offour oppor
tunities to use the surplus envelope space to distribute a monthly newsletter. Id. at 916 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). This displacement effect may well have been the CPUC order's most serious intrusion
on the utility's rights.
293. Id. at 910 n.8.
294. /d. at 910-11. The Commission, intent on creating a forum for opinions adverse to those of
the utility and for information deemed beneficial to consumers, had selected TURN to present these
views. The record in Pacific Gas & Electric indicated that at least one application for use of the extra
space had been rejected by the Commission on the ground that the group seeking to use the space
"neither wished to participate in Commission proceedings nor alleged that its use of the billing
envelope space would improve consumer participation in those proceedings." Id. at 907 n.5.
295. The Court generally has struck down government attempts to "restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (invalidating $1,000 ceiling on independent expenditures for political
candidates); accord First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978) (striking down law
forbidding expenditures by banks and business corporations to influence referendum voting). The

893

Texas Law Review

Vol. 64:817, 1986

eficiaries of government favoritism assisting those speakers in spreading
their message and at the same time burdening the utility in expressing its
views. 296 Such viewpoint discrimination has long been viewed as offen
sive to the first amendment's equality principle and as justifiable only
when supported by a compelling interest. 297
Having determined that the Commission's order burdened protected
expression, Justice Powell nevertheless would have upheld the order if
the state was furthering a compelling interest and had chosen means
which were narrowly tailored to further its end. 298 The state asserted
two interests: assuring an effective ratemaking process299 and "promot
ing speech by making a variety of views available to appellant's custom
ers."300 Although Justice Powell was willing to agree that these interests
were compelling, the state failed to satisfy the means component of the
standard of review, because compelling access to the billing envelope for
TURN's fundraising effort was not sufficiently related to the state's in
terest in assuring an effective ratemaking procedure. 301 Moreover, the
state was not free to advance TURN's speech at the expense of the util
ity's own speech rights as a means of promoting public awareness and
debate. 302
In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stressed two distinctions
between Pacific Gas & Electric and Prune Yard: "the degree of intrusive
ness of the permitted access" 303 and the fact that "the State has chosen to
give TURN a right to speak at the expense of appellant's ability to use
the property in question as a forum for the exercise of its own First
Court responds more positively only when the government subsidizes some speech without any in
tent to supress the speech of others. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
548-50 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for contributions to veterans' organizations); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. at 97-105 (upholding general election campaign financing for major parties).
296. 106 S. Ct. at 911. In criticizing the viewpoint-discriminatory aspect of the Commission's
action, Justice Powell found that it exacerbated the chilling effect of the access order. See supra note
289.
297. See supra note 132.
298. 106 S. Ct. at 913. One other argument justifying the CPUC order was also rejected by
Justice Powell. His opinion dealt with the Commission's conclusion that the utility's customers
owned the surplus space in the billing envelopes and that, therefore, the utility could not complain
about the fact that access rights to that space were awarded to groups that represented those custom
ers. Justice Powell found the fact of customer ownership of the surplus space to be irrelevant be
cause, under the Commission's order, the utility was required to distribute TURN's literature in its
billing envelope. The envelope itself was not viewed by the Commission as the property of the
customers. Justice Powell viewed this circumstance as equivalent to the Maynards being forced to
lend their automobile to display the state's message printed on their license plate. /d. at 912.
299. /d. at 913.
300. /d. at 914.
301. /d. at 913.
302. /d. at 914. Because the order did not satisfY the requirement of content neutrality, the
opinion also rejected CPUC's argument that its order was a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation. /d.
303. /d. at 915.
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Amendment rights." 304 Justice Marshall viewed the intrusiveness in
Prune Yard as minor because the center was open to the public in ways
that were similar to traditional public forums and because the state
courts had not allowed activity on the property that was any more intru
sive than the activity the owner himself encouraged. By contrast, the
billing envelope had not been made available to the public to serve "as a
sort of community billboard."3os
Additionally, the facts in Prune Yard did not suggest that the prop
erty owner was prevented from engaging in protected expression of his
own as a result of the access granted to others. In Pacific Gas & Electric,
however, the forum was limited to the monthly billing envelope. Four of
the twelve opportunities each year for communication with utility cus
tomers were given over to TURN, ousting the utility from occasions on
which it would have used the surplus envelope space for its own
speech. 306 This intrusion, given the character of the state's justification,
was viewed as impermissible by Justice Marshall. Because the state was
interested in promoting speakers with particular viewpoints, it would
have been free to utilize its own resources to further the interests of
TURN, but it could not use means that interfered with the first amend
ment rights of the utility.J07
Three justices dissented in Pacific Gas & Electric. 30 S Justice Rehn
quist's dissent disagreed with the majority in several fundamental re
spects. First, he did not believe that the access order would
demonstrably affect the utility in the exercise of its first amendment
rights, and he found the case indistinguishable from Prune Yard in this
aspect. 309 Second, he was of the view that corporations do not have the
304. ld. at 916.
305. ld. at 915.
306. Id. at 916.
307. Id. at 916-17. In addition to Justice Powell's plurality opinion and Justice Marshall's con
currence, there was one other concurring opinion. Although joining Justice Powell's opinion, Chief
Justice Burger also wrote a brief separate opinion stressing his view that the case could be decided on
the authority of Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). As in those two cases, the utility was ordered to employ its property
to disseminate views that it found objectionable. 106 S. Ct. at 914.
308. Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined in part by Justices White and Stevens; Justice Stevens
also wrote separate 1y.
309. Justice Rehnquist's dissent reaffirmed much of the reasoning relied on in his majority opin
ion in PruneYard, in which three factors were seen as distinguishing that case from Wooley v. May
nard. First, the disseminated message did not originate with the government; second, there was an
opportunity to disavow in PruneYard, unlike the situation in Wooley where the license plate message
could not be covered up, see supra note 190; finally, the third PruneYard factor was the possibility
that views expressed would be assumed to be those of the shopping center owner. Under the circum
stances of PruneYard, Justice Rehnquist's opinion found no such possibility existed. For a discus
sion of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in PruneYard, see supra text accompanying notes 189-93.
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same free speech rights as individuals and newspapers. 310
Justice Rehnquist's opinion took a narrow view of the scope of the
first amendment right not to speak. He would protect that right only
when "the effect of the action approximates that of direct content-based
suppression of speech." 311 If the government action granting access
"only indirectly and remotely affects a speaker's contribution to the over
all mix of information available to society," 312 it would be upheld if it
could be justified by a rational basis.
On the facts of the case before him, Justice Rehnquist found the
"potential deterrent effect" to be "remote and speculative" and not "suf
ficiently immediate and direct to warrant strict scrutiny." 313 Relying on
the fact that no particular action by the utility triggered TURN's right of
access, Justice Rehnquist found no logical or evidentiary support for the
view that the utility would refrain from speaking out about certain sub
jects to attempt to discourage TURN from speaking on those subjects. 3 14
He also disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the utility would
feel compelled to respond to views expressed by TURN. As he had in his
opinion inPruneYard, 315 he viewed the required disclaimer of any associ
ation between the utility and the views expressed by TURN, as removing
any likeliliood of impermissibly compelling PG&E to respond to the
opinions expressed by TURN. 316 Moreover, because TURN could ex
press its views in other places if denied access to the billing envelopes, the
utility might decide to respond to TURN's opinions even in the absence
of CPUC's order. Finally, the utility retained complete control over the
content of its monthly magazine. Given these facts, Justice Rehnquist
saw no way in which PG&E's behavior had been affected by the Com
mission's order that rose to the level of a significant direct effect on its
first amendment rights.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion also offered a more sweeping alternative
analysis. He viewed the individual's right to refrain from expression as
"a component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in
freedom of conscience." 317 This interest explained the Court's opinions
in Barnette, Wooley, and Abood., Justice Rehnquist viewed the interest in
310. Justices White and Stevens did not join this part of the opinion.
311. 106 S. Ct. at 918.
312. Id. at 917 (emphasis in original).
313. Id. at 919.
314. Id. at 920.
315. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
316. 106 S. Ct. at 920; see also supra note 190 and text accompanying notes 199-201 (discussing
Justice Rehnquist's disavowal analysis in PruneYard and the reasons that caused Justice Powell to
dissent in that case).
317. 106 S. Ct. at 920.
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protecting individual "freedom of mind" 318 as inappropriately applied to
nonmedia corporations: "Extension of the individual freedom of con
science decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those
cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an
'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse met
aphor with reality." 319 Recognizing that corporations have been granted
free speech rights, Justice Rehnquist nevertheless viewed such rights as
arising out of a desire to promote the exchange of information and opin
ions, and not out of a view that corporations have any independent inter
est in self-expression. Because freedom of conscience promotes values
such as privacy-separate and distinct from the promotion of a vigorous
marketplace of ideas, that freedom ought not to apply to corporations. 320
The various opinions in Pacific Gas & Electric raise a complicated
series of analytic possibilities. On an obvious level, Pacific Gas & Electric
presented another opportunity to explore the situation first encountered
in PruneYard. In his Prune Yard opinion, Justice Powell limited the deci
sion to the facts of the case and held open the possibility of a different
result if the property owner opposed the message distributed through the
use of his property. For Justice Powell, Pacific Gas & Electric was just
such a case. The antipathy between the utility and TURN's message was
obvious because TURN was granted access rights only because its views
were opposed to those of the utility. His Pacific Gas & Electric opinion
also reiterated his Prune Yard view that neither the opportunity to disa
vow321 nor the nongovernment source of the message3 22 are of first
318. /d. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
319. /d. at 921.
320. /d. at 921-22. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion took a much narrower view of the issues
in the case. His view of the CPUC's order was that TURN was granted access for the purpose of
fundraising efforts and that the Commission did not authorize TURN to use the surplus space to
engage in general advocacy of political viewpoints. /d. at 923. Moreover, because TURN was the
only ratepayer organization that had applied for access, he declined to find that the Commission had
engaged in viewpoint discrimination. /d. at 922-23. Justice Stevens, given the limited purpose for
which TURN was granted access, saw no difficulty in upholding a CPUC order requiring "the
utility to act as the conduit for a public interest group's message that bears a close relationship to the
purpose of the billing envelope." /d. at 924. Justice Stevens found the access requirement to be
similar to a variety of rules, not thought to raise any first amendment concerns, applied to commer
cial communications by the Securities and Exchange Commission. /d. His rejection of the plural
ity's viewpoint-discrimination approach comes as something of a surprise given his general
receptivity to such claims. See supra note 272.
321. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980). Justice Powell views
the opportunity to disavow as part of the burden impermissibly imposed on the speaker in violation
of the first amendment. The utility may be forced to take advantage of that opportunity in order to
disassociate itself from the views of its opponents. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Commission's order
specifically required that TURN attach a disclaimer to its message stating that the views expressed
were not those of the utility. 106 S. Ct. at 907. This disclaimer did not impress Justice Powell as
lessening the unconstitutional impact of the Commission order, even though PG&E was not pres
sured to speak in order to clarify any ambiguity as to the source of the communication. Justice
Powell worried that, despite TURN's required disclaimer, the utility would feel pressured to respond
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amendment significance because they do not lighten the first amendment
burdens created by the order. Also important to the outcome in
Prune Yard was the fact that the state had chosen a content-neutral
method of promoting its ends. 323 In Pacific Gas & Electric, the state
chose a less favored content-based method of achieving its objectives. As
a result, its effort was much more easily struck down.
Despite the differences between Pacific Gas & Electric and
Prune Yard, it cannot go unnoticed that Pacific Gas & Electric follows
two Supreme Court opinions, Roberts 324 and Knight, 325 in which claims
of compelled expression and association received swift rejection. One
wonders what factors present in Pacific Gas & Electric made it so easily
distinguishable from those earlier decisions.
One factor relevant to this result is that, despite citations to Barnette
and Wooley, it is clear that Pacific Gas & Electric is viewed by the plural
ity as a special subcategory of compelled expression cases in which the
obligation of compelled access to private property is triggered by state
ments the property owner makes. In such cases, the owner may be able
to avoid the access obligation by altering the behavior that gave rise to
that obligation. 326 This subtle "content-based penalty" 327 is in many
ways more invidious than a specific compelled governmental message be
cause of its immediate hnpact on the expression of the person or entity
confronted by the penalty.
Another hnportant qualification is that Pacific Gas & Electric is a
to TURN's speech out of a fear that it otherwise would be presumed to agree with these views.
Thus, Justice Powell saw a distinction between the ratepayers' believing the utility was the speaker,
and their believing the utility agreed with the speaker because the speech was enclosed in the utility's
billing envelope.
322. 447 U.S. at 98 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("But even when no particular message is
mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state action that forces a property
owner to admit third-party speakers."). Even if Justice Powell had found some relevance in the
source of the communicated views, he could have found the nongovernment source requirement
satisfied in Pacific Gas & Electric. Although the government was not the author of the message as it
had been in Barnette and Wooley, the government had chosen to favor antiutility views in order to
expose ratepayers to a greater diversity of views and sought to aid speakers with messages that
furthered the Commission's purpose of spotlighting the essentially antiutility viewpoint. Therefore,
the government was not as disassociated from the content of the speech as it had been in Prune Yard.
323. /d. (Powell, J., concurring) ("[N]o particular message [was] mandated by the State ....").
324. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 226-54.
325. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). For further
discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 255-76.
326. See supra note 289. Ironically, the only other recent compelled expression case in which an
analogous circumstance exists is Knight. In that case, the faculty members could avoid the obliga
tion to join MCCFA if they were willing to give up their right to participate in the meet-and-confer
process. 465 U.S. at 298-99 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
327. 106 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974)).
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compelled-access case, like PruneYard and Wooley insofar as private
property owners are obligated to provide a forum for the speech of
others328-private parties or the government-and not to say something
they do not wish to say. Unlike PruneYard, however, the access is not
granted on a content-neutral basis. Here, the Commission selects some
speakers for access based on the content of their speech. This viewpont
discrimination is a special concern under the first amendment and very
similar to the government's dictating a particular message of its own
choosing and coercing private parties to participate in the dissemination
process, the situation in Wooley. 329 The use of such objectionable means
was a critical factor in the analysis of the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality
and concurring opinions.
A third factor that cannot be ignored in evaluating Pacific Gas &
Electric is the extent to which the case involves traditional free speech
concerns. In Justice Marshall's analysis of the facts, the utility is pre
vented from using the envelope space four months out of the year. Thus,
not only have access rights been granted, but they have been granted at
the sacrifice of the utility's ability to speak. This partial silencing of a
speaker and depriving the speaker of a chosen method of communication
turns Pacific Gas & Electric into a censorship case, not requiring any
compelled expression analysis. Even Justice Powell's plurality opinion,
although it does not emphasize this same adverse impact, nevertheless
describes direct invasions of free speech rights when he worries that
PG&E will feel pressured to refrain from speaking as a result of its com
pelled distribution of TURN's views.
Because the case contains so many of the worst features of prior fact
patterns-ousting speakers from space otherwise available for their own
speech; imposing access obligations on speakers because they have exer
cised free speech rights; imposing obligations to spread a message with
which the speakers disagree; and acting in a viewpoint-discriminatory
manner-it comes as no surprise that the Commission order was
invalidated.
Despite the unsurprising nature of the outcome in Pacific Gas &
Electric, there is one very striking difference between the decision and its
doctrinal predecessors. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the nature of the de
328. Examples of Supreme Court approval of government authorized access to private property
as a forum for expression are rare. In addition to Prune Yard, one well-known example is found in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which upheld FCC rules requiring free
reply time on radio to respond to personal attacks and political editorials. Justice Powell's plurality
opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric distinguishes Red Lion as justified by the public ownership of the
airwaves and the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. By contrast, communication by mail is freely
available to all. 106 S. Ct. at 908 n.6.
329. See supra text accompauying notes 130-34.
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bate among the ·various Justices shifted. For the first time, the debate
focused on more than factual similarities with and differences from prior
cases; the debate also considered the first amendment values at stake.
For the majority, first amendment values associated with freedom of ex
pression are threatened, such as the likelihood that the utility will change
its speech as a result of the order and the fact that the utility is deprived
of the opportunity to speak four months out of the year. By comparison,
for Justice Rehnquist there is no empirical data to support this adverse
impact ·on the marketplace of ideas, and, to the extent Barnette and
Wooley draw their doctrinal origins from the intrinsic values of intellec
tual individualism, such rights do not apply to the nonmedia corpora
tion. Pacific Gas & Electric attempts to confront the values underlying
the decision to protect the right not to be compelled to speak; this effort
is both commendable and novel in the Court's compelled expression
jurisprudence.
·The debate over values and the plurality's hostile attitude toward
the Commission order raise the question of whether that hostility is justi
fied based on the concerns that prompted the Barnette opinion. One of
Justice Jackson's first concerns was the prospect that compelled speakers
would alter their own beliefs under the influence of government compul
sion and that society would be deprived of their differing views. No
member of the Court suggests that such a danger exists in Pacific Gas &
Electric. There is little danger that the utility, unlike the Jehovah's Wit
nesses in Barnette, will change its point of view as a result of the forced
association with TURN's opinions. The nature of the utility's business
enterprise dictates many of the views that it holds and makes any change
highly improbable. 33o
A second concern of Justice Jackson was that compelled speakers,
even if not changing their beliefs, would be less likely to express their
true views as a result of compelled association with government-spon
sored ideas. Justices Powell and Rehnquist disagree about this possibility
in their opinions in Pacific Gas & Electric. Although it is hard to know
whether such a result will occur, this seems unlikely on many of the is
sues of interest to both Pacific and TURN because these issues are con
tested in mandatory appearances before state and federal regulatory
agencies, and the views of the utility are already a matter of public rec
ord. As to other issues, such as proposed legislation, even when there are
330. In the same way that commercial speech "may be more durable" and less vulnerable to a
chilling effect than political speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976), it can be argued that the utility is more likely to adhere
to its origiual views than an individual.
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issues on which the utility chooses not to air its views before its custom
ers, it seems doubtful that the prospect of a response by TURN will oper
ate as a significant deterrent factor. As Justice Rehnquist points out,
TURN is free to express its views in other forums, as it has in the past,
which is just as likely to prompt a response by the utility. Unlike cases in
which the proximity of opposing views makes a response more compel
ling, proximity seems unlikely to play a role in the utility's
decisionmaking.
The only other forced expression concern raised in Pacific Gas &
Electric is found in Justice Powell's belief that the utility will feel com
pelled to respond to TURN when it would prefer to remain silent. In
previous cases, such an effect was seen as threatening the individual's
right to develop one's own personality, even if it was a silent one, free of
outside interference. What is doubtful in Pacific Gas & Electric is that
the utility would realistically prefer silence. As a regulated utility, many
of whose policies are established or approved by government bodies,
PG&E has little incentive to remain silent when its interests are at stake.
In this respect, to the extent that there is a publicly held corporate per
sonality, it is not a personality that is as individualized as its human
counterparts. Whatever motivates private individuals to prefer silence
shyness, inarticulateness, preferring to be private persons, uncertainty
about their views-seems unlikely to influence the behavior of a large,
publicly held, and highly regulated corporate entity. Without taking Jus
tice Rehnquist's extreme view that corporations are not protected from
being forced to speak, in the circumstances of this case there is little real
istic likelihood of such an impact on PG&E's first amendment right to
remain silent.
When examined closely, the Pacific Gas & Electric fact pattern
raises few of the concerns that were implicated in Barnette, or even in
Wooley. The most serious first amendment consequence, depriving
PG&E of the use of the surplus space for four months out of the year,
directly involves the utility's right to speak and not its right to refrain
from speech or association.331
Despite the Court's efforts to treat Pacific Gas & Electric as a proto
typical compelled expression case, in truth the circnmstances of the case
331. Any possibility of a forced association claim seems eliminated by the disclaimer contained
on TURN's communications and the fact that TURN is not granted space in PG&E's own newslet
ter. The only association between the utility and TURN is the fact that TURN's newsletter shares
physical space with communications from the utility contained in the envelope enclosing the utility
bill. This physical proximity bears no relationship to the forced association of the nonunion em
ployee forced to pay union dues or the male members of the Jaycees forced to admit women to
membership in their organization.
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share few of the philosophical underpinnings of past compulsion cases.
Although the Court's focus on values is to be applauded, it has failed to
appreciate the important distinctions between Barnette with its concern
for intellectual individualism, and the plight of a utility forced to share
its billing envelope with its opposition.
IX.

A Suggested Two-Tiered Analysis

It is clear that the Supreme Court's approach to the first amend
ment problem of compelled expression and association is neither consis
tent nor adequate. The varying first amendment interests at stake in the
different factual situations encountered within this general problem area
are not appropriately considered.

A.

The Analytic Framework

This Article suggests a possible analytic technique· for deciding such
cases that would avoid at least some of the pitfalls that the Court has
encountered. As its first principle, this technique requires considering
the nature and extent of the first amendment infringement that has oc
curred as a factor in the resolution of the case. All invasions of the right
, to be free from government-compelled expression and association are not
equally serious under this approach: an effort is made to separate those
cases in which the level of compulsion is sufficiently serious to involve
the first amendment interest in intellectual individualism that concerned
Justice Jackson in his Barnette opinion. The cases falling into this first
category are those in which government compulsion creates a serious risk
of forced conformity to government-favored ideas.
A second group of cases, although rising to the level of a first
amendment invasion, involve a less worrisome form of invasion. Here,
the individual is not alleging that the degree of government intrusion
chills the enthusiasm for expressing contrary ideas or seriously com
promises individual identity. Instead, the individual typically complains
of interference with the freedom to be one's own person unfettered by
government constraint. In such cases, the government should be permit
ted to support its action with a lesser level of justification.
Dividing compelled expression and association cases into two tracks
seems justified in light of this Article's detailed evaluation, based on cases
the Supreme Court has decided, of how seriously first amendment values
are affected. The cases demonstrate a range of different impacts, not all
serious to the same degree. The kind of division suggested, moreover, is
hardly unusual in first amendment analysis-the Court already distin
guishes between categories of speech, protecting some more than others
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based on the unique characteristics of different varieties of speech. 332
And, when confronted with a claim of government prohibition of speech,
the Court customarily distinguishes between direct government censor
ship of speech that suppresses an idea (content-based cases) and govern
ment restraint that is incidental to some purpose other than the desire to
suppress an idea (content-neutral cases). 333 In content-neutral restraint
cases, the Court requires a lesser level of governmental justification based
on its view that such restraints present fewer threats to basic first amend
ment values. 334 Although a parallel two-tiered analysis for compulsion
cases is not surprising, the Court has failed to distinguish between these
two types of cases in its earlier encounters with compelled expression.
1. First-Tier Cases.-If the government directly requires individu
als to engage in speech against their will or requires that individuals be
come more than nominal members of an organization, the case would be
viewed as the most serious interference with fust amendment values. In
such cases, having identified the government's action as a direct compul
sion, the inquiry would shift to the government's asserted justification
and choice of means. That justification should then be subjected to strict
scrutiny. If the government's purpose is to encourage a particular idea or
further a particular cause or association, that goal would be inadequate
332. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be ex
pressed by the use of less offensive language."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) ("[G]reater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech ... may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements ...."); Chaplin
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that there are certain narrowly limited
classes of speech that may be constitutionally subject to punishment); see also Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265 (1981) (discussing categori
zation in free speech analysis).
333. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down a state university ban on
the use of school facilities for religious meetings because the content-based exclusion was not justi
fied by a sufficiently compelling government interest as required by strict scrntiny review) with Hef
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a
content-neutral rule restricting distribution of literature at a state fair to a rented booth as justified
by the state's siguificant interest in crowd control). For a thorough exploration of the Supreme
Court's use of the content-based/content-neutral distinction, see Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
334. The Court's standard of review in content-neutral cases has been described as "an essen
tially open-ended form of balancing." Stone, supra note 333, at 190. In one major category of
content-neutral regulation-restrictions classified as time, place, and manner restraints-the test
employed by the Supreme Court asks whether the regulations "are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The
Court's characterization of content-neutral time, place, and manner restraints as presenting a lesser
threat to first amendment values and its use of a lower-level of scrutiny for regulations of this type
has been viewed with approval. See Farber & Nowak, 17ze Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1237 (1984).
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to justify direct interference. If the government's purpose is unrelated to
a desire to further speech, then the question becomes whether the pur
pose is a compelling one and whether the choice of means is necessary to
accomplish that compelling end. Such strict scrutiny is merited because
of the seriousness of the invaded interest in terms of the impact on values
protected by the first amendment.

2. Second-Tier Cases.-lf compelled behavior is exacted by the
government, but the nature of the compelled behavior is-instead of
speech or membership--some lesser association with an idea or an organ
ization, a lower level of scrutiny should be applied in order to judge con
stitutionality. These indirect or incidental associations with ideas are
forms of compelled behavior; they involve, however, a lesser impact on
individual conscience and are less likely to discourage the individual
from expressing contrary ideas. Because such incidental coercive meas
ures involve a less serious challenge to first amendment values, the lower
level of scrutiny is justified. Just as in fust-tier cases, despite the lower
level standard of review, a court should be hostile to government efforts
to justify the use of compulsion as a means of spreading a particular
government-sponsored message or coercing adherence to a government
favored idea. 335 As long as the government action is not motivated by
such a suspect purpose, the court should uphold a law if it found that:
(1) the government's purpose was both nonsuspect and substantial; (2)
the law directly advanced the asserted government purpose; and (3) the
law was no more extensive than necessary to serve that purpose.
B. Applying the Two-Tier Approach
1. Barnette Revisited.-Under this two-tiered analysis, Barnette is
clearly a first-tier case. The governmental interference is direct: school
children were required to recite the words of the pledge and salute the
flag. Because the invasion of first amendment interests is direct, compel
ling speech itself, strict scrutiny review is mandated. The next inquiry
focuses on the government's purpose for requiring the flag salute. In
Barnette, the government's purpose was its desire to encourage patriot
ism. 336 Because this purpose is simply an attempt to spread a govern
ment-favored idea, such a justification is not adequate to excuse a direct
compulsion of speech. Although the government's motive may be per
335. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
336. West Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 n.2 (1943) (noting that the West
Virginia Board of Education resolution adopting the mandatory flag salute described the American
flag as the symbol of national unity and the purpose of the mandatory flag salute as promoting
national unity).
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missible, the means used are not acceptable. Alternative means exist to
achieve such an end that do not interfere to the same extent with first
amendment interests.
Applied in a case like Barnette, this analysis parallels cases of con
tent-based censorship, in which the government desires to suppress a dis
favored idea and does so by directly forbidding its utterance. Such a
motive is at odds with basic first amendment values. Therefore, such an
impermissible motivation will lead to the virtually automatic invalidity of
the law, 337 unless the speech involved is entirely unprotected by the first
amendment or receives only some lower level of protection. 338 By com
parison, when the government attempts to spread an idea instead of sup
pressing one, no clear rule of invalidity currently exists. 339 Instead,
limitations on government-fostered speech have focused on the narrower
question of the appropriateness of the means employed, and the Court
has held impermissible only those means that compel allegiance to an
idea and deprive an individual of the ability to refuse to cooperate with
the government's efforts. 340 To permit such government action wonld
337. See, e.g., Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-72 (1982) (plurality opinion) (remand
ing district court summary judgment that held the removal of anti-American books from a school
library did not violate first amendment); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 536 (1980) (striking down order of public utility commission prohibiting utility bill inserts that
discussed controversial issues of public policy).
338. Content-based regulations are viewed with less hostility when the speech singled out is not
entitled to the full protection of the first amendment. For speech deserving no protection, the gov
ernment's justification for content-based censorship usually is directed at the same harmful qualities
attributed to the speech that led the Court to consider the speech outside of the protection of the first
amendment. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (concluding that "a con
tent-based classification of speech has been accepted because ... the evil [of child pornography] so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests"). When the government is regulating a category
of speech receiving reduced first amendment protection, the Court has been less hostile to content
based regulations that are reasonable in light of the special nature of the speech subject to the regula
tion. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (commercial speech); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (sexually explicit speech).
339. Government efforts to disseminate an idea are described generally under the heading of
government speech. See supra note 134. Although commentators have argued that first amendment
limits on government participation as a speaker in the marketplace of ideas are appropriate, e.g.,
YuooF, supra note 134, at 260-61; Kamenshine, supra note 134, at 1105-06, courts have followed
their lead only when the government is engaging in partisan political activities, and then only by
relying on nonconstitutional grounds for decision. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass.
178, 198, 380 N.E.2d 628, 641 (municipality lacks authority to spend funds to influence referendum
results), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979); Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 453, 375
N.Y.S.2d 235, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (state agency lacks authority to campaign for passage of proposed
amendment to state constitution); see also Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The
Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REv. 578 (1980) (analyzing the statutory and constitu
tional restraints on governmental partisanship); Note, The Constitutionality ofMunicipal Advocacy
in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1980) (critiquing the current mode of
analysis used to adjudicate municipal referendum advocacy).
340. This hostility to compelled expression motivated by the government's desire to spread an
idea is obvious in the Court's decision in Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. A similar hostility appeared in
Wooley when the Court summarily rejected a state justification that was not considered to be view
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work a two-fold distortion of the marketplace of ideas: one distortion
occurs because the government-compelled idea is artificially elevated in
prominence above others by gaining the advantage of citizen advocates
who are compelled to express the idea; the second distortion occurs be
cause some individuals who might otherwise express a differing view
point may be discouraged from doing so as a result of the government
compulsion.
2. The Loyalty Oath Cases.-A second example of direct interfer
ence with the freedom from compelled expression and association is
found in the loyalty oath cases. 341 Individuals are compelled to speak
against their will by reciting a loyalty oath or affixing their signatures to
a form; the government's asserted purpose is assuring that persons it em
ploys and entrusts with carrying out policies are loyal to their govern
ment employer and will endeavor to execute their duties by lawful
means. 342
Unlike Barnette, in the loyalty oath cases the government's domi
nant purpose is not a desire to encourage a government-favored idea
acting within the law-but instead to test an individual's preexisting be
lief in such an idea, an admittedly subtle distinction. Because the govern
ment's purpose is not the suspect one of spreading a government
approved idea, the compelled speech should not be immediately con
demned as inappropriate in terms of first amendment values. There is
nothing impermissible about the government's desire to assure belief in
the law on the part of its employees. Moreover, far from being impermis
sible, such a goal satisfies the compelling government purpose require
ment of strict scrutiny review. 343 The outcome of the case therefore
turns on the fit between means and ends. The question to be asked is
whether use of a compelled loyalty oath is necessary to assure that gov
ernment employees respect the law and are loyal to their employer.
One way of resolving this question is to focus on the existence of
available alternative methods for assuring the loyalty of employees with
out so directly intruding on interests protected by the first amendment.
It may well be that by concentrating on job qualifications, by interview
ing prospective applicants to discern attitudes, and by checking referpoint neutral. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 345
47.
341. For a discussion of the loyalty oath cases, see supra Part III.
342. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 682 (1972).
343. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S.
371, 373 (1882) (noting the government's legitimate purpose in "promot[ing] efficiency and integrity
in the discharge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service")).
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ences of potential employees, the government will be better able to assure
loyalty among its employees than by the use of a loyalty oath. The dan
ger of using a loyalty oath for this purpose is that the least law-abiding
employees are more likely to be willing to recite the oath and risk perjur
ing themselves in order to infiltrate government. Thus, the technique
may be ineffective for avoiding the danger of disloyal employees and yet
appear sufficiently intrusive to persons who would make excellent em
ployees to discourage them from working for the government.
3.

Second-Tier Cases: Wooley, Abood, PruneYard, and Pacific
Gas & Electric.-Many of the subsequent coercion cases fall into the
second tier and merit a lower level of judicial scrutiny. For example, in
Wooley v. Maynard, 344 the behavior coerced-displaying the state motto
on the Maynards' license plate-was an incidental restraint on freedom
from coerced expression. Because the Maynards' involvement with the
state motto was something less than coerced speaking of the motto, and
because the association between the Maynards and the motto was not
one that would make the world believe the Maynards were advocates of
the state's "Live Free or Die" message, lower-level scrutiny is justified.
A court's focus for similar fact situations should begin with the govern
ment's purpose behind requiring citizens to bear the state message.
In Wooley, the Court identified two government purposes. 345 One
was the state's desire to spread the state's motto and communicate "an
official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individ
ualism";346 the second was the need for easy identification of properly
licensed vehicles. The first purpose, because it involved the desire to
spread a particular viewpoint, was not sufficient to justify the compelled
behavior, just as such a purpose was not sufficient to justify the use of
compulsion in Barnette. The second purpose, even if assumed to be sub
stantial, as required by lower-level review, would require a focus on the
fit between means and ends. The suggestion of the Court's opinion in
Wooley was that the means were more extensive than necessary because a
state's license plates can be made easily identifiable without the presence
of a motto. 347
A similar analysis would also apply to facts like those presented in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 348 In that case, indirect coercion
existed in the form of forced payment of union dues. That degree of
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

430 U.S. 705 (1977), discussed supra Part IV.
430 U.S. at 716.
/d.
/d. at 716-17.
431 U.S. 209 (1977), discussed supra Part V.
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compelled participation is clearly less than speech itself or compelled ac
tive participation in an organization. In addition, the government's pur
pose was to promote labor peace and to avoid the free-rider effect, and
not any desire to promote a particular union message. 349 These articu
lated purposes were easily viewed as important to the system of labor
relations. Just as in New Hampshire's effort to justify the state motto
with the need for vehicle identification, the critical question for Abood
becomes the fit between means and ends. 3 5 0
A third case falling within the second tier is PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 351 in which the forced association was indirect. The
center's owner was not forced to engage in speech but had to make the
shopping center property available as a forum for the expression of the
ideas of others. The government's purpose for compelling access to the
shopping center property was the state's desire to promote the market
place of ideas, a value protected by the California Constitution's free
speech provision. 352 Government efforts to provide access to a forum for
expression are generally viewed as involving a substantial government
purpose, although there are significant limits on the means that can be
used to achieve this end. 353
Assuming the propriety of compelled access, the question becomes
the traditional one of whether there was a direct fit between means and
349. 431 U.S. at 220-23.
350. Because the analysis of whether such a fit is direct and the requirement no more extensive
than necessary involves difficult questions of labor policy and union management, that analysis will
not be attempted here. It was the Supreme Court's view in Abood that adequate justification existed
for imposing the costs of union collective bargaining activities on nonunion employees, id. at 222,
but that there was no similar reason to make nonunion members pay for the union's political activi
ties. Id. at 235.
351. 447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed supra Part VI.
352. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-11, 592 P.2d 341, 346-48, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (1979) (interpreting CAL. CoNST., art. I, § 2).
353. Prior to its decision in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court had already recognized significant
limits on access grants. For example, the government cannot usually open up a forum for expres
sion and exclude speech that advocates a particular point of view. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion). Even subject-matter restraints are stricdy
scrutinized. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) ("requir[ing] the most exacting
scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its context" and
applying that scrutiny to a state university regulation that prohibited the use of school grounds for
religious worship or teaching); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544
(1980) (inclusion by public utility of controversial, political statements in monthly billing envelopes
is neither "a permissible subject-matter regulation[] nor a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a
compelling state interest"); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (explaining that "justi
fications for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized" and, because
"picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, ...
discrimination among pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest."). Addi
tionally, government efforts to equalize access to a forum by potential speakers with disproportion
ate assets have been viewed as violative of basic first amendment principles. E.g., First Nat'! Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
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ends. Provision of access to the shopping center property clearly satis
fied that test. Because large numbers of persons can be easily and
cheaply encountered for first amendment purposes, such as distributing
leaflets and collecting signatures for petitions in a shopping center, mak
ing this forum available significantly contributed to the purpose of open
ing up a forum for expression. 3 54 In addition, because property owners
were permitted to create reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
on access to their property, 355 the access requirement was no more exten
sive than was necessary to further the government's substantial interest.
The most recent compelled expression case, Pacific Gas & Elec
tric,356 also is classified as an indirect compulsion case. Like the other
second-tier cases, the behavior compelled is less than the direct expres
sion of an idea by the utility. Just as in Prune Yard, the utility was forced
to lend its property for the expression of the ideas of others. The connec
tion between the utility and the ideas expressed by TURN was an indi
rect one especially in light of the disclaimer contained in TURN's
communication. 357 The state's purposes for compelling access to the bill
ing envelopes were twofold: fair utility regulation and, as in Prune Yard,
promoting the marketplace of ideas. 358 While these purposes are easily
viewed as substantial, the CPUC order fails to satisfy the means compo
nent of second-tier scrutiny. As Justice Powell's opinion recognizes, ef
fective utility ratemaking can be promoted more directly by a variety of
other means that avoid the intrusion on Pacific's first amendment rights
resulting from the access order. The second purpose provides even less
justification for the choice of means. The state has chosen to advance a
favored viewpoint by giving that viewpoint access to private property in a
way that imposes a burden on the expression of the property owner.
Such means are an impermissible method of promoting the state's inter
est in encouraging the exchange of views about utility regulation. 359
354. The modern-day importance of shopping center property as a forum for expression was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc. 391 U.S. 308, 324-25 (1968). Although the Court subsequently overruled Logan
Valley, it did so on the ground that state action conld not be found under the public function theory
by analogizing between the central business district of a city and a shopping center, not because
shopping centers were viewed as insignificant forums for expression. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507, 518, 520-21 (1976).
355. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910-ll, 592 P.2d 341, 347-48, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1979), aff'd sub nom. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
356. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986). For a discussion of the Pacific Gas & Electric case, see supra Part
VIII.
357. 106 S. Ct. at 907.
358. /d. at 913-14.
359. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 & n.31 (1978) ("Government is
forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern them
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Thus, the commission's order is unconsitutional under the second tier
analysis.
4. The Difficult Cases: Roberts and Knight.-Although the ma
jority of the compelled expression cases fall relatively easily into either
tier one or two for purposes of analysis, two of the three cases decided
during the 1983 Tenn depart from this pattern of easy characterization.
The lone exception is Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steam
ship Clerks, 360 which follows closely in the footsteps ofAbood. The chal
lenge to union use of the agency fee in that case can easily be seen as a
government action having only an incidental effect on speech. As in
Abood, the outcome turns on the fit between the means (using fee money
for certain purposes) and the end (eliminating free riders and achieving
labor peace).
In contrast, Roberts v. United States Jaycees 361 can be placed in
either tier depending on one's perspective. Being compelled to admit wo
men to membership is something less than speech itself; moreover, no
one was forced to join the Jaycees against their will. This formal analysis
could lead one to conclude that the compelled act amounted to an indi
rect compulsion and no more.
Moving beyond form and focusing on substance, however, yields a
different result. Although the compelled behavior was not speech as
such, it could be viewed as symbolic expression.362 Requiring the
Jaycees to communicate their approval of becoming a mixed-gender or
ganization could easily be viewed as a direct compulsion, linking the or
ganization with a new message, one not chosen voluntarily. In addition,
being compelled to accept new members might be, from the organiza
tion's point of view, an interference with associational freedom as severe
as forcing an individual to join an organization.
If the effects were classified as direct compulsion, strict scrutiny re
view would be applied, but such scrutiny is not inevitably "fatal in
selves."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....").
360. 466 U.S. 435 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 208-25.
361. 468 U.S. 609 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 226-54.
362. The possibility of classifYing compelled behavior as symbolic expression was first suggested
by Justice Jackson in Barnette when describing the mandatory flag salute. See supra text accompa
nying note 22. Although the compelled act of admitting women to membership in the Jaycees is not
a universal symbol on the order of the flag salute, the act of admitting women might "be understood
by the viewer to be communicative" of approval of women members joining the organization. Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (prohibiting camping in Wash
ington D.C. parks does not violate the first amendment even though the symbolic expression of
camping is designed to highlight the problem of the homeless).
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fact." 363 The government purpose was not spreading the idea of equal
treatment for women, but, instead, eliminating discrimination against
women by places of public accommodation as a social policy objective. 364
The government's target was discriminatory behavior itself and not the
communication of the idea of equal treatment as a social good. Of
course, it should be noted that spreading this idea was an incidental bene
fit consistent with the government's primary purpose in altering the
membership policies of the Jaycees. Under strict scrutiny review, the
government's purpose of eliminating gender discrimination was a com
pelling one. 365 Thus, the only question that remained concerned the ne
cessity of the chosen means. In similar situations, the Court has shown
deference to legislative judgments about the necessity of means adopted
to eradicate discrimination. 366 Given a similar deference, the application
of the state's human rights law to the membership policies of the Jaycees
could survive strict scrutiny review.
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight 367 also re
quires some effort to categorize accurately. In Knight, faculty members
at the Minnesota community colleges were forced to join an organization
that functioned as their exclusive bargaining agent if they wished to serve
on the meet-and-confer committees that served as the formal mechanism
for discussions of academic policy on nonbargaining subjects with the
administration of the community colleges. Organization membership
was unnecessary if faculty members were willing to sacrifice the opportu
nity to participate in the meet-and-confer process.
Although faculty members were not compelled to join the organiza
tion under a direct state order, this does not relegate the Knight facts to
the second tier. The fact that the government used the device of a condi
tion, instead of a direct mandate, does not change the character of the act
that the government strongly encouraged. By imposing this requirement,
the government compelled actual and active membership in an organiza
tion as a precondition to participation in the formal process for discuss
363. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1972).
364. See supra note 232.
365. /d.
366. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92, 595-96 (1983) (upholding IRS
ruling that private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies are not entitled to tax
exempt status as a means of discouraging racial discrimination); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
318-20 (1977) (per curiam) (upholding congressional effort in § 215 of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 415 (1970 and Supp. V), to redress past economic discrimination against women); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259-61 (1964) (upholding public accommoda
tions provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964)), and, by implication, similar state statutes).
367. 465 U.S. 271 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 255-76.

911

Texas Law Review

Vol. 64:817, 1986

ing academic policy. Because faculty members could choose whether to
belong to the association, the critical question in Knight was whether any
kind of compulsion existed. 368 The troubling issue in the case was not
whether the compelled association was direct or indirect. If one dis
counts the mitigating effects of imposing a condition rather than an or
der, and views the choice given faculty members as only theoretical, then
the "compelled" act directly interfered with the freedom from compelled
expression and association.
Under this approach, Knight would be classified as a direct compul
sion case; therefore, the government's burden to justify this compulsion
as a legitimate extension of the exclusive representation system of labor
relations would be heavier than was the case in Abood and Ellis. That
heavier burden would require some more exact showing of the need for
organization membership as a requirement for meet-and-confer commit
tee participation. Nothing in the Knight record satisfies this required
evidentiary showing. The justification for the Minnesota requirement
was described in terms of guaranteeing that the government employer
hears only one version of the views of its employees so that reaching an
agreement on academic policy matters would be facilitated. 369 Under
strict scrutiny review, a more specific showing of the necessity for this
requirement would be required for it to survive a constitutional chal
lenge. Such a showing could probably not be satisfied, and the law
should consequently be declared to be unconstitutional. 3 70
The suggested two-track standard of review does not make resolu
tion of the compelled expression and association cases easy. Neverthe
less, the suggested test at the least begins to focus attention on the fact
that all cases in which the government is guilty of compulsion do not
involve the same degree of threat to first amendment interests. More
over, unlike the Supreme Court's current approach, the proposal ad
vanced brings this area of first amendment doctrine into the mainstream
of contemporary first amendment analysis.
X.

Conclusion

Written in the midst of a turbulent period for first amendment juris
prudence, Justice Jackson's pronouncements in Barnette appealed to
368. This question produced a serious disagreement between Justices O'Connor and Brennan in
Knight. Compare 465 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J.) ("[T]hey are not required to become members of
MCCFA.'') with id. at 298-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Minnesota has put direct pressure on non
union faculty members to join MCCFA.").
369. Id. at 291-92.
370. A similar skepticism about the validity of the state's interest in imposing the membership
requirement is expressed in Farber & Nowak, supra note 334, at 1259.
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high-sounding principles, but actually reflected an effort to walk a nar
row decisional path avoiding the freedom of religion pitfalls that had
previously divided the Court.
In the period after Barnette, the decision was relied upon often, but
no further attempts were made to refine or comprehend the values that
were at the heart of the opinion. Justice Jackson had stressed two ideals:
first, freedom from government-compelled ideas as a necessary precondi
tion for avoiding forced conformity and the costs it would impose on
society, and second, protection of the individual right to be one's own
person, a freedom essential to the ideal of tolerance in a democratic na
tion. Later decisions did not consciously root themselves in these values.
Instead, Barnette was applied through a process of factual analogy with
out any attempt to understand what was really at stake.
Perhaps unintentionally, the Barnette doctrine was extended some
what beyond its original concerns in Wooley. In that case, an unconsid
ered and unenunciated extension of Barnette took place, and personality
rather than political conformity became the preeminent concern. Subse
quent cases reflect an effort to draw a line somewhere, but, again, this
effort was effectuated more by seeing factual differences than by making
principled distinctions. In Abood, the line was drawn between permissi
ble compelled financing of collective bargaining activities and impermis
sible forced funding of union political activities. In PruneYard, the
Court looked to the source of the compelled message, the opportunity to
disavow, and whether the message would be assumed to reflect the views
of the provider of the forum. Although these distinctions could explain
the results of the particular cases, they have little relevance to the first
amendment values central to the Barnette decision.
Ironically, the two situations that involved problems closely similar
to those that Justice Jackson addressed in Barnette were disposed of by
the Court with perfunctory attention to potential first amendment diffi
culties. In Abood, the constitutionality of the agency shop and the use of
the agency fee for collective bargaining purposes was easily justified as
applied to public employees; in Knight, restricting participation in the
meet-and-confer sessions to association members was upheld with little
concern for the rights of faculty members who did not wish to join the
association.
For the first time since Barnette, the Court seriously considered the
values underlying the compelled-expression doctrine in Pacific Gas &
Electric. It is too early to tell whether subsequent cases will continue to
address these basic questions, or whether the Court will revert to its
practice of looking more at facts than exploring values. As a cautionary
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note, the Court's willingness to look askance at the Commission's order
in Pacific Gas & Electric, but to find no first amendment fault in Roberts
and Knight raises additional questions about the level of doctrinal consis
tency the Court will achieve in future cases.
The area of compelled expression and association is ripe for rethink
ing. One alternative to the current haphazard analysis employed by the
Supreme Court is the use of the two-tiered method of analysis suggested
above. Whether this or some other solution to the problem is chosen, it
is clear that rational evolution of the doctrine is possible only if an at
tempt is made to understand the cases in terms of specific values being
protected. Clear boundaries for the scope of the values being protected
can be presented, and articulated choices must be made. Otherwise, the
Supreme Court and the lower courts as well may continue to drift from
case to case without any clear touchstones to provide a foundation for
analytic development.
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